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Abstract 
From an economic perspective the value of a group of related businesses under one 
management is derived from the potential for synergy, based on the exploitation of 
underlying economies of scope. To realise this inherent economic value, 
organisational theorists have argued that a purposively cooperative pattern of 
structures, systems and processes must be put in place. Divisions of modem 
multidivisional companies are internal, quasi-corporations of related businesses and, 
as such, theoretical economic/organisational rationales would posit divisions as 
cooperative enterprises. 
Using a sample of divisions purposively chosen to comprise businesses that were 
highly related, this thesis set out to explore the extent to which divisional managing 
directors expressed views and initiated organisational dynamics consistent with a 
cooperative perspective. Semi-structured interviews with senior divisional personnel 
in 12 divisions and with business and functional level staff in 2 of these provided the 
prime source of data which served as a basis from which a case study was written for 
each division. The cases were analysed in terms of the membership benefits (value) 
the divisional managing director was attempting to optimise for the component 
businesses and the extent to which he expressed a cooperative orientation and was 
overseeing cooperative structures, processes and systems. 
Two categories of division are identified. The 'cooperative' grouping is consistent 
with the theoretical view of economies of scope and cooperative structures but a 
larger number of divisions are categorised as 'non-cooperative' with perspectives, 
systems etc. consistent with a traditional M-form orientation of autonomous, non- 
interacting businesses. 
Reasons for this mismatch of theory and practice are discussed with the existence of 
non-cooperative divisions being explained as the consequence of a variety of 
organisational contingencies. Implications for divisional management and practice in 
multidivisional firms are suggested. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
"Complex systems have many important behavior characteristics that we 
must understand if we expect to design systems with better behavior. Complex 
systems: (1) are counterintuitive; (2) remarkably insensitive to changes in 
many system parameters,, (3) stubbornly resist policy changes; (4) contain 
influentialpressure points, o . 
ften in unexpectedplaces, ftom whichforces will 
radiate to alter system balance; (5) counteract and compensatefor externally 
generated action (the corrective program is largely absorbed in replacing 
lost internal action); (6) often react to a policy change in the long run in a 
way opposite to how they react in the short run, (7) tend towards low 
performance. "I 
(Forrester, 1969: 109 
1.1 The Beginnings 
This thesis investigates the strategic management of divisions, those quasi- 
corporations of related businesses in diversified companies. It does so from the 
perspective of the divisional general manager and those under him. Born out of the 
practical managerial experience of the author and the confusions that engendered, it 
was developed within the context of the literature on strategic management and the 
multidivisional fum and, in particular, the strategic issues of relatedness and synergy 
as they apply to business units within divisions. 
1.1.1 Practice 
Prior to beginning doctoral studies I had spent over a decade in general management 
positions in listed, diversified, multi-divisional companies in Australia and the UK. My 
1-1 
career progression was typical in terms of increasing breadth and depth of 
responsibility. The first business, part of a whitegoods division, was 'autonomous' in 
all respects except that brand marketing and sales were a divisional responsibility. My 
second tenure, in the same company, put me in charge of another consumer goods 
subsidiary with a functions contained within the business, thus increasing my 
managerial scope. After a spell in industrial markets within the largest division of a 
major Australian company I progressed to a managing director position running the 
Australian subsidiary of the Consumer Goods Division of a UK listed firm. In this 
position, various board responsibilities allied to the usual business operations as well 
as the management of overseas operations in New Zealand and Taiwan brought new 
breadth of responsibility. 
Upto this point, equipped with an MBA, numerous management courses, many books 
on strategic and operational management, various successful peer role models and a 
previous career working with people, I believed myself to be conceptually 'in touch' 
with running a competitive business. My numerous mistakes were errors of 
judgement, timing, care or specific ignorance and were all understandable and 
(mostly) rectifiable with hindsight. 
I was then promoted to the UK to take charge of the Consumer Products Division as 
the Divisional Managing Director. Reporting to the Managing Director of the 
1-2 
company I was now responsible for seven subsidiary companies in 5 countries. The 
scope and depth of my role had increased significantly along with status, power and 
rewards. The usual period of occupational disorientation always associated with a 
new role lasted longer than usual. Periods of 'inactivity"' seemed to be an increasing 
component of my day until I had to admit to myself that I had no real idea of what I 
was supposed to be doing. What was my role? Having evolved into a 'reward me or 
sack me but let me run it my way' business manager I gave the same leeway to my 
subordinate managing directors. I found, therefore, that except for the occasional 
(heaven sent! ) crisis where my assistance appeared legitimately warranted I seemed to 
have little of value to do. Two related happenings showed me that my fellow 
executive directors also struggled with the meanings of their roles. 
Enlisting the help of some noted academic consultants the MD initiated a major 
strategic review in late 1993/early 1994. Divisional MDs were asked to prepare 
strategy presentations for one of the several weekend retreats. The question was 
raised by a colleague (also encumbered with an MBA) as to the nature of the 
f corporate' strategy within which we were to ground our divisional strategies. A long, 
and at times heated, debate then ensued as to whether corporate strategies preceded 
1 This is a relative term by which I mean lack of useful activity as opposed to paper shuffling, 
attending or calling non-essential meetings, visiting businesses for no real reason etc. 
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divisional strategies or vice versa. It struck me that not only did I not know what a 
'divisional strategy' was but nor did anyone else, despite the fact that we were all 
comfortable using the expression. At a later date, when the presentations were made, 
it was clear that the distinction between 'divisional strategy' and 'business strategy' in 
our minds was mainly that the former was the plural of the latter2. 
The second event occurred later during the same strategic review process. As part of 
the review process Andrew Campbell (of Goold and Campbell (1987) fame) made a 
brief presentation on corporate strategy using the intuitively attractive and relatively 
new (then) concept of 'parenting advantage' (Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994). 
In addition he posed the more familiar, but still awkward, question as to how the 
executive committee, as a corporate HQ, added value to the diverse grouping of 
businesses under their collective management. The struggle with the ramifications of 
parenting advantage, and the superficiality of the proposed value-adding attributes of 
corporate and divisional staff again illustrated that our mental maps were guides to 
competitive strategy and portfolios but left us lost in between. Nobody in the room 
seemed to really know what divisional level people where supposed to be doing to 
2 By this I mean that divisional strategy was deemed to be the product/market growth strategies of 
the individual businesses. Also added to this was the 'divisional' growth plans i. e. greenfield or 
acquisitions in other countries. 
14 
add value above controlling business performance and preventing losses due to 
diminished performance or catastrophe. 
It seemed time to turn to the traditional standby of the strategic management texts. 
1.1.2. Theory 
Sun Tzu in the East and Aineias the Tactician (of Athens) in the West were writing on 
strategy in warfare over 2400 years ago while NiccoI6 Machiavelli's thoughts on 
political strategy, written in 1513, are still pertinent to today's public officers (Griffith, 
1963; Adams, 1992; Cummings, 1993). Within this context, literature on strategy in 
business management is in its infancy. Whilst embryonic conditions for strategic 
management as a discipline were well established in the economic and managerial 
literatures from the 1930s onwards, the 1960s are most often cited as the decade of 
birth (Whittington, 1993; Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1994). Chandler's (1962) 
Strategy and Structure, Ansofrs (1965) Corporate Strategy and the Harvard 
Business School's basic strategy text Business Policy: Text and Cases (Learned, 
Christensen, Andrews and Guth, 1969) are frequently nominated as foundation 
academic works with Sloan's (1963) My Years with General Motors being one of the 
first in a long line of influential practitioner autobiographies and insights. Strategic 
management became the new teaching metaphor to replace the "functional 
1-5 
integration" image which was the basis of business school education in the 1950's 
(Rumelt et al, 1994). 
At the same time that 'strategic management' as a separate discipline was being born, 
much research and theory was focused on the more behavioural aspects of the firm. 
While one of the major expressions is seen to be in Cyert and March's (1963) 
emphasis on organisational learning, work on other aspects such as structure in 
organisations (Woodward, 1970), the relationship of the firm with its enviromnent 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), management (Drucker, 1954) and decision making 
(Simon, 1960) have equally powerful lineages. From these early days the 'strategists' 
and the 'behaviourists' pursued parallel but (relatively) non intersecting research 
paths. The cross-over between the economics dominated strategic management 
literature and the social science dominated, behavioural stream was infrequent and 
superficial at best. The last decade, however, has seen a pronounced shift. The 
emergence of the resource based view (RBV) of the firm as a powerful strategic 
paradigm (Wernerfelt, 1984) has ensured that such concepts as knowledge (Nonaka, 
1994) mental maps (Huff, 1990), learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) and complex 
adaptive systems (Gleick, 1987) have become sufficiently mainstream in strategic 
management literature that a cognitively based paper by Bettis and Prahalad, 
1-6 
published in 1986, was the recipient of the first Strategic Management Jounial Best 
Paper Prize. 
Strategic management burgeoned into a forest of concepts, definitions, processes and 
issues. Despite the intersection with the more fundamental social disciplines, strategic 
management remains firmly rooted in practice with the earliest writings describing and 
explaining structures, functioning and trends in use in business and business units. 
Early business schools, most notably Harvard, emphasised a practical, atheoretical 
perspective by initiating and championing the case study as the primary learning 
vehicle for budding general managers. These case driven, utilitarian underpinnings 
have given rise to a diversity of, frameworks and theories (Whittington, 1993), 
definitional ambiguities, (Mntzberg, 1987) and an individualistic research tradition 
(Camerer, 1985) that still bedevil attempts at more holistic integration. 
1.2 Derinitions 
1.2.1 Divisions 
At least in terms of levels of strategy there seems to be a general consensus amongst 
strategic management authors. Strategic management texts uniformly teach that there 
are three levels of distinct but overlapping categories of strategy. Johnson and Scholes 
(1997) is a typical example wherein corporate strateSy dealswith the "overall 
purpose and scope of the organisation7',, (p 11) competitive or business unit stratejy 
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deals with "bow to compete successfullY in a particular market" (p 11) and 
operational orfinctional strategies deal with "the component parts of the 
organisation" (p 12). 
These traditional categories, are reflected in the archetype organisational. chart 
illustrating the linking of structure and strategic level. (Fig. 1.1) (Grant, 1991: 2 1). 
I Corporate HQ I 
I Scrvices I 
Corporate Strategy 
Division Al IDivision BI IDivisionCl Competitive Strategy 
Manufacturing 
Marketing 
R&D Functional Strategy 
Materials Management 
Accounting 
Fip, ure 1.1 Divisional Structure - in Theo 
This simple model is a useful heuristic device for teaching strategy to MBAs but the 
real world situation is far more complex. Mintzberg (1983) coined the term "multiple- 
divisionalised form" to describe "divisions on top of divisione' while others 
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acknowledged that structural complexity was often more characteristic than the 
simpler organisations represented in Fig. 1.1 I-Ell and Pickering attest that 
"... it appears that the divisions are often complex entities in their 
own right, thereby serving to emphasize that it is by no means valid 
to assume that there is a direct one-to-one relationship between a 
division, one distinct business and one end market". (1986: 31) 
Although still an over-simplification. Fig. 1.2 is a more representative picture of the 
typical divisionalised form. This reality is generally ignored, however, as (presumably) 
secondary to the main strategic issues. The divisional level is incorporated into 
competitive or corporate levels (Goold et al, 1994) or is viewed as an uneasy 
balancing act between the two (Jemison, 1985). 
Corporate HQ Corporate Strategy 
--I 
-SC r V-1 -cc-s- 1 
12ýivis on BI Divisio C ??? Strategy??? Division A 
PO 
r 
Competitive Strategy Business X rB-usiness Yj FB-usincss Z 
g 
Functional Marketing Manufacturing R& 1) Materials Accountin Strategy Management 
Fixure. 1.2 Divisional Structure - in Practice 
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As suggested in Fig. 1.2, however, the complications may not be merely structural. 
The neat split into corporate, business and functional strategic levels can still occur 
but leaves questions to be resolved at the divisional level. The strategic management 
literature has not attempted to answer these questions to any depth at either the level 
of the divisional unit; 
".. in the literature on the theory of thefirm, there is great silence on 
how those units that do contain interdependences should be managed". 
(Hedlund 1994: 84) 
nor the manager caught in the middle;. 
"there has not been widespread, systematic examination of (the 
divisional general manager) in multibusiness companies and the 
contribution they make to value creation. " 
(Jemison, 1985: 165) 
The diversity of modem organisational structures militates against tightly constrained 
definitions and so "notions of a theoretical optimum must yield to pragmatic 
initiatives" (McYieman, 1992: 22). The typical division is defined here as a self 
contained, semi-autonomous, organisational unit within a diversified company 
(Chandler, 1994). It has an M-form structure and comprises a group of related 
businesses which are functionally organised (U-form) and which directly interact with 
the customers, competitors, suppliers etc. of their particular product/market. 
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A division, as a group of businesses within a multi-divisional firm, differs from its 
parent in several way?: 
1. It does not perform the "public company" functions of the corporation (tax, 
law, investor issues etc. ) 
2. It is focused in a particular strategic domain and, perhaps aspart of a 
diversified portfolio of divisions, only has related businesses to manage. i. e. it is 
created out of and defined by the relale&iess of its business units. 
3. It is subject to the demands and constraints of a corporately imposed 
framework of systems, structures and processes so that, for example, human resource 
policies on recruitment, remuneration and promotion are often corporate constraints 
as are capital expenditure guidelines and limits and budgetary frameworks. The 
corporate parent has a greater flexibility in meeting market expectations. 
So the division has a less diverse range of tasks than the parent firm but has an 
increased depth of operational responsibility in a more focused arena and is subject to 
more constraints on its freedom to act. The division is similar to the multidivisional 
firm, however, in that it has a group of businesses to manage which are themselves 
semi-autonomous units. 
-' I am refeffing here to the 'typical' case. 
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1.2.2 Strategy 
The essence of meaning of 'strategy' and 'strategic management' as used in this work 
derives from the interaction of three orientations: 
9 The essential definition of strategy" is captured in the classical definition of 
Chandler (1962), who wrote that it is 
"... the detennination of the hasic, long-term goals and ohjectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of 
resources necessaryfor those goals. " (p. 13) 
Consistent with the views of Andrews (197 1) this definition incorporates goals atid 
actions over the long term but is grounded in an assumption of managerial 
purposefulness in the management of strategy. Managers are assumed to be 
purposive, strategic agents who are "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so. 
(Simon, 1947: xxiv). 
Hence a key assumption underlying this thesis is that management is a key strategic 
driver. Managers are beset by unforecast environmental contingencies, hampered by 
cognitive and perceptual boundedness and shaped by inarticulable recipes and 
routines. Nevertheless they have a sense of a desired long-term organisational fiiture 
and initiate short, medium and long term activities in attempts to enact it. Another 
implication of this overall view is that the long term viability of the finn, in particular 
relative to other competitive firms, is predominantly in the hands of its managers i. e. 
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over a sustained period those firms whose managers actively develop and enact 
'better' strategies will out-perform rivals. 
* Secondly strategy as used in this thesis is assumed to be manifest in two of 
Nlintzberg's (1987) 5 'Ps': perspective and pattern. As Mintzberg indicates, 
strategy-as-perspective suggests strategy to be a concept that exists in the minds of 
strategists or in the 'collective mind' (Weick and Roberts, 1993) of the 
organisation. It infers a shared view of the world, has much in commonwith 
culture and ideology, and implies the need to understand the perceptions, 
cognitions and intentions of strategists. Strategic perspective can be unconscious 
and deeply engrained (as with the routines of Cyert and March, 1963) and thus 
may be most eloquently revealed through thepattern of behaviour and processes 
throughout the organisation. Regularities in behaviour and processes i. e. strategy 
as enacted, may not be consistent with managers descriptions or aspirations i. e. 
strategy as espoused. In the case of a mismatch what is done is strategy. 
* Finally this thesis is concerned with strategy in profit-making organisations. In 
these firms it is assumed that the over-riding long term goal is the creation of value 
wWch is ultimately measured in financial returns to owners. Objectives may be 
couched in terms of 'advantage' over competitors or satisfying the needs of 
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customers, stakeholders etc. but ultimately these are intermediary steps in creating 
value for owners (Kay, 1993). 
1.3 Research Questions 
There was no linear progression from practitioner confusions via academic 
enlightenment to research project. Recursive wanderings through the strategic 
management literature led down the typical blind alleys before further exploration 
came full circle to the puzzles of practice. Practical relevance was a substantial 
criterion underpinning the eventual direction taken. While Mqntgomery, Wemerfelt 
and Balakrishnan (1989) argue that the need to show direct management applicability 
is sometimes a handicap in strategic management research Pettigrew (1995) asserts 
that such research must surmount hurdles of both academic quality and practical 
relevance. In accord with this Schendel emphasises that research is 
"ultimately of value when tested by its contribution to improving 
practice and organisationalperformance ". (1995: 1). 
Thus the research questions reflect an academic/practice mix 
1. What is 'divisional strategy' in theory? 
i. e. What is the value creating rationale of the division? 
2. What is 'divisional strategy' in practice? 
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i. e. What is the value creating perspective of divisional management and how do 
they purposively enact it? 
3. How are different divisional strategies reflected at business unit level? 
4. What practice implications emanate from a deeper understanding of divisional 
strategy? 
5. In what ways can deeper understanding of the divisional strategic role develop 
existing views of the multi-divisional firm? 
1.4 The Research Process 
Drawing on a number of authors and his own experience Archer (1988), writing about 
qualitative research and in particular case based research, suggests that, while it is not 
possible to establish sufficient conditions, a number of necessmy conditions for 
meaningful research can be articulated that at least "signpost major pitfalle'. 
1. Researchers requirefamiliarity with thefield. Whilst life experience may be the 
ideal background it can be also achieved through study of the relevant literature 
and personal exposure. 
2. The research requires an initial conceptualftamework or 'proto-theory' which is 
explicitly articulated in writing or diagrammatic form. 
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3. This ffamework should contain a crucial insight or conjecture which, while not 
necessarily generating disconfirmable hypotheses, provides a basis for questions or 
propositions to guide the focus of the research. 
4. The achievement of factual status is dependent on the demonstration of stability of 
the processes under study through a sufficient degree of replication in the 
methodology. Allied to this the base data should be available for comparative 
interpretation by other researchers. 
This thesis attempts to fitwrithin these broad guidelines. 
As indicated earlier the researcher had significant 'life experience' of managerial roles 
at the level of study both in terms of contact with others and though having occupied 
roles at that level. Also pertinent to the style of this research are the skills developed 
over an initial (10 year) career in clinical psychology. 
Though a review of some of the relevant academic concepts an initial view of 
divisional strategy is developed in which to ground the inquiry. 
Although the methods and analysis used are 'qualitative' and the overall orientation is 
towards theory development, sufficient replication is undertaken to ensure the 
robustness of the findings both in terms of their existence in a 'real world' (as 
opposed to statistically nuanced) sense and in a method/researcher free sense. 'Real 
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world' robustness serves also to further the practical intent of this work. Base data 
remains available for alternative interpretation. 
1.5 Contributions 
This thesis aims to make contributions to knowledge at theoretical and practical levels 
1. There is a noted gap in the strategic management literature in the area of the 
modem day business division. This gap may exist for any number of reasons. It 
may be that the issue is so self-evident that neither research nor deep discussion is 
warranted. On the other hand the general lack of senior management experience of 
most researchers may have contributed to a theoretical blind spot in an important 
area which the simpler model in Fig. 1.1. neatly covers. Notwithstanding the 
reasons there is a gap and it warrants exploring if for no other reason than 'it is 
there'. 
2. Whilst there has been a significant body of research on the relationship between 
relatedness and performance there has been little empirical work examining how 
relatedness is managed. Relatedness as a variable has been accepted as a given 
state and little has been done to examine it as a managerial process (Hedlund, 
1994). Divisions, being created on an i priori basis of relatedness, offer the 
opportunity to study relatedness. as perceived and managed by divisional and 
business personnel. 
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3. Synergy is closely connected with relatedness in the strategic management 
literature and is often given as a significant rationale for strategic actions such as 
acquisitions. Again there has been little empirical work on how managers perceive 
and attempt to operationalise synergy from related businesses. Given the 
theoretical and intuitive power of synergy more work in this area is needed. 
4. Multi-business management is a ma or focus for strategic management authors and j 
consultants and yet little, if any, specific guidance is available to the managers of 
the most ubiquitous multi-business organisation of all. i. e. the division. Only 
specific examination of real world divisions can underpin useful counsel. 
1.6 Chapter Outlines 
Chapter 2 reviews some of the strategic management literature pertaining to the 
history, rationale and management of the multi-divisional firm. In particular it 
examines literature on business relatedness and synergy and views these within the 
context of the resource based view (RBV) of the firm particularly in light of the 
RBV's commitment to the dynamics of learning and knowledge. 
Chapter 3 draws together many of the points raised in Chapter 2 to develop a 
theoretical perspective of divisions as internal corporations of related businesses 
wherin inter business and intra-divisional cooperation should be the predominant 
phflosophy and mangerial mode. 
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Chapter 4 describes the basis for the methodology, design and analysis of the study 
and the fieldwork undertaken. Practical issues and the relevance of the researcher as 
instrument in qualitative work are given emphasis. 
Chapter 5 presents descriptions and analysis of a set of five divisions that fit with the 
theory of divisional strategy as the exploitation of (knowledge-based) economies of 
scope. These are tenned 'cooperative' divisions. 
Chapter 6 presents descriptions and analysis of a set of seven divisions that fit with a 
view of divisional strategy as being the management of a set of stand-alone businesses 
where the focus and dividing imperatives of M-fonn organisation is the predominate 
driver of divisional perspectives. These are termed 'non-cooperative' divisions and 
exist in spite of theoretical rationales of cooperation as the essence of divisions. 
Chapter 7 discusses the value-adding roles of the divisional level and the division and 
offers views on the nature of the wdque value adding potential of divisions over that 
of the stand-alone businesses. 
Chapter 8 reconciles the theory of divisional strategy as the cooperative, exploitation 
of economies of scope with the empirical existence of non-cooperative divisions. It 
then goes on to draw general implications for practice in divisional management. 
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Chapter 9 revisits the research questions from this chapter and offers brief answers 
based on the theoretical and empirical inputs. It discusses the limitations in the 
empirical work and suggest directions for other research. 
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Chapter 2 
DMSIONALISATION, RELATEDNESS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY. 
"Yhe pure (conglomerate) Divisionalized Form emerges as a 
configuration symbolically perched on the edge of a cliff, at the 
end of a long path. Ahead it is one step awayftom disintegration - 
breaking up into separate organizations on the rocks below. 
Behind it is the way back to a more stable integration, perhaps 
a hybrid structure with Machine Bureaucracy at some intermediate 
spot along the path. And ever hovering above is the eagle, attracted 
by its position on the edge of the cliff and waitingfor the chance to 
pull the Divisionalized Form up to more centralized social control, 
on another, perhaps more dangerous, cliff. Yhe edge of the cliff is 
an uncomfortable place to be - maybe even a tempormy one that 
must inevitably lead to disintegration on the rocks below, a trip to 
that cliff above, or a return to a safer resting place on the path 
behind (Mntzberg, 1983: 252) 
Mintzberg's dramatic characterisation of the multibusiness form suggests a state of 
tension, ambiguity and instability and yet, particularly for large firms, it remains the 
most prevalent organisational structure in Western economies. Since their beginnings 
in the early 1900's in the US, two major questions have framed research, thought and 
practice in such multidivisional companies: 
A. What is the additional value generated by such forms? 
This is a question of econon-ks and essentially addresses the issue of the value 
inherent in having a group ofpolenlially stand-alone businesses under one 
management. 
B. How are they best managed? 
This is a question of organisation and addresses the issue of how inherent value is 
optimised. 
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This chapter reviews some of the research and thought that have gone into 
addressing these two questions. After briefly tracing the history of the multidivisional 
company and thoughts about the source of its value, the traditional concept of 
relatedness as an economic value rationale is highlighted, particularly when linked to 
ideas of synergy as manifest in the emerging ideas of resource based competences 
embedded in and driven by organisational learning. The second question is addressed 
through that part of the literature on corporate strategy that pertains to the processes 
of managing multibusiness organisations. 
A. Why Multidivisonals? 
2.1 Divisionalisation. 
Splitting armed forces into automous units capable of self directed action has long 
been a feature of military organisation form the cohorts of the Romans to the platoons 
of the modem British Army. Similarly, during construction of large transportation 
works such as the Erie Canal in the 1820s and 1830s, the road or canal line was 
divided into a number of "divisione' each overseen by an "assistant engineer" 
(Chandler, 1962). In both cases the dividing of force and task helped overcome the 
administrative and operational problems created by size and complexity and was 
consistent with the first principle of business espoused by Henri Fayol in the early 
1900s (Fayol, 1949). 
According to Chandler (1994) the modem, hierarchical business enterprise arose in 
the 1850s in the United States and Europe to administer the new railroad and 
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telegraph companies. Whilst an early organisational structure of self-contained units 
was evolved to cope with multi-regional systems in transportation and 
communication, a structure based on a split into functional responsibilities was the 
norm for companies of the day. Wiltiamson (1975), coined the term "IJ-form" (unitary 
form) for such functionally organised firms and argued that such a structure was the 
"natural" organisational response to multifunctional activities. 
"Specialization byfunction permits both economies of scale and 
an efficient division of labor to be realized -provided that 
control over the various parts can also be realized". (p. 133) 
Expanding size however, particularly where expansion includes diversification, 
compromises the effectiveness of the U-form through cumulative "control lose' 
effects. Increased difficulties in aligning functional and enterprise goals 
C'incommensurability"), more extensive coordination requirements between the 
functions making for control loss between levels Cindecomposability") and increased 
confounding of operational and strategic decisions compound the overall control 
problem (Wifliamson op. cit. ). As Chandler (1962: 299) puts it: 
"Yhe inherent weakness in the centralized, functionally departmentalized 
operating company .. became critical only when the administrative load 
on the senior executives increased to such an extent that they were 
unable to handle their entrepreneurial responsibilities efficiently. 7his 
situation arose when the operations of the enterprise became too 
complex and the problems of coordination, appraisal andpolicy 
formulation too intricatefor a small number of top officers to handle 
both long-run, entrepreneurial, and short-run, operational 
a&ninistrafive activities. " 
To overcome such problems a movement to an innovative organisational. form was 
pioneered in the early 1920s in America by Du Pont, General Motors, Jersey Standard 
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and Sears, Roebuck (Chandler, 1962). This innovation, referred to as the 
"multidivisional" form by Chandler and designated the'M-forre'by Williamson 
(1975), divided up organisational. tasks and responsibilities by substituting quasi- 
autonomous operating units Cdivisione), organised on brand, product or regional 
lines, for the functional divisions of the U-form. According to Williamson (1970) 
such a structure is both rational and synergistic i. e. " the whole is greater (more 
effective, more efficient) than the sum of the parts. " (p. 12 1). Chandler (op. cit. ) had 
also been impressed by the success of the multidivisional form, 
"Yhe basic reasonfor its success was simply that it clearly removed 
the executives responsiblefor the destiny of the entire enterpriseftom 
the more routine operational activities, and so gave them time, 
information, and even more psychological commitmentfor long-term 
planning and appraisal... 
7hus the new structure left the broad strategic decisions as to the 
allocation of existing resources and the acquisitions ofnew ones in 
the hands of a top team of generalists. Relieved of operating duties 
and tactical decisions, a general executive was less likely to reflect the 
position ofjust one part of the whole. " (p. 3 09-3 10) - 
Williamson (1975) noted that optimising the benefits of divisionalisation is contingent 
on an optimal structure. In his classification, thepure multidivisional (M-form) is one 
"in which a separation of operatingftom strategic decision-making 
is provided andfor which the requisite internal control apparatus 
has been assembled and is systematically employed " (p. 152) 
He divided this into two subcategories; type DI, "a highly integrated M-form 
enterprise, possibly with differentiated but otherwise common final products"(p. 153) 
and type D2, the diversified M-form. 
His classification included other, less optimising, structures: 
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Yhe H-form, whilst still a divisionalised enterprise, lacked the "requisite control 
apparatue' (p. 152) with the parent often operating through a subsidiary relationship 
with its divisions. 
The Transitional Multidivisional (M-form) is undergoing a process of adjustment 
where a "regular divisionalized relationship" (p. 153) has yet to be established. This 
can be in existence as a U-form moves to an M-form structure or wHe new 
acquisitions are integrated where the new divisions have negotiated "special 
autonomy" (p. 153) i. e. a temporary H-form. relationship. 
The CorruptedMullidivisional (Fd-form) is a multidivisional structure which has the 
requisite control apparatus in place but where the "appropriate distance relation" is 
missing in that "general management has become extensively involved in operating 
affairs. " (P. 153) 
The Mixed (X-form), whose viability over the long tenn "is perhaps to be doubted" 
(p. 154), comprises a mixture of the other multidivisional forms. 
Williamson's academic caveats about the need to balance operating distance and 
control echoed the practical concerns of Sloan (1963) when he wrote his 
"Organization Study" for General Motors at the end of 1919. He pointed out that 
while the du Pont company was reorganising ftorn a centralised organisation due to 
"too much centralization! ' (p. 46), General Motors' operating problems had arisen I 
from "too much decentraliýtion7' and it needed "to find a principle of co-ordination 
without losing the benefits of decentralization. " (p. 46). In Williamson's terms both 
were seeking to move to an M-form from differing starting structures, the U-form of 
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du Pont and the H-form of General Motors, but for the same reasons; to optimise 
operating and strategic effectiveness. 
Initially the economic depression of the 1930's discouraged other companies from 
adopting this apparently expensive and complex structure but the post World War II 
boom, with the consequent growth of large companies through diversification, 
encouraged its acceptance and rapid adoption. Whereas in 1949 less than a quarter of 
the Fortune 500 were divisionalised, this had risen to just over a half by 1959. 
Another ten years on, in 1969, only one fifth of companies in the 500 were not 
divisionafised. Most of this change was due to the finns in the Fortune 500 
purposefully adopting an M-form structure (from U or H forms) rather than a change 
in the composition of firms in the top 500' (Rumelt, 1974). A similar trend was 
evident in the UK and Europe (Scott, 1973, Channon, 1973, Dyas and Thanheiser, 
1976) although less so in Germany and France than in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (Constable, 1986). 
Such a rapid spread is consistent with the M-form having 'ecological advantages' 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1988) over other structural forms. However, the 
correspondence between rate of M-form adoption and chief executives with elite 
business school degrees and cross directorships with other multidivisional finns 
caused Palmer, Jennings and Zhou (1993) to suggest that coercive and normative 
institutional processes also had a strong part to play. Rumelt's rider that "structure 
I Rurnclt estimated that 53% of the change was due to increased diversification and 471/o to "the 
secular change toward divisionalization. " (p. 70) 
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also follows fashion" (1974: 149) was based on similar observations. Enthusiasm for 
M-form orientation went even beyond business effectiveness. Based on his view that 
"for large diversified companies, only one form is consistently successful - the M- 
form" (p. 17), Ouchi (1984) proposed M-form organisation and philosophy as a 
paradigm for helping with "the problems of managing (US) society" (p. 3). Open 
economies, like the US, interact with other economies in a way that requires 
centralised oversight by government. At the same time the individual states operate 
autonomously within 'strategic' guidelines of the (government) centre. 
2.1.1 Value of the M-form 
It is a stated or implied premise that to make economic sense the multidivisional firm 
must add more value than the sum of its stand-alone businesses. (Porter, 1987; Goold 
et. al, 1994; Mathur and Kenyon, 1997) and the search for the source of this added 
value has been the basis for much theorising and research (Williamson, 1970; Rumelt, 
1974; Teece, 1980). 
The value of the multi-business corporation can be represented in the conceptual 
equationý: 
V, = A, +B, +C, 
= A. +B, +C. +M, 
where: 
the value of the corporation. 
21 am grateful to my supervisor Professor John McGee for the idea of expressing these views in this 
way. 
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A,, B,, Cc = the net values of businesses A, B and C under the control of the 
corporation (c). For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that all corporate costs are 
allocated across the businesses on some pro-rata basis. 
B., C. = the respective values of the stand-alone (s) businesses A, B and C. 
the total net3 value of corporate membership i. e. membership benefits. 
Following the economic rationale that such corporate groupings have a value greater 
than the sum of the stand-alone constituent businessee then: 
V, > A. + B. + C. by the value of N42 
Thus the critical value factor for a corporate group are membership benefills. (NL) and 
the creation, optimisation and management of these benefits would logically seem to 
be the essence of corporate (i. e. group) strategy. 
in many cases (most according to Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994) K has 
proven to be negative i. e. 
A, +B, +C, +K<A. +B. +C. 
3 The idea of "net7 value acknowledges that there are a variety of "costs" of membership. These are 
more than the financial overheads of corporate staff etc. Examples of other costs include business 
time and resource invested in corporate or inter-business activities; the potential loss of 
entrepreneurial drive as market incentives are replaced by more focused, internal rewards that 
encourage "satisficing" behaviour-, the containment of business activities to a more narrow product, 
process or geographic range than might be attainable in stand-alone mode; the sustained cross- 
subsidisation of businesses that, in a stand-alone capacity, would be bankrupt; etc. 
4 For the sake of simplicity the notion of inter corporate relative value or corporate parenting 
advantage (Goold ct. al., 1994) is not dealt with here although the same principles apply. 
5 Note that, technically, only in the case of the corporate restructurer or portfolio manager where the 
intention is to sell on the business at a profit is it necessary that an individual corporate business (e. & 
AJ have an (eventual) value greater than it had as a prior stand-alone operation (A. ). Collis(1991c) 
points out that the sub-optimisation of an individual unit (s) to optimise the value of the whole is 
consistent with value creating corporate strategy. There are potential dangers of value destroying 
cross-subsidisation in such cases as managers justify longterm losses as 'strategic' or, "patient 
money". 
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When this situation prevails the break-up of the corporation is an economically logical 
strategy and proved a lucrative one for the corporate raiders of the 1980'e. 
The value of K has been seen to be derived from different sources over the history of 
the M-form. Organisational gains derived from the splitting of strategy into 
formulation (and control) by head office and implementation by operating divisions 
had a value-logic grounded in managerial efficiency and focus (Chandler, 1962; 
Mintzberg, 1983). This traditional rationale, allied to the benefits of size and scale 
(Chandler, 1990) seems an adequate explanation of the reorganisation of growing 
companies ftom. increasingly inefficient U-form to efficient M-form. However growth 
through diversification, and the M-forin as organisational progenitor rather than off- 
spring strains the power of organisational efficiency per se as a source of added value. 
From an economic perspective Teece (1982) pointed out that under the assumptions 
of neoclassical theory7 it is "virtually impossible to erect a theory of the multiproduct 
firm" (p. 40). It needs the reality of market and human imperfections, and the costly 
transactions these entail, to provide an economic basis for multiproduct organisation 
through the governance and scope advantages of hierarchy over markets. NMiile 
governance advantages reside in the realisation of internal capital market economies, 
primarily through the corporate office being better informed investors, scope 
advantages arise from the realisation of economies at operational levels. 
6 Collis (1991) points out that a significant loss of value is necessary before takeover-break-up-and- 
sell becomes a viable option. With typical transaction costs of 2% and an acquisition premium of 
20% a corporation "can be creating only 78% of the value that could be generated.. and yet still be 
immune to the threat of a change in corporate control. " (p. 6) 
1 Le. profit maximising entities, competitive product and capital markets, zero transaction costs and 
competitive equilibrium. 
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Governance: It has been suggested that the divisionalised form manifests the 
advantages of hierarchy over market mechanisms in economising on bounded 
rationality, attenuating opportunism, and reducing other informational, control and 
agency problems inherent in the relationship between the stand-alone business and the 
capital market (Williamson, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1989b). In stand-alone units, business 
managers can maximise their "on-the-job consumption7'(Fama, 1980) as well as 
taking advantage of information asymmetries and the control disadvantages of the 
market to escape censure for sub-optimal performance. As part of a corporation, 
however, the business is informationafly more transparent due to the requirement for 
frequent reporting and the use of auditing functions to maintain the integrity of 
information. Managers are paid at market rates but are compelled to perform to Mgh 
standards to retain their positions. Control advantages reside at corporate level which 
can intervene at an early stage to correct poor performance in one of its sub-units. IEII 
(1994) refers to these set of advantages as reflecting the "measurement" branch of the 
transaction cost literature which is essentially concerned with "measurement problems 
that exist under conditions of uncertainty. " Such 'advantages' have not gone 
unquestioned. For example the top managers of the corporation are free from 
hierarchical governance and are still in a position to act in their own best interests 
which may not be the same as those of the shareholders (Jensen, 1989). 
Scope: As well as potentially dealing with the tensions between markets (owners) and 
managers the multi-business organisation is argued to have value enhancing properties 
over stand-alone operations in the way that it can facilitate econonýes of scope of 
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specialised physical capital, knowledge, and managerial expertise (Penrose, 1959; 
Teece, 1982). In the case of indivisible, specialised physical capital, internal 
transactions are subject to managerial control devices. These attenuate the "costly 
haggling and other manifestations of non-cooperative behavioe'(Teece, op. cit: 49) 
which characterise external transactions seeking to extract the quasi rents potentially 
accruing to speciahsed assets in small markets. Specialised organisational knowledge 
embodied in people is also difficult to trade because of its tacit components and team 
embeddedness and the uncertainty of its value (Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1982; Ifill, 
1994). The uncertainty of the value of know-how compounded by information 
asymmetries between buyer and sefler is the basis of Arrow's paradox as a barrier to 
external transacting (Arrow, 1974). i. e. the buyer needs the information (know-how) 
to evaluate its worth but once he/she has the information there is no reason to pay for 
it. Similar uncertainties, but this time in measurement, accompany the sharing of 
resources between businesses that are involved in the exploitation of economies of 
scope. Again multi-business organisation has advantages in ameliorating the complex 
haggling and free rider problems inherent in market transactions (IEII, 1994). 
Another, more controversial, advantage of the M-form, this time over other 
organisational forms, fies its suitability as a vehicle for growth through acquisition 
(Chandler, 1994). Unfortunately for shareholders the apparent ease with which this I 
organisational structure facilitated the incorporation of other businesses into the 
corporate m6lange is argued to have therefore led corporate management into 
inappropriate acquisitions which later had to be divested (Porter, 1987). 
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The over-enthusiastic use of the M-form as a facilitator for takeover has not been the 
only drawback noted with this ubiquitous corporate structure. Ironically, given its 
potential for scope benefits mentioned above, it is seen by some authors as an 
inhibiting influence on organisational learning, knowledge transfer and cross-company 
competence development (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hedlund, 1994). In particular, 
the cross-boundary, "hetarchical" organisational context seen to support team 
learning is argued to be difficult to maintain against the boundary-enforcing properties 
of the M-form (Hedlund, 1986). It seems that the "division7l i. e. "splitting" 
characteristic of the M-form and the stand-alone operating it demands in some areas, 
is consistent with the strongly individualistic culture of the US and US managers 
(Hoskisson, IEII and Kim, 1993). A spill-over from this may be resistance to cross- 
business sharing of resources and knowledge which becomes an ongoing dynamic 
contrary to the optimisation of scope economies. Almost inevitably associated with 
bureaucracy the M-form can suffer from the impersonal, inflexible narrowing of 
perspective potentially inherent in such structures (Mintzberg, 1983). Rumelt noted 
dangers in M-form organisation. In his first study of diversification he saw "the 
decentralized product-division structure as the solution to the problem of managing 
diversity" (1972). By 1986, however, he was 
"... increasingly sensitive to the unanticipated side effects of this 
structure: thefinancial orientation it imposes on general management; 
the way planning systems in diversifiledfirms dive out subtlety; and 
the lure of exciting large-scale acquisitions and mergers to managers 
suffering the ennui of a moveftom an operatingjob to a headquarters 
position. " 
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2.1.2 Divisionalisation and Strategy 
At the same time that Chandler (1962) was observing that structure followed strategy, 
Edith Penrose (1959) was characterising firms as a "collection of productive 
resources" (p. 25) with the capacity of one of those resources, i. e. the management 
team, being both a significant driver and firnit to firm growth. She asserted that 
diversification was a manifestation of this view. 
"In a sense, thefinalproducts heingproduced by afirm at any given 
time merely represent one of several ways in which thefirm could be 
using its resources, an incident in the development of its basic 
potentialities .. (the firm 's) basic strength has been developed above 
or below the end-product line as it were... " (P. 150-151) 
Despite this early insight, the 1960-70's saw the strategy-as-resource view of the firm 
de-emphasised. Academic and managerial focus followed organisational economics in 
focusing on strategy as responses to the more powerfW determinants of market and 
industry forces. The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) relationship (Bain, 1954), 
particularly as popularised. by Porter (1980), became the dominant paradigm and 
'strategy-as-fit' to a relatively deterministic, (product market) environment the 
normative view (e. g. Andrews, 1971). 
Initially the intuffive logic of divisionalisation as a response to complexity seemed self- 
evident. Day-to-day operations and short tenn tactical issues were handled by the 
managers of the business unit or division while senior officers in the corporate head 
office, free from such distractions, focused on long term, strategic issues (Sloan, 
1963). The intuitive value of divisionalisation was further boosted during the 1960s as 
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diversification grew as a strategic imperative in its own right and acquisition and 
merger became am. ajor mechanism for growth (Chandler, 1990). A strategically 
driven corporate centre with self-contained off-shoots seemed ideally suited to the 
management of new businesses. While perhaps a response to aggressive anti-trust 
enforcement in the US, diversification for growth was endorsed by the market and 
reflected in the increased share prices of acquiring companies (Schleifer and Vishney, 
1994). Emboldened by shareholder approval, and armed with increasingly all- 
encompassing definitions of synergy' and faith in the transferability of general 
management skills, companies embarked on a diversifying buying spree (Chandler, 
1994; Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994). To accommodate the inevitable growth 
in ensuing administrative complexity, clusters of market-related units were established 
as 'groups', 'sectors' or 'divisions' under the charge of a general manager. i. e. not 
only was divisionalisation a reactive means of easing administrative overload from 
organic growth it also became a proactive mechanism for growth (Chandler, 1994). In 
many cases senior managers had no previous occupational experience of the 
operations and/or markets of the businesses which they bought and subsequently 
scontrolled' Seemingly, however, the corporate office had no need to fully understand 
operational details as its role was to formulate and oversee the implementation of 
value adding strategy which the divisional staff, who often came as part of the 
3 For example Goold et al. (1994) cite the example of the British Oxygen Company (now BOC) 
buying a manufacturer of frozen pizza on the synergistic basis that gases were used in the freezing 
process. 
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acquisition, implemented. Entire collections of new business units were brought under 
the corporate umbrella. 
Whilst demand exceeded supply and industries experienced stable growth, even 
relatively inefficient firms were able to prosper. By the early 1970's a more complex 
and turbulent economic environment highlighted the unwieldy nature of many 
businesses. These changes led to performance problems manifest in capital constraints 
and engendered a sense of crisis in managers of conglomerates (McKiernan, 1992). 
Senior managers sought different rationales and tools to manage their set of 
businesses. Their needs were seemingly met by the new portfolio planning techniques, 
and most notably, the growth share matrix developed by the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG). Based on the cost reducing properties of experience curve dynamics, 
the growth share matrix gave a cash flow rationale for business linkage, acquisition 
and divestment. When combined with the logic of risk reduction through 
diversification (Markowitz, 1954) the portfolio orientation seemed to offer salvation 
to overstretched corporate managers. 
The helicopter view offered by such techniques encouraged managers to correct past 
mistakes by divesting weak businesses Cdoge) and establishing a seemingly more 
solid rationale for the corporate mix than some tenuous definition of synergy (Goold 
et al. 1994). By the end of the 1970's nearly half the Fortune 500 companies were 
using portfolio planning in some way to deal with a collection of businesses that were 
often beyond the scope of senior executives to manage and control at other than 
arm's length (Haspeslagh, 1982). What started off as an aid to analysis became a 
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strategic paradigm in its own right and one that was accepted relatively uncritically by 
practitioners. This is understandable in the light of McKiernan's (1992, p. 15) 
assertion that although the growth-share matrix was being taught on all management 
degree programmes in UK universities by 1989, only 20% of this teaching was in a 
critical vein. While academic commentators (Day, 1977, Wensley, 198 1) were more 
circumspect and critical about the (over)use of portfolio planning the simplified and 
stereotyped application by consultants and managers was seen by some to result in 
caricature rather than strategic paradigm. 
"It has taken around a decade to reduce the Boston Consulting 
Group's idea to the demeaning illogicality of supporting the 
stars, milking the cows and kicking the dogs. " (Reed and Luffman, 1986: 29) 
Shortcomings of strategies driven by the 'boxes' became not only manifest in 
academic critiques but also in the profitable buy-break-up-sell tactics of the corporate 
raiders of the 1980's. By the late 1980's the requierns for portfolio management were 
many, 
"In most countries the days when portfolio management was a 
valid concept of corporate strateo, are past ". (Porter, 1987: 5 1) 
Not only did the technique of portfolio management receive the last rites from many 
authors but also the relative value and performance of diversified companies became a 
focus of research (Rumelt, 1974; Bettis, 1981; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). 
While overall results are equivocal (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989) with value 
being contingent on more than simple combination (Ifill, 1994), a high degree of 
negative consensus was achieved following a second wave of takeovers and, in 
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particular, the growth of leveraged acquisitions in the 1980's. Spectacular leaps in 
sales and profit per share of conglomerates in the 1960's and 70's were followed by 
even more eye-catching decline. In the 1980's a significant number of such diversified 
companies were bought as wholes and sold off piecemeal with the break-up value 
routinely covering the purchase price many times over. 
Illusory gains followed by concrete losses became such a familiar pattern that 
diversification and growth via acquisition was seen by some authors to be an ill-fated 
triumph of managerial "empire building" and short-sightedness over sound, 
shareholder-value driven strategy (Marris, 1964; Porter, 1987). Whilst undoubtedly 
true that self-interest is a rational objective for managers it is probably over- 
simplifying to attribute all diversification to this narrow rationale. It is equally feasible 
that managers believed they were acting in the best interests of shareholders (owners) 
as well as themselves. Williamson (1975) for one has argued that the corporate office 
can do better with investments than the capital markets. Owners (shareholders) clearly 
signalled their approval of unrelated diversification by boosting the stock price of 
bidders in unrelated acquisitions and diminishing the stock price of bidders in related 
acquisitions in the 1960s and early 1970s (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994)9. 
i. e. "'7he difference between the two returns is significant. It seems that 
investorsfully subscribed to the belief that unrelated acquisitions 
benefited theirfirms relative to the alternatives, which makes it even 
less surprising thatfirms diversified Theyjust &d what the stock 
market told them to do. " (p. 405, emphasis added). 
9 In the 1980s this value relation was reversed i. e. bidders for unrelated firms saw their share price 
fall while bidders for related companies increased in value. 
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Whatever the initiating reasons the subsequent, manifest failure of the acquisition 
strategv of many corporate headquarters also lead to a closer examination of the value 
and role of headquarters itself, after all it was they who had overseen the mistaken 
acquisitions (Goold and Campbell, 1987; Chandler, 1994). As well, the self-evident 
rationale of the multi-divisional firm came under scrutiny with the logic of the capital 
market being posited as a better alternative. Shareholders could diversify for 
themselves and there was significant cost and fimited apparent value in having a 
portfolio of potentially stand-alone businesses managed (or, perhaps more correctly, 
"administered') by a central group. At the very least, detailed understanding of the fit 
between centre and subsidiary was needed to avoid the value destruction seen to be 
more typical than value creation as well as a logical coherence of strategic orientation 
and style of management (Goold and Campbell, 1987; Goold et al. 1994). A current 
view of the value of many large, divisionalised conglomerates is captured in the title 
of the book Break Up! "en Large Companies are Worth More Dead than Alive 
(Sadtler, Campbell and Koch, 1997). The authors argue that dernerging most multi- 
business enterprises is the quickest way to create value for shareholders. The value 
added though the financial control, administration, tax benefits and personnel skills of 
the corporate head office is far outweighed by the pervasive value destruction of the 
business grouping. In their view single business companies such as Coca-Coal, 
McDonald's and Intel will be the long tenn winners for shareholders. 10 Ironically, size 
" Unsurprisingly these are not universally held views. 7he Economist of 5th April, 1997 (p. 79) cites 
various conglomerates (e. g. VEBA, General Electric, Samsung) that consistently and significantly 
out-perform the market. The article points out that these companies are not isolated examples as the 
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and complexity, amongst the original rationales for the creation of the multi-business 
firm, are now being seen as the reasons behind the need to break them up. The market 
had also changed its view in the 1980's by approving of related acquisitions but 
discounting the shares of unrelated diversifiers ( Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). 
This would seem to verify Andrew's wry comment, made over a quarter of a century 
ago, that 
"-diversification is often an illusory diversionftom the opportunities 
that a company is hest ahle to capitalize. " (1971: 40) 
Despite such questions about the structure and even the continued existence of the 
public corporation in its modem form (Jensen, 1989), the multi-divisional firm 
continues to dominate the Western corporate landscape. It is, however, perhaps 
becoming more a collection of related businesses (Williams, Paez and Sanders, 1988; 
Schleifer and Vishny, 1994) as relatedness among business units is assumed to 
enhance value. Unfortunately the relatedness-value connection is not clear cut. 
2.2 Relatedness 
The managerial and organisational value of relating is intuitively contingent on the 
degree of actual and potential relatedness. Relatedness, however, is a dynamic, 
interactional construct beset with problems of definition, measurement and value. 
Most authors (Ansoff, 1965: Rumelt, 1974; Porter, 1985) conclude that relatedness is 
primarily defined at market (common markets, products or distribution systems) or 
production levels (common facilities or vertical integration) to which Rumelt (op. cit. ) 
top quartile of American, Australian and European conglomerates achieved annual returns between 
1985-1995 which were almost 5% above the market average. 
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adds relatedness based on exploiting patents. More specific conclusions have proven 
to be less universal. 
Rumelt's landmark study followed Wrigley (1970) in moving away from simple 
product counts and industry classification schemes to "managerially meaningful 
distinctions among corporate diversification postures" (1974: 95), although later work 
demonstrated a high correlation between his categories and the simpler market-based 
classifications (Montgomery, 1982). Wrigley's (1970) classified companies into 
Single, Dominant, Related or Unrelated Product firms based on a 'specialisation ratio' 
which indicated "the proportion of the firm's annual revenues attributable to its 
largest discrete product-market activity" (Rumelt, 1974: 11). 
1. Single Product companies were those that had not diversified (SR between 0.95 
and 1.0). 
2. Dominant Product firms were diversified to a minor degree (SR between 0.7 and 
0.95). 
3. Related Product companies had diversified into new product areas but shared 
market or technological features with existing product areas (SR less than 0.7). 
4. Unrelated Product finns had diversified into totally new areas. 
Rumelt's taxonomy allocated companies to one of nine categories. Retaining the basic 
fourfold system he argued that Wrigley's use of the term "product" was broader "than 
is usually meant by the terne' (1974: 12) and substituted 'business' for 'product. He 
then made the classifications more precise by adding "related" and "vertical" ratios 
(Table 2.1). 
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Wrigley (1970) Rumelt (1974) Rumeh (1986) 
Single Product Single Business Single Business 
Dominant Product Dominant Business Dominant Business 
a) Dominant - Vertical a) Dominant - Vertical 
b) Dominant - Constrained b) Dominant - Constrained 
c) Dominant - Linked c) Dominant - Linked - 
d) Dominant - Unrelated Unrelated 
Related Product Related Business Related Business 
a) Related - Constrained a) Related - Constrained 
b) Related - Linked b) Related : Linked 
Unrelated Product Unrelated Business Unrelated Business 
a) Unrelated - Passive 
b) Acquisitive Conglomerate 
Table 2.1 Categories of Relatedness 
The related ratio is the degree to which a "common skilL resource, market or purpose 
applies to each (business) " (p. 29). A group is "linked " when each member is only 
related to one other and "constrained" when all are directly related to one another. A 
Dominant Business can be linked, constrained or unrelated while a Related Business 
can be linked or constrained., 
The 'vertical ratio" is a measure of the firmýs vertical integration and reflected in a 
"verticar' addition to the Dominant Business category. 
Finally, arguing that the true conglomerate is "acquisitive" he differentiated between 
the "Passive" and "acquisitive" Unrelated Business. 
His study of 246 US fhns over the period 1949-69 supported the performance 
superiority of the multidivisional form but questioned the value of diversification. 
Dominant-Constrained and Related-Constrained groups significantly out-performed 
the Unrelated categories. Significant among his general conclusions was that diversity 
per se, was less ftnportant than the way firms related new businesses to current ones 
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and that the reluctance of managers to invest in unfamiliar areas explained the better 
performance of the constrained categories, In a later extension of his work he merged 
the Dominant-Linked and Dominant-Unrelated into one subgroup of Dominant- 
Linked-Unrelated and ceased the distinction between Passive and Acquisitive 
Unrelated businesses thus reducing his categories to seven (Rumelt, 1986). Although 
finding the high retum-on-capital of the Related-Constrained group to be an 
"industry effect" he confirmed his original findings and in particular that the Unrelated 
categories were among the worst profit performers. Managing sameness or relating 
the new to the familiar did indeed seem to be a better way of creating value for multi- 
business firms. 
Rumelt's original study confirmed the intuitive wisdom of practitioners and strategic 
management authors that related business groupings made more sense in terms of 
value than unrelated ones and hence that management could best develop value by 
"sticking to the knitting" (Peters and Waterman, 1982). In accord with this view the 
founders of PIMS, the archetype of quantitative management guidance, suggest that 
one aspect of corporate strategy is to do writh "the design of a portfolio of SBUs that 
reinforce each other" (Buzzel and Gale, 1987: 229 emphasis added. ). 
The relationship between the make up of business groupings and their economic 
performance became a major research focus. While some authors were supportive of 
Rumelt's main contentions (Armour and Teece, 1978; Bettis, 1981; Teece, 1982; 
Singh and Montgomerie, 1987) a significant body of research was in disagreement 
(Channon, 1978; Cninyer et a], 1980; IEU and Pickering, 1986; Amit and Livnat, 
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1988). Factors such as industry structure (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; 
Lecraw, 1994; Montgomery 1985) and firm characteristics (Montgomery, 1985; 
Grant and Jammine, 1988) played important roles and, once these were controlled, 
'relatedness' seemed to have little explanatory power. Grant and Jamine (1988), for 
example, found that only 3-6 percent of performance variance was explained by 
portfolio composition compared with over 20 percent by industry structure and 
longitudinal effects. Similarly Montgomery (1985) found that relatedness had no 
correlation with performance variation once aflowances were made for the impact of 
industry profitability and market share. Using market-based measures of relatedness 
has produced equivocal evidence on the link between firm performance and the 
composition of the corporate business portfolio with few strong findings on either 
side and no consensus (Chattedee, 1986; Ramanjujam and Varadarahan, 1989; 
Hoskisson et A 1993; Robins and Wierserna, 1995). 
The problem with the demonstrated lack of relationship between relatedness and 
performance is argued to lie primarilyMth the validity of the traditional market or 
industry based relatedness measures (Lemelin, 1982; Markides and Williamson; 1994; 
Robins and Wiersema, 1995). Markides and Williamson for example claim two major 
problems with the measures. The first is that they provide an "incomplete and 
potentially exaggerated picture' (1994: 149) of the scope for exploiting SBU 
interrelationships because, while they capture surface characteristics of similarity, 
they do not capture relatedness of strategic importance. The relatedness that is really 
valuable is that between "strategic assete' which are important to competitive 
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advantage and cannot be quickly or cheaply gained by nondiversified competitors. The 
second drawback is that traditional researchers have tended to have a narrow view of 
relatedness because they tended to view the benefits as lirnited to "static exploitation 
of economies of scope" (p. 150) without taking into account the dynamic creation and 
accumulation of 'strategic assets'. Lemelin (1982) had earlier argued that taking into 
consideration additional sources of relatedness such as the sharing of technical 
knowledge, similarity of differentiation techniques and complementary product use, 
improved explanation of variations in firm performance. 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) also objected to the narrowness of conventional measures 
arguing that 
"'real diversity'in a managerial sense does not ariseftom the variety 
in technologies or markets or by the number of distinct businesses, 
per se, hutftom the strategic variety among businesses. " 
(p. 496 emphasis in original) 
They emphasised the idea that managers'perceptions were a basis for the degree of 
strategic variety and a valid basis for relatedness. Since then others have argued that 
the subjective views of managers are an important factor in strategic relatedness 
(Keats, 1990; Nayyar, 1992; Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997) and these views may be a 
source of sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1992). 'Totential" relatedness 
may be captured by existing measures but "actual" relatedness can only be seen 
through the eyes of managers (Nayyar, 1992) or even through their powers of 
imagination. (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). Relatedness then is a multi-dimensional 
construct and while traditional measures may have validly captured the degree of 
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market diversification (Hoskisson et al., 1993), they did not capture the subjective 
components nor the degree of multi-factor interaction (Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997). 
A more subtle but significant shift in the behavioural orientation to relatedness is a 
broadening of the term 'relatedness' to the extent that it becomes synonymous with 
'synergy'. This is logically and in practice not the case. Whereas relatedness implies 
sameness, whether this be in markets, products, processes etc., synergy connotes 
additional value or performance. Relatedness may be exploitable as synergy but it is 
not axiomatically so. 
2.2.1 Relatedness and Synergy 
The basis for assuming that relatedness is important in value creation is that it is seen 
in some way to be a necessary (but not sufficient) precursor of synergy. 
"Related diversification often leads to synergy". 
(Salter and Weinhold, 1979: 9) 
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary 'synergy' is "the combined effect of 
drugs, organs etc. that exceeds the sum of their individual effects" (emphasis added). 
while Itami suggests 
d7he goal of synerSy is to get aftee ride 
(1992: 44) 
Ansoff (1965) was an influential founder who emphasised the major importance of 
synergy for the firm's product market strategy. He encapsulated it as 'n +2= 5" 
although the definition he quotes in his end notes expresses only the concept ofjoint 
action. Trying to maintain a link with ROI measurement he classifies synergy into four 
components: 
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1. Sales Synergy - the use of common distribution, administration and 
advertising offer scale and efficiency benefits and the opportunity for additional and 
cross selling increases the productivity of the combined sales forces. 
2. Operating Synergy - as well as higher facility utilisation there is the 
potential benefit of common learning curves. 
3. Investment Synergy -joint use of plant, inventory, tooling as well as R&D 
carryover from one product to another. 
4. Management Synergy -a more qualitative concept for Ansoff without a 
direct link to the ROI equation, but seen to be an important contributor. He claims 
that it only occurs if the problems in the new industry are similar to the ones in the 
old. If not, then positive synergy can be low and "negative' synergy can result; what 
Sadder, Campbell and Koch refer to as "anergy" or "value destroying ffictione' 
(1997: 15). i. e. the concept of relatedness as aprecursor of synergy is raised here. 
Salter and Weinhold (1979) offer 5 different areas of potential synergy which are 
subsumed by Ansofrs categories which, in turn, are taken up by Porter's (1985) value 
chain analysis. Buzzel and Gale (1987) suggest that synergistic value is created 
through sharing resources or activities, spiflover effects of marketing and R&D, 
"similar" businesses (in terms of knowledge and skills) and/or a shared image. They 
also take the view that "'synergy' can be negative as weU as positive! " (p. 235) as 
their definition of "synergy" focuses on the performance of a cluster of businesses 
"relative to what its expected performance would be as the sum of its components" 
(p. 23 5). i. e. synergy is negative when the cluster performs at a lower level than the 
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potential sum of the stand-alone components. They suggest this as one reason for the 
relatedness-performance controversy. 
"Ais two edged sword of shared-image synerV may be one reason 
why researchers have not been very successful infinding significant 
performance differences between the related and conglomerate 
categories of diversified companies. " (p. 236) 
Attached to familiar revenue and balance sheet items and informed by the dynamic 
underpinning of commonality the potential benefits of synergy has wide intuitive 
appeal. Synergy became accepted, relatively uncritically, as a legitimate and, perhaps 
more importantly, as a purposively achievable rationale for corporate strategy (Salter 
and Weinhold, 1979; Glueck, 1980; Hofer and Schendel, 1986; Digman, 1990). As 
such it was a justification for much of the diversification activities of acquisitive 
conglomerates in the 1960's and 1970's. 
Examination of the subsequent failure of much merger and diversification activity led 
to a closer inspection of the underlying rationales. Using returns to stockholders as a 
proxy for the benefits of synergy, Haugen and Langetieg (1975) failed to detect any 
positive signs following 59 non-conglomerate mergers between 1951 and 1968. 
Chattedee, (1992) found that restructuring and asset disposal released more value in 
takeovers than synergy. Despite some positive signs (Brush, 1996) synergy is found 
by many to have been over-stated and over-stretched as a basis for corporate strategy 
(Reed and Luffinan, 1986; Alexander, 1993). 
"Benefits of synerjy are now truly legendary. Diversification and 
synerjDi have become virtually inseparable in texts and business 
language. Yet as every student knows, those particular benefits 
show an almost unshakeable resolve not to appear when it 
becomes timefor release. " (Reed and Luffinan, 1986: 34) 
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or more cynically: 
"... synergy means that the deal makes nofinancial sense, but 
(please, God) something will come out of it in the end " 
(Heller, 1985: 120) 
While accepting that synergy seemed "a nice idea but rarely occurred in practice' 
(1985: 3 18, emphasis in original), Porter was not inclined to dispensewith it 
altogether. In fact he argued for a focus on "horizontal" strategy to drive synergy as 
fe perhaps the most critical item on the strategic agendafacing a 
diversifledfirm. " (1985.318) 
He contended that the major causes of failure to exploit synergy lay in a lack of 
comprehension of the "interrelationshipe' underpinning potential synergy and an 
inability to implement the appropriate actions, processes and systems. He then 
offered, through his value chain concepts, a mechanism for conceptualising 
appropriate, mutually beneficial, connections. Similar views are echoed by Goold, 
Campbell and Alexander (1994) who, while warning of Miculties for most 
companies, agree that synergistic benefits are releasable through appropriate 
corporate involvement at the level of "linkagee' between the businesses. Bourgeois 
(1987) had also identified market, technology and product linkages as key areas for 
releasing value. The strong message from these authors is that synergy is not an 
automatic consequence of grouping, it is not akin to spontaneous combustion. It may 
rely on "metaphysical strategic insighte' (Collis, 1994: 145) and must be aggressively 
managed even for businesses that appear similar. In the same way that relatedness has 
proved to be a multi-faceted, subjective phenomenon so too has synergy. It seems that 
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Ansofrs (1965) "managemenf' category may be the most significant and yet it may be 
management that is the most lacking when it comes to unlocking synergistic benefits: 
"In a diversified corporation, management's real opinion of the 
value of synergy is revealed by how it organizes. Related 
operations are brought together wider a grouP executive. It is 
at this level that the strategic advantage of synergism must be 
realised But there is almost never any strategic staff at the 
group level Because group executives realize how little 
practical value synergism offers, they rarely employ even one 
strategist tofind ways to exploit it. " 
(Lauenstein, 1985: 50, emphasis in original) 
If management is a key catalyst in exploiting relatedness to create synergistic value 
and such synergy is based on internal 'strategic assets' then exploitable relatedness 
may be more comprehensible through the perspective of the resource based view of 
the firm. 
2.2.2 Relatedness and the Resource-Based View (RBV) 
What underlies the relative perfonnance of firms, their successes and failures is the 
central question in strategy and strategic management" (Porter, 1991; Teece et al, 
1997), with the concept of thefil of the organisation to its environment long being 
seen as an important explanatory variable (Andrews, 1971). Although Andrews 
highlighted both firm characteristics and external influences as important, economists 
working within the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm had long de- 
emphasised the internal aspects of the firm, giving prominence instead to industry 
structure and conditions and the positioning of the firm and its products within that 
11 As Rumelt, Schcndel and Teece (199 1) point out in a footnote (p. 6) they use the terms "strategy" 
and "strategic management" (along with "policy") interchangeably as they essentially mean the 
same thing. 
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industry (e. g. Bain, 1956). "Unfortunately, the academic literature on capabilities 
stalled for a couple of decadee' (Teece et al., 1997: 5 13). In what was an essentially 
static framework, internal competences were taken as a given to be matched with 
given opportunities (Rumelt, 1994). 
Building on tMs tradition, Porter's (1980) integration of econornic and strategic 
concepts triggered a mass of work on generic strategies and industry structural issues 
(Dess and Davis, 1984; White, 1986; Kotha and Vadlamani, 1995). Strategy became 
the seeking and maintaining of competitive advantage through cost or differentiation 
of products while dealing with the structural issues of entry and mobility barriers, 
substitutes and the relative power of customers and suppliers in markets and 
industries, i. e. a product-market focus. A key assumption was maintained that 
industry structure and conditions were the major factors dictating potential rents. 
These views were consistent with the exploration of relatedness at the product market 
level as epitomised by Rumelt (1974). 
Initially analytic research supported this primacy of markets over companies in 
deterniirýng returns (Schmalensee, 1985). Work that fbHowed, however, took the 
strongly opposed position that organisational or firm-specific factors explained more 
of the variance in returns than industry factors (Cool and Schendel, 1988; Hansen and 
Wernerfelt, 1989; Rumelt, 1991). The current strong consensus is that firms differ in 
meaningful ways (Nelson, 1991; Carrol, 1993) and that heterogeneity is important in 
explaining the persistence of abnormal returns over industry based expectations 
(Jacobsen, 1988). 
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Proponents of the RBV present the argument that the internal assets and resources of 
the firm are the key elements in strategy (Carr, 1993; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). 
Heterogeneity in these underlying resources and hence in firm performance has always 
been accepted as the norm due to differences in history (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), 
managerial talent (Penrose, 1959) and future and past investment conunitments 
(Ghemeawat, 199 1) to asset "stocke' (Dierickx and Cool, 1994). 
"It is the heterogeneity ... of the productive services available 
or potentially available ftom its resources that gives eachfirm 
its unique character. " (Penrose, 1959: 75) 
This theoretical stream is traceable back at least to Selznick (1957), who first coined 
the term 'distinctive competence' and Penrose (op. cit. ), who saw the rate of growth 
of the firm as hostage to managerial capabilities; the so-called 'Tenrose effect" 
(Marris, 1963). However the strong emergence of the RBV as a 'modem' strategic 
concept can be attributed to the explicit consideration of resources by Wemerfelt 
(1984) and the significant flow of work thereafter (Derickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 
1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993). Drawing on this work, Collis and 
Montgomery take the strong position that 
"Competitive advantage, whatever its source, ultimately can be 
attributed to the ownership of a valuable resource that enables 
the company to perform activities better or more cheaply than 
competitors. " (1995: 120). 
They summarise the properties of strategically valuable resources as being difficult to 
imitate and substitute, durable, appropriable and competitively superior. Imperfect 
imitability (Bamey, 1991) or mobflity (Petraf, 1992) must be a key feature of a 
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strategically valuable resource if it is to be the basis of sustained rent eaming. Collis 
and Montgomery (1995) suggest that at least one of four properties must characterise 
a resource if imitation is to be at least forestalled: 
physical uniqueness, i. e. "almost by definition cannot be copied" (p. 12 1); 
* path dependent creation, i. e. the accumulation process is a key component of the 
resource; 
9 causal ambiguity, i. e. it is virtually impossible, even for the organisation's 
managers, to "disentangle either what the valuable resource is or how to re-create 
it" (p. 12 1 ); 
9 economic deterrence, i. e. the resource is just too expensive for competitors to 
replicate. 
A complex integration of industry structure, product-market position and resource 
based perspectives remains the likeliest explanation of sustained out-performance 
(Porter, 1991). However the RBV has struck a resonant chord with managers and 
acadernics and has brought focus back on to underlying competences both as a basis 
for advantage for the individual business and as basis for exploitable relatedness 
among groups of businesses. 
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2.2.3 Relatedness and Core Competences. 
In a highly influential article 12 Prahalad and Hamel (1990) thrust the concept of core 
competence into prominence where a stream of other publications have since kept it 
(Hamel and Heene, 1994; Sanchez et al., 1996). 
"Core competence are the collective learning in the organization, 
especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate 
multiple streams of technology. " (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990: 82) 
Core competences are underpinned by intangible, people-based characteristics and, in 
particular, by organisationally-specific knowledge and learning. They are the "invisible 
assete' (Itaný and Roehl, 1987) of the corporation but unlike physical assets are 
enhanced by use. They support a few core products which in turn underpin the end 
products of the corporation. (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) or may be reflected in other 
strategically important processes such as Wal-Mart's fabled logistics techniques 
(Stalk, Evans and Shulman, 1992). Although discussed by Prahalad and Hamel in 
mainly managerial terms, core competences have a basis in the economics literature 
where they are seen as manifestations of economies of scope, viz.: 
"Economics of specialization assume a different significance when 
viewedfrom this conceptual viewpoint, as specialization is referenced 
not to a single product but to a generalized capability .. the organization 
theoreticfIrm ... selects an endproduct configuration, consistent with 
its organizational lechnoloSy, which is definedyetfungible over certain 
arrays offinalproducts. " (Teece, 1982: 45-46) 
and, more recently and even more specifically 
12 Heene (1994 p. xxvi) reports that by 1993 the article had become the HBR's most reprinted article 
ever. 
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"... the economic logic of exploiting economies of scope ... has received 
much attention in the business press, and is often known as "leveraging 
core competences " "competing on capabilities " or "mobilizing invisible 
assets. P. - (Besýýo, Dranove and Shanley, 1996: 179) 
Development of core competences is path dependent and causally ambiguous making 
them difficult to understand and costly to imitate (Barney, 1986; Dierckx and Cool, 
1994). As they result from "collective learning" derived ftom ongoing interaction 
-within a system, (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) and are embedded in distinctive 
coordinating and combining routines (Teece et al, 1997) it is unlikely that even 
individuals within the system can fully specify the competence or any meaningful 
causal path (Lippman and Rumelt, 1992). As such imitation by competitors is less 
likely because the source of competitive advantage is not reducible to an economic 
equation, simple behavioural routine, product or technology. 
The economic foundations for multibusiness firms are argued by resource based 
theorists to lie in the interrelationships between the business units and the scope 
economies therein (Teece, 1982, Peteraf, 1993). Strategic relatedness between 
businesses in the portfolio is claimed to have a direct link with firm performance 
(Robins and Wierserna, 1995). In line with these views Rumelt points out, that the 
core competence concept provides a new 13 and valuable insight for multi-business 
strategy in that 
"core competencies span businesses andproducts within a corporation. 
Put differently, powerful core competences support severalproducts or 
businesses. " (1994: xv emphasis added). 
" The -newnessý" of the insight is debatable given Penrose's (1959) simila observations with respect 
to diversified companies and Teece's (1982) comments on "fungible knowledge" underpinning a 
firm's capability which "lies upstream from the end product. " (p. 45) 
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Core competences also offers potential for further insight into the relatedness/synergy 
debates. Rumelt suggests that one of his original (and better perfom-dng) relatedness 
categories, the Related - Constrained strategy in which each business "draw(s) on the 
swne common core skill, strength or resource' (1972: 3 60) was a clear precursor of 
core competence but was essentially a static concept. He suggests that the power of 
ecore competence' over the original 'distinctive competence' as proposed by Selznick 
(1957) and developed by the Harvard strategists, and particularly Andrews (Learned 
et al., 1969), lies in its dynan& and integrative role. In the original conceptualisation 
'scom etencies are given, opportunities are given, and the strategist's 
job is to engineer a creativefil. " (xvi) 
i. e. competences were more static than dynamic. Another crucial difference, linked 
with the dynamic, learning-by-doing aspect of core competence, lies in the "proactive 
construction of competence' (xvii) inherent in Prahalad and Hamel's (1990) view. 
This offers scope for purposive enactment of core skills between business units while 
the original 'distinctive competence' was more constraining in its (implied) view of 
capabilities as a given. Baden-Fuller and Boschetti (1996) illustrate how resources 
which include competences and capabilities are built and shared in two cases of 
transnational mergers. 
Not all authors are as sanguine about the purposive creation of distinctive capabilities. 
Kay (1993) believes that "they are almost never created as the result of a conscious 
process of strategic choice' and attempts to do so lead "inescapably down the path of 
wish-driven strategy" (p. 125). This problem is due, at least in part, to the 
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acknowledged problems of definition and operationalisation that exists for both 
practitioners and researchers (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; McGrath, MacMilIan 
and Venkataraman, 1995). Given the proposed organisational embeddedness of 
competences, their dynarnic and holistic nature and their causal wnbiguity such a 
problem is perhaps understandable although no less of a problem through being thus 
understood. 'Tinning down" the "concept of core competence" is difficult enough 
(Segal-Horn and McGee, 1997) given that "there are almost as many definitions of 
organisational capabRities as there are authors on the subject. " (CoHis, 1994) but this 
difficulty is compounded when other descriptors are added. i. e. 
"Since no clear conceptuahsation of competence hasyet been put 
forward.. efforts to distinguish competences that are "core "ftom those 
that are not "core " are likely tofail on grounds of conceptual inadequacy 
of the underlying notion of competence per se ", 
(Sanchez, Heene and Thomas, 1996: 5, emphasis in original) 
Despite definitional difficulties, Prahalad and Hamel assert that core competences are 
the "central subject of corporate strategy" (1990: 220) and that multibusiness 
companies should see themselves as a "portfolio of competences" (p. 221) as well as a 
portfolio of products and services. They decry what they see as a dominant focus on 
SBUs in multidivisional firms being defined in the external terms of markets, products 
and competitors. 
""en the SBU is an article offaith, resistance to the seductions of 
decentralization can seem heretical. In many companies the SBUprism 
means that only one plane of the global competitive battle, the battle 
to put competitive products on the sheff today, is visible to top 
management ". (p. 221 emphasis in original) 
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The "tyranny of the SBU', if it promotes its own automous functioning, does not 
facilitate the complex interactions and sharing that are necessary for corporate wide 
development and exploitation of core competences. This ultimately results in the 
demise of core capabilities linking the businesses and thus impairs the exploitation of 
potentially valuable relatedness (Prahalad and Hamel, op. cit. ). 
2.2.4 Core Competences and Organisational Learning. 
Core competences are characterised as organisational knowledge underpinned by 
individual, group and organisational leaming processes (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Similarly proprietary know-how has been suggested as an important scope economy of 
the multiproduct (multibusiness) enterprise (Teece, 1980). While a full review of the 
vast work on organisational learning and knowledge processes is beyond the scope of 
this work, a brief look at findings relevant to inter-business core competence is 
necessary given the newly emphasised potential of core competences to underpin 
value in the multiclivisional firm (Rumelt, 1994). 
'Organisational learning' has enjoyed a long and powerful tradition in the 
organisational behaviour literature since Cyert and March (1963) made their 
significant contribution (Argyris, 1977; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Levitt and March, 
1988; Huber, 1991). Despite this history, the leaming-by-doing dynaniics of the 
experience curve (Allan and Hammond, 1975) was one of the few overlaps between 
the learning literature and the economics dominated, strategic management writings. 
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"A decade ago we barely heard knowledge-oriented terms such as 
'tacit knowledge, organizational 'competence'and 'capability, 
lintangible assets', and 'organizational learning. 'Now, rej7ecting 
path-breaking work done outside ourfield by organizational 
theorists... we hear them everywhere. ' 
(Spender and Grant, 1996: 5) 
Across a wide spectrum of strategic literature, learning (Hayes, Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1988; Senge, 1990; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991) and knowledge (Loasby, 
1986, Nonaka, 1994; Hedlund, 1994; Spender and Grant, 1996) are now seen to be 
central to the long term effectiveness of organisations 14 . The 'learning organisation' is 
a widely accepted ideal for the successful companies of the 90's (Garrat, 1987; Senge, 
1990(b); Garvin, 1993). So pervasive is this paradigm that, in calling for a new theory 
of strategic management, Hamel and Heene (1994b) suggest that such a theory must 
explicitly integrate the metaphor of the firm as a 'learning organisatiore' which they 
specifically tie into the core competence orientation. Amongst the characteristics of 
such a learning organisation the authors identify 
"transrationalprocesses such as intuition, symbolism and meWhors... 
(p. 319) 
The uncritical and enthusiastic promulgation of the learning organisation as current 
and future strategic model begs the question of consensus about the concepts of 
organisational learning in the primary literature. Despite a long academic history there 
is limited agreement on how organisations learn or even how to define organisational 
learning (Garvin, 1993; Crossen et al., 1993). For example authors are in 
" The creation, capture and exploitation of knowledge has become of such strategic significance that 
the 1996 Winter Special Issue of the Strategic Management Journal was devoted to 'Knowledge and 
the Firm'. 
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disagreement as to whether behavioural. change is necessary (Fiol and Lyles, 1985) or 
whether the potential for behavioural change, (Huber, 199 1) or merely the acquisition 
of knowledge is sufficient ( Stata, 1989). For some, information processing is the key 
underlying process (Huber, 1991) while memory and the sharing of mental models is 
more germane for others (Stata, 1989). Another important debate exists between 
those who support organisational learning as the result of the pooling of the learning 
of individual members (Huber, 199 1) against the view that there is a superordinate 
"collective mind" in organisations (Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
Given these exwnples of theoretical debate amongst authors at the heart of 
organisational learning research, it seems hardly surprising that strategy authors have 
tended to use the concept at a metaphorical rather than an empirical level (Hamel and 
Heene, 1994b). This brings its own problems however, as intuitive extensions of 
metaphor to meta-theory can be at odds with empirical findings in the primary field . 
For example fast learning, and particularly faster learning than your competition, is 
intuitively appealing as a source of competitive advantage (de Geus, 1988; Pacale, 
1990). Pettigrew and Whipp are typical: 
"... it is the ability to shed outmoded knowledge, techniques and 
beliefs as well as learn and deploy new ones which enablesfirms to 
cany out given strategies. To dofaster than one's competitors is 
likely to become one of the cardinal determinants of competifive 
strength in the 1990s ". (1991: 238, emphasis added) 
And yet Levitt and March point out that falling into "competence trape' i. e. 
developing expertise in inferior technologies is sensitive to learning rates. 
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"Fast learning among alternative routines tends to increase the risks of 
maladaptive specialization... th ere is a ten den cy. -forfaster learn ers to 
specialize in inferior technologies". (1996: 520, emphasis added) 
Sometimes slower leamers will survive and prosper over their quicker adversaries. 
Of more significance, perhaps, is the common view amongst strategy authors that 
organisational learning is axiomatically to do with change or the development of new 
knowledge or skflls (Pettigrew and "pp, 1991; Garvin, 1993; Crossan et al, 1993; 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) or even "re-creation" (Senge, 1990). Such a view focuses 
on the acquisition aspects of learning (Huber, 1991) and neglects the maintenance 
aspects (Skinner, 1953). People and organisations are continuously being reinforced 
for their existitig behaviour patterns through success, pay, social acceptance, 
alleviation of uncertainty etc. and thus a similar pattern of behaviour exhibited over a 
long period illustrates an organisation learning to sW as it is (Skinner, 1953; Cook 
and Yanow, 1993). This is captured by the observations that behaviour in 
organisations is based on Wstorically dependent routines (Lindblom, 1959; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982) which "adapt to experience incrementally in 
response to feedback about outcomes" (Levitt and March, 1988: 320, emphasis 
added). "Unlearning" (Hedberg, 198 1) involves understanding the ongoing learning 
process which is maintaining the status quo, as well as the content to be discarded. 
The almost legendary failure rate of organisational change programmes (Wilson, 
1992) might well be traced to a failure to understand learning as a continuous, 
maintenance process as weU as the adoption of new modes of operation. 
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Despite these difficulties a number of (relatively) consensual concepts about 
organisational learning and knowledge seem to fit with core competences as espoused 
by the RBV authors. 
1. Organisational learning is a process which occurs throughout the organisation on a 
number of levels, (Senge, 1990) and "core competencies are the collective 
learning in the organisation7' (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990: 82). 
Organisational learning and competences are multiple level processes. Two 
important levels have been identified as characterising organisational learning. The 
lower level comprises specific, ongoing activities and the higher level the "overall 
rules and norme'that govern those actions (Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 808). Lower 
level learning has been variously referred to as "single loop" (Argyris, 1977), 
"'routines" (Cyert and March, 1963) and "exploitation of competences" (March, 
1991) while the higher level learning has been characterised as "double loop" 
(Argyris, 1977) "exploration" (March, 1991) or, "paradigm shifte'(Kuhn, 1970). 
In the quality field Deming (1986) makes the same distinction when he contrasts 
working in the system (activities) with working on the system (the rules and 
norms). Levitt and March (1988) contrast the trial and error, search dominated 
mechanisms used in changing behavioural routines (lower level learning) with the 
transformation of givens, redefinition and frame shifting necessary for changes in 
"collective understanding7(higher level leaming). 
2. Tacit knawledge is increasingly recognised as a key component in the performance 
of complex, team-based tasks (Winter, 1987) - "a competence is a bundle of 
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constituent skills and technologies ... the 
integration of a variety of individual skille' 
(Hamel, 1994: 11). 
Organisational knowledge and competences comprises two significant, interacting 
components. The "tacit" (Polanyi, 1966), "experiential" (Kolb, 1993) or 
99 procedural" component (Cohen and Bacdayank, 1994) is a key aspect of skilled 
performance. It is personal, intuitive and difficult to formalise and communicate 
and is less easily forgotten than explicit knowing (Cohen and Bacdayank, 1994). 
The individual is unable to specify the exact nature of their knowledge nor the 
pathway of their knowing. 'Ve know more than we can tell" (Polanyi, 1966: 4). 
i. e. in the language of RBV proponents, "causal ambiguity" is a feature of tacit 
knowledge. By contrast, "explicit" (Polanyi, 1966), "declarative' (Cohen and 
Sproul, 1996) or "articulated" (Hedlund, 1994) knowledge is more consistent with 
cognitive knowing and can be specified or codified by the individual in speech, 
writing, drawings etc. The advantages of articulated knowledge are that it is easier 
to transtnit and is less sensitive to team embeddedness (Hedlund, 1994). These 
advantages, however, are precisely the features that make such knowledge more 
imitable and tradeable and thus potentially less durable as the basis of competence 
based advantage. 
3. Where the knowledge to be acquired is a complex process of skills and cognitions, 
learning is facilitated by ongoing group interaction. (Senge, 1990; Grant, 1996, 
Teece et al, 1997) - "building core competencies requires the accumulation and 
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integration of knowledge ... a rich pattern of cross-discipline communication and 
leaming" (Hamel, 1994: 28). 
While organisations learn through individuals, organisational learning and 
competences are manifest as more than the simple sum of individual learning (Crossan 
et al, 1993; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Nonaka, 1994, Hedlund, 1994). The content 
and processes of organisational learning and organisational knowledge are influenced 
by systems and structure and particularly by the dynamic interactions of people in 
teams. 
Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1991) point out that the structure-conduct-performance 
based models of Porter (1980,1985) and the resource based view of strategy are 
major attempts within strategic management to synthesise research and economic 
theory pertaining to the persistence of profit in particular firins. i. e. the long 
established empirical observations that 
'firms within the same induspy differftom one another, and that 
there seems to be an inertia associated with these differences. Some 
firms simply do better than others, and they do so consistently. " (p. 12) 
The resource based view has broadened the explanations of such success by bringing 
"learning, ambiguity, tacit knowledge, nonimitable resources and skills, the sharing of 
core competencee' and other such behaviourally grounded dynamics to a shared 
forefront with "mobility barriers, entry barriers, market pre-emption7' etc. (Rumelt et 
al., 1991: 13). In particular 
"Yhis perspectivefinds its greatest use in examining heterogeneity 
within industries and in the discussion of 'relatedness'among 
diversified husinesses". (p. 13) 
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Organisational learning, knowledge and core competences underpin the dynamic 
capabilities explanation of how relatedness, as congruence of resources or capability 
(knowledge), can be the precursor of synergy (Nayyar, 1992; Markides and 
Williamson, 1994). These factors support one perspective of the value of 
multidivisional firms in epitomising the fungible, tacit, team embedded, process- 
dependent indivisibilities for which transfer by market mechanisms fail and hierarchical 
mechanisms (multiproduct/multibusiness organisation) are preferred. (Williamson, 
1975; Teece, 1980,1982). 
2.2.5 Summary: Membership Benefits and the Multidivisional. 
The section on the value of the M-fonn began with the conceptual equation 
V, = A, + B, + C, +K where NL represents the value benefits of membership. 
Membership benefits have been suggested to include such general advantages as cost 
reduction from size effects (Chandler, 1990), transaction cost, including governance 
and scope, benefits (Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1982) and amelioration of agency 
problems between owners and managers (Eisenhardt, 1989b) 
A particular dimension underpinning the potential added value of M-form firms has 
been argued to be the degree of relatedness of the business units. Relatedness can be 
taken as an indicator of the potential for economies of scope or synergy and in 
particular scope economies based on firm-specific learning and knowledge. Significant 
research had been undertaken attempting to demonstrate that multidivisional value (as 
represented in performance) is a positive function of the relatedness between the 
business units 
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NL = (A, -, 
B,, Q 
where f (A, -, 
B, Q=a function of business relatedness. 
Results have been equivocal but this has been argued to be due to definitions of 
relatedness being too superficial and, in particular, not taking sufficient account of 
internal processes of the firm such as its logic of relatedness and how it manages that 
relatedness. i. e. relatedness, like its off-spring synergy, may be a potential source of 
value for the multidivisional but, like any resource or capability, its optinýisation is 
contingent on appropriate organisation and management. 
This chapter now turns to an examination of these critical processes of organisation 
and management in multi-business firms. 
B. The Management of Multidivisionals. 
2.3 Managing the M-form. 
Organisational processes, systems and structures are major influences on firm 
performance. Optimising value from U-form businesses is dependent, amongst other 
things, on cross functional coordination of separate departments in the service of an 
overall enterprise goal (i. e. the prevention of "functional siloe') whilst simultaneously 
encouraging the pursuit of stand-alone functional excellence ( Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Hammer and ChamPY, 1993). Similarly, whatever the source of added value 
attributed to the M-form, the realisation of optimal value relies on appropriate 
management of structure and process (Porter, 1987; Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 
1994). 
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From its inception, academics and practitioners have been aware of the problems 
associated with the management of the multidivisional firm and the particular tensions 
inherent in the issues of business control vs autonomy and centralisation vs 
decentralisation. Williamson's (1975) 'M-form hypothesis"" was dependent on 
"more than mere divisionalization" (p. ISO). The term W-form' was "reserved for 
those companies that combine the appropriate structural and internal operating 
attributes. "' (p. 151, emphasis in original). Sloan (1963) founded his reorganisation of 
General Motors on two principles: 
"]. The responsibility attached to the chief executive of each operation 
shall in no way he limited Each such organization headed hy its chief 
executive shall be complete in every necessaryfunction and enable/d/ 
(sic) to exercise itsfull initiative and logical development. 
2. Certain central organizationjunctions are absolutely essential to the 
logical development andproper control of the Corporations activities. 
(p. 53) 
It was only on looking back on his 1919 document that Sloan was "amused" to note 
the contradiction inherent in these two principles. While in point 1. decentralisation is 
maximised, i. e. operations "shall in no way be limited". point 2. immediately limits 
such responsibilities in the interests of "proper control". Accepting the contradictory 
nature of the language Sloan contended that "its very contradiction is the crux of the 
mattei" (p. 53, emphasis added) and that the basic principles remained "in touch with 
the central problem of management as I have known it to this day" (p. 53). While 
Sloan was primarily concerned with the relationship between the business unit and the 
15i. e. "The organization and operation of the large enterprise along the lines of the M-forinfavors 
goal pursuit and least-cost behavior more nearlY associated ulth the neoclassical profit 
maximization hypothesis than does the Worm organisational alternative 11. (p. 150) 
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corporate level, Lorsch and Allen (1973) also identified coordination between 
business units as key issues facing corporate managers. Business-corporate and 
business-business relationships remain a central focus of corporate strategy (Buzzel 
and Gale, 1987; Porter, 1987; Goold et a], 1994; MI, 1994, Mathur and Kenyon, 
1997). 
2.4 Corporate Strategy 
While "corporate strategy" has been used in an encompassing sense to mean all 
strategy within a business", most authors now identify corporate strategy with 
multibusiness finns. Porter's (1987) view is typical, 
"Corporate strategy, the overallplanfor a diversified company... 
concerns two different questions: what businesses the corporation 
should be in and how the corporate office should manage the array 
of business units. " (p. 43, emphasis added) 
Corporate strategy is concerned with the choice of industries to compete in, or 
"domain selection! ' (Bourgeoise, 1980), and with the setting of an organisational 
context for the operations of the component business units and managing the 
relationships between them (Ansoff, 1965; Bourgeoise, 1987; Andrews, 1987). 
Adding value through buying and selling businesses is one aspect of corporate 
strategy. Porter (1987) terms this corporate approach "Portfolio Management" while 
Goold et. al. (1994) refer to "Corporate Development" although they take a broader 
view and include the reshaping of existing businesses by amalgamation or division and 
the creation of new businesses by internal venturing. Porter's (1987) view that 
"' Some texts maintain this general usage. e. g. Johnson and Scholes (1997) 
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"portfolio management is no way to conduct corporate strategy" (p. 5) is endorsed by 
Goold and his colleagues: 
"Ae weight of research evidence indicates that the majority of 
corporately sponsored acquisitions, new ventures and business 
redefinitionsfail to create valu. e. " (1994: 82). 
In discussing the aspect of corporate strategy that is to do with the management of 
the multibusiness organisation Porter (1987) identifies three organisational/process 
concepts of corporate strategy: "restructuring". "transferring skille' and "sharing 
activitiee'. 
Restructuring occurs when businesses are acquired with the specific intent of 
achieving value by active intervention and improvement. Relying on superior insight in 
identifying such opportunities the long term view of the corporation is to sell the 
business after achieving restructured value. The centre needs the capability to effect 
such transformation and thus it exerts strong direct influence on business performance 
and processes. 
Sharing Activities is based on the component businesses using the same facilities, 
services, processes or systems and thereby reaping utilisation, learning curve (scope) 
scale or differentiation benefits. Management is based on inter-relationships but not 
necessarily interdependencies between the business units. i. e. the shared facility can be 
a corporate level activity. 
Transferring Skills is managing ongoing inter-relationships between the businesses. In 
this case the corporate centre actively fosters the sharing of expertise or skills among 
the businesses even thought they might have different value chains (Porter, 1985). As 
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with "sharing activities" the centre is actively involved but this time it is in developing 
and promoting linkages and interdependencies between business units. Research into 
the management and value of business interdependencies emphasises the delicacy of 
the corporate balancing act as any benefits gained can be dissipated by the costs of 
coordination as well as loss of focus, loss of perfonnance visibility and dirninished 
innovation in the business units (Thompson, 1967; McCann and Ferry, 1979; Prahalad 
and Doz, 1987). 
Goold et a] (1994) have also spent a considerable time focusing on the multi-business 
company and how its corporate strategy adds (or subtracts") value. They too identify 
three classes of corporate strategic management: "stand-alone influence"I "functional 
and services influence" and "linkage influence". They emphasise that these are not 
either/or choices but can all be in operation at the same time. 
Stand-Alone Influence is the value created by the influence on the individual business 
strategy and performance. The major focus is on vertical linkages mainly to the CEO. 
It parallels Porter's 'restructuring' category but is an ongoing process rather than, 
necessarily, an intermediate step between buying and selling. 
Functional and Services Influence is again a vertical process on stand-alone 
businesses with the focus on adding value through the influence of a range of centrally 
controlled staff functions. These may replace or augment those already in place in the 
businesses. 
" This is more than a technical parenthesis as the general thrust of their findings is that value 
destruclion is the norm in multi-business companies. 
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Linkage Influence aims to increase value through the relationships between the 
businesses. The focus is on horizontal processes and incorporates both the 'shared 
activities' and 'transfer of skills' categories of Porter (1987). 
Collis (1991c) also suggests an "exhaustive but not mutually exclusive" (p. 6) set of 
possible management roles for the corporate level in addition to the 'public company' 
functions of tax, legal, investor relations etc.: "intervening to change SBU decisions", 
(business units), "central provision of a resource', - or 
"coordinating behaviour across 
divisione". 
Intervening to change SBU decisions. This is done through either behaviour or 
outcome control. Outcome control is based on altering the incentive structure of the 
business managers and thus focusing his/ber attention on particular goals. e. g. the 
bonus of the manager may be linked to cash generation rather than accounting profit. 
In this case the specific mechanism for achieving the goal is left to the business 
manager. These interventions change a business unit's focus from that it may have had 
as a stand-alone entity. Behaviour control aims to directly influence business unit 
actions, processes, structures etc. e. g. the business manager may be required to 
introduce a quality programme, develop a range of new products etc. These 
interventions change a business units strategic and operating decisions from those it 
might have made as a stand-alone entity. Collis points out in the Cooper Industries 
Case Teaching Note (199 1) that outcome control is a feature of conglomerates (e. g. 
BTR, Hanson) while behaviour control is a feature of operating companies (e. g. 
Cooper Industries) 
2-50 
Centralprovision ofa resource. In this role the corporate level provides a service or 
function which business units use. If such services or functions become critical 
resources or competences of the corporation then use across divisions enables 
"leverage" of these resources which then become a source of "corporate advantage" 
(Collis, 1991b). 
Coordinating behaviour across businesses is "the traditional case of exploiting 
synergy between business units" (p. 4) and is based on exploiting scope economics. 
He argues that if there are scope economics between business units then "allowing 
each to maximise its own performance will lead to a suboptimal corporate outcome". 
(p. 4). 
Although terminology and emphasis vary between the three sets of authors their 
tripartite categorisations of corporate strategic management are simHar to each other. 
Allowing for a certain degree of terminological licence these roles can be seen as 
gmanagerial', 'functional' and/or 'inter-business'(Table 2.2). 
Value Role Collis (199 1 c) Porter (1987) Goold et. al. (1994) ý _ Managerial SBU Intervention Restructuring Stand-Alone Influence 
Functional Central Resource Sharing Activities Central Functions 
_ Inter-business SBU Coordination Transferring Skills Linkage Influence 
Table 2.2 Categories of CoEporate Strategic Management 
Managerial. In this most common value role the corporate centre influences business 
behaviour through its direct influence on the business unit manager in the form of 
behavioural or outcome control or a mixture of both. This can be directly through the 
reporting line as one-to-one contact of the business manager with his direct superior 
or as group meetings of business managers (e. g. monthly executive committee 
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meetings). Managerial influence may also be exerted indirectly through policy and 
procedure manuals, remuneration systems, capital and expenditure approval 
procedures etc. If this is the sole mechanism of corporate influence then the business 
is generally "autonomous" with respect to its operational functioning both in terms of 
corporate influence and in tenns of other businesses in the firm. The less direct and 
operational (i. e. behavioural) the nature of the influence, the more the corporation is 
consistent with Williamson's (1975) pure M-form requirements of arms-length 
influence. 
Functional. In this value role the corporate level contains functional "experte' either 
as individuals or departments who influence or oversee the equivalent function or 
process within the businesses or replace the business function entirely. When the 
function augments eNisting business facilities the influence can be a mandated 
interaction or based on business request. A well known example of the 'augmenting' 
value role which combines both prescriptive and voluntary use is the Manufacturing 
Services Group of Cooper Industries i. e. 
"In 1988, the Manufacturing Services Group consisted of 14 
professionals, all with 10 to 15 years of operations experience, and 
had an operating budget of $1.8 million. Its staff included experts in 
facilities, automation, and environmental engineering, and in 
materials management, quality control, and management information 
systems .. (R) used benchmarking and cross-referencing to improve 
production methods and had a bifurcated strateSyfor introducing 
the manufacturing improvements. In the case of new acquisitions, the 
group simply stepped in and worked with EVPs and their operating 
managers to improve plant efficiency and to transfer Cooper's 
manufacturing know-how andprocesses to the new division. -In 
contrast .. the group (never entered) an old Cooper's division unless Mery were invited by division managers. " 
(Cooper Industries Corporate Strategy (A) Case p. 14) 
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Although the businesses do not necessarily interact or share with other businesses in 
the corporation they are subject to direct corporate intervention in strategic functions. 
Intervention might not be mandatory, but the focus and resources of such corporate 
functions will tend to facilitate a level of competence that is difficult for the operating 
businesses to maintain and hence would be self-defeating to ignore. 
Inter-business: In this role the corporate level has staff and systems that actively 
develop and maintain inter-business processes. Business are no longer strategically 
stand-alone and, while not necessarily dependent on other businesses in terms of day- 
to-day operating, they are integral parts of a group system the overall capability of 
which is contingent on inter-business cooperation and shared learning. These 
common, group based, processes are often seen in terms of valuable trans-business 
capabilities or competences. The corporate focus on horizontal processes in an inter- 
business role differentiates it from the focus on vertical processes in the other two. 
Companies where this value function predominates are often described in terms of 
I'matrix" or "horizontal"" organisational structures. A well known example of this on 
a global scale is Asea Brown Boveri (ABB). 
"ABB Asea Brown Boveri is a global organization ofstaggering 
business diversity. Yet its organizingprinciples are stark in their 
simplicity. Along one dimension the company is a distributed global 
network. Executives around the world make decisions on product 
strategy andperformance without regardfor national borders. Along 
a second dimension, it is a collection of traditionally organized national 
18 "Cross-functional teams" are a well established integrating mechanism in Worm companies. The 
equivalent in a multi-business context win be the N-form (New-fOrm) context according to Hedlund 
(1994) wherein horizontal integration is the predominant organising dynamic. Somewhat 
confusingly N-form can also be a shorthand for "Network-form7 in some works but the essential 
connation of the two terms is the same. 
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companies, each serving its home market as effectively as possible. ABBs 
global matrix holds the two dimensions together. " 
(Taylor, 1991: 93, emphasis added) 
Within both 'functional' and 'inter-business' paradigms the business units cease to be 
autonomous in the conventional sense of stand-alone operation. They become 
strategically interdependent on one another or on a corporate function or activity they 
all share. The businesses are participants in or users of important strategic resources 
which they cannot unilaterally direct or control. Their delegated, stand-alone 
activities are fewer and more narrow and performance measurement is more 
ambiguous due to shared resources or activities. 
2.5 M-form Structure and Strategy -a Contingency View. 
It is difficult to conceive of a business without some degree of 'managerial' role of the 
corporate level. i. e. "All parents exert considerable stand-alone influence on their 
businesses" (Goold et al. 1994: 78) and 
"All corporations intervene to some extent to change decisions made 
in their business units because of the need to overcome the agency 
problem of business unifspursuing behavior in their own selfinterest. 
(Colfis, 1991c: 10) 
However there are differences between companies that aim to achieve value 
predominately or exclusively in this manner compared vAth companies that aim to 
achieve value by substituting or augmenting business processes or functions and/or 
developing inter-business linkages. These differences are manifest in systems, staffing, 
processes etc. Paradoxicafly, while espousing the fact that the various corporate 
management strategies are not mutually exclusive and can co-exist, all of the authors 
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mentioned in table 2.1 indicate the different philosophies, dominant logics, structures 
etc. needed for each approach. There is at least an inference that optimal performance 
is contingent upon a specific set of processes for each corporate role. Williamson's 
(1975) arguments for the optimal value of the M-form are contingent on specific 
organisation and Collis (1991 c.: 7) points out that 
"Corporate strategies which predominantly use one or other of these 
three roles to realize the value inherent in their resources should, 
according to contingency theory, align their structure, systems and 
procedures according to those roles 
In accord with this view, corporations do not need large corporate staffs if they are 
fulfilling a predominantly 'managerial' role whereas coordinating and integrating staff .. 
are needed if inter-business relationships are aimed to be a major source of value. In a 
similar way the structure of business manager incentives should vary, -, krith group 
based incentives needed for 'inter-business' oriented corporations and stand-alone 
incentives appropriate for the more 'managerial' orientations. 
As well as the view that organisational structure, processes etc. should be contingent 
on the corporate role, there is also the suggestion that the optimal corporate role is 
contingent on the degree of relatedness between the business units. Porter (1987) 
posits relatedness at some level of the value chain as a basis for his corporate 
strategies of sharing skills and transfer of skills. He defines unrelatedness, in a 
somewhat circular fashion, as "having no clear opportunity to transfer skills or share 
important activities". (p. 57). Similarly Collis (1991c: 9) links relatedness and 
strategy, 
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"Yhe importance of exploiting the resource interdependencies 
between business units in relatedproduct corporations, such as 
Kraft General Foods, explains, for example, why companies like 
these need more centralized coordination... " 
Hill (1994: 301) indicates that 
"Operationally, diversification to realize economies of scope 
requires the sharing of resources andlor transfer of skills between 
two or more otherwise distinct businesses ". 
and that such diversification is typically referred to as "related diversification". To 
realise economies of scope (synergy) from relatedness, cooperation between 
businesses is required. This leads to increased centralisation of functions and systems 
(Mntzberg, 1983; Child, 1984) and an increase in integrating mechanisms between 
businesses (Lorsch and Allen, 1973, Luke, Begun and Pointer, 1989, Alexander, 
1993). The performance ambiguities inherent in sharing facilities and functions are 
tackled by seeking more information on a broader, less financial, range of indicators 
(Mll and Pickering, 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986) and by business incentives 
based on group rather than individual performance (Lorsch and Allen, 1973; Gupta 
and Govinddarajan, 1986). This is consistent with the two corporate value roles of 
Functional and Inter-business discussed earlier. A value enhancing, cooperative fonn 
may be a sustainable advantage for a firm as its unique history and context make it 
idiosyncratic to the firm and thus more difficult to imitate (Hoskisson et al, 1993). 
Unrelated businesses have no opportunities for increased value from economies of 
scope and are argued to benefit from M-form membership due to the governance 
characteristics of that structure (Williamson, 1975). This includes the control and 
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informational advantages of a firm Chierarchy") over outside investors. Within such a 
framework the corporate office of the M-form takes on the role of informed investor 
and runs the businesses on a competitive basis as stand-alone entities who are rivals 
for capital which is allocated on a 'best-use' basis consistent with external capital 
markets. Performance incentives are based on unambiguous, financial outputs. 
Source of Economic Benefit 
Economies of Scope Governance 
(related businesses) (unrelated businesses) 
Basic Structure: Cooperative Competitive 
Multidivisional Multidivisional. 
operating and Business Some Centralisation Complete Decentralisation 
Level Strategic Decisions: of Critical Functions 
Interbusiness Integrating Moderate to Non-existent 
Mechanisms: Extensive 
Business Performance Mix of Subjective and Primary Reliance on 
Appraisal: Objecti e Criteria Objective Financial Criteria 
Business Incentive Linked to Corporate Linked to Business 
Schemes: Performance Performance 
Table 2.3 Comparing Cooperative and Competitive Structural Forms 
(adapted from Hoskisson et al., 1993). 
Table 2.3 surnmarises the strategy-structure-relatedness connection in M-forrn 
corporations and summarises some of the differences between the archetypal 
governance and scope oriented finns. 
in a sense the governance derived, competitive M-form, the "pure'M-for7n as seen by 
Wiffiamson (1975), can be argued to be the basic or "default" structure for modem, 
large multibusiness firm that are more than holding companies". While overall 
strategy remains the province of the corporate centre, functions important to 
I" This is my sense of the current situation and not one that Williamson for example might suggest. 
"Default" is used to express a sense of inertia, preference or standard way of doing things. To move 
from a pure default mode entails cffort. 
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competitive advantage and operational processes are decentralised. to business control 
and the businesses operate vvithout connection to each other. The performance of the 
business is judged completely on financial criteria and the incentives of the business 
managers are based on those financial outputs consistent with aligning the goals of the 
principal and agent2o who, in this circumstance, are the corporate and business level 
respectively. The structure and its principle values and philosophies are simple, clear- 
cut and have a legitimacy based on decades of manifestation throughout the Western 
economies. 
The cooperative structure and dynamics are attempts to move away ftom the 
"defaulf ' M-fonn in an effort to capture the trans-business economies of scope 
neglected by that structure. Thus functions deemed critical to strategic success and 
perceived as susceptible to scope economies may be totally centralised or at least 
subject to direct, functional intervention from the centre. The coordination and 
integration of processes across businesses mean that, to a greater or lesser extent, 
mechanisms to effect that integration need to be in place. Given an increased focus on 
processual inputs the measurement of performance and capability broadens to include 
non-financial measures (the "balanced scorecard') and more subjective behavioural 
criteria indicative of cooperation, communication and team endeavour. Finally, 
consistent with a more integrated view of the corporation, at least some components 
20 Consistent with the governance principles of the positivist branch of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
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of the incentives of business managers are linked to the overall performance of the 
corporation. 
In contrast to the optimism of multiple, coexistent corporate roles expressed by Porter 
(1987) and Goold et al (1994), 11ill (1994) points out that the "radical differences" 
between these two types of M-fonn are such that 
"... it may he difficultfor diversiftedfirms to -simultaneously realize 
economic benefitsftom economies ofscope aid efficient governance... 
Competitive and cooperative organizations- have dfferent internal, 
configurations with regard to centralization, integration, control 
practices and incentive schemes. As- a -result the internal - 
managementphilosophies of coqperafiveýand competitive 
organisations are incompatible". (p. 312-313, emphasis added) 
This means that cooperative and competitive philosophies are different strategies %rith 
different organisational and managerial arrangements. Thus if an M-fonn firm is 
comprised of a set of businesses some of which are related and others which are not, 
it is faced with an econon& and organisational dilenuna. While one resolution of this 
n-ýight be to focus on related or unrelated businesses and divest the others, another is 
through the creation of another organisational level wherein 
"all related businesses are placed -- and a pseudo-corporate office is 
installed-specifically to manage linkages among the business units. 
In this way coordination is removed as a corporate role. 
(Collis, 1991c: 9) 
This means that within large, diversified companies there are M-form groupings of 
related businesses which are run as quasi-corporations and that the appropriate 
organisational framework to optimýise the potential value of these grouping is a 
&cooperative' one. 
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These internal corporations have many names. In the academic/consulting literature 
they often qualify as SBUs and in practice they are increasingly known as divisions. 
2.5.1 SBUs. 
Strategic Business Unit (SBU) came into the strategic management lexicon after 
McKinsey and Co. recommended to General Electric (GE) in 1969 that GE 
reorganise into operational SBUs? '. 
" 7he general characteristics of an SB U were defined asfollaws., a 
unique set of competitors, a unique business mission, a competitor in 
external markets (as opposed to internal supplier), the ability to 
accomplish integrated strategic planning, the ability to "call the shots 
on the variables crucial to the success of the business. 
(Aguilar and Hammennesh, 1981: 3) 
These apparently simple, market based criteria were still problematic for GE as 
different Groups (collections of Divisions), Divisions (multi-functional single business 
units) and Departments (single function service units) all qualified as SBUs. 
Moreover, whilst 80% of the SBU designations were readily accepted by all, the 
remaining 20% "required considerable judgement" and were based on Fred Borch's 
"comfort index" with the particular business and the people running it (p. 4). The 
organisation chart 9 years later (i. e. June 1,1978) still had Groups, Divisions and 
Departments as SBUs (p. 10). 
Buzzell and Gale (1987) equate "Strategic Business Units, Strategic Business 
Segments, Product/Market Units or Planning/Control Unite' (p. 31-32) with "business 
unit" in their PIMs analysis and, like McKinsey and Co. /GE, use such terms to cover 
21 Fred Borch, the MD of GE, points that the term was "stolen (by McKinsey's) from a study we 
made back in 1957. " (Aguilar and Hammermesh, 1981: 3) 
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division(s), product line(s), or other product centre(s) of a company" (p. 32) meeting 
similar market based criteriaý2. The reasoning behind their definition is 
"that it represents the smallest subdivision of a companyfor which 
it would be sensible to develop a distinct, separate strateSy. 
(p. 32. emphasis in original) 
Once again an SBU, which definition entails a significant element of "sensible' 
judgement, can be as narrow as a product line or as broad as a collection of semi- 
autonomous businesses. In a similar vein Collis (1991c) uses "businese', - "business 
unit", "division" and "SBU' interchangeably. The pragmatic use of "SBU'is reflected 
in modem research where the term is often not defined but is used interchangeably 
with the stand-alone profit centres under analysis (e. g. Gupta, 1987, Golden, 1992). 
2.5.2 Divisions. 
initially a 'division' was a functionally organised business focused on one or a few of 
the major products of the company, i. e. it was the 'lowest level multifunctional 
office' (Chandler, 1994: 329). For example in General Motors fourteen divisions were 
initially proposed in 1921 with titles such as Chevrolet Division, Cadillac Division and 
Buick Division (Sloan, 1963). Consistent with this Harnmermesh (1977), in his 
examination of divisional profit crises, uses 'division' in the sense of 'business unit' 
and writes about the multiple levels of general management which "separate divisional 
and corporate management" (p. 125). In their significant work on corporate-divisional 
22 The PM criteria for a business unit being that it: 
" produces and markets a well-defined set of related products and/or services; 
" serves a clearly defined set of customers, in a reasonably self-contained geographic area; and 
" competes with a well-defined set of competitors. (p. 32) 
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relationships Lorsch and Allen (1973) use 'division' in the same sense of 'business' 
with 'group' being a collection of business units ("divisione). Similarly, Jemison is 
clear in his description of the role of the divisional general manager that he/she is the 
"business-level strategic manager in a corporate setting" (1985: 168). 
Even in the early days, however, 'division' was not used in a rigorously specific sense. 
For example the General Motors Corporation organisational chart of January 3rd 
1921 (Sloan, 1963: 57) showed the Hyatt Bearings Division, the Jackson Steel 
Products Division and the Remy Electric Division contained within the Accessory 
Divisioti. Continued growth brought ever more administrative difficulties for large 
diversified companies and by the 1970s more splitting and recombination was 
required. DuPont and many other companies pursued one of two solutions. They 
either fonned integrated business units within divisions "Nvhich coordinated and 
controlled a single product or very closely related product linee' (Chandler, 1994: 
329) or they joined sets of divisions into larger "group" offices. so that 
"... whatever the names used, by the 1970s most large multi- 
business enterprises had three (notjust two) levels of autonomous 
planning and administrative offices... Ae business unit normally 
operated through thefunctional U-form structure; the divisions, 
like the corporate office, operated through a version of the M-form 
structure with its own staff and senior executives responsible for 
profit, market share, and other measures ofperformance. 
(Chandler op. cit: 329) 
i. e. a 'division' became a collection of business units or "the highest-level office 
where senior line executives had profit responsibility" (Chandler, op. cit:. 329). IEII 
and Pickering's (1986) investigation of performance of divisionalised UK companies 
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uses 'division' in this sense. So too does Bart (1993) in his examination of the control 
of new and existing products and Barton et al. (1992) in their study of investment 
decisions in large divisionalised companies. Goold et al (1994) discuss the sharing of 
"parenting"' responsibilities between the corporate layer and the level below which is 
often called a "division" and 
"tjpically has prime responsibilityfor stand-alone influence on 
the individual business units andfor linkages within the division. 
(p. 407) 
In UK companies in particular, "division" as an M-form organisation of market 
related business is the common usage of the term.. 
e. g. GKN Automotive Driveline Division: 
".. comprises companies worldwide manufacturing constant velocity 
joints mid dIveshafts, propeller shafts, viscous control units, mid 
related companies producing transmission products and catalytic 
converter substrates ". (GKN in Brief 1995 23: 11) 
and Caradon Plumbing Divisioti 
"Includes Europe's largest manufacturer of radiators, the UK market 
leader in showers and leading manufacturers of bathrooms, boilers 
and drainage systems in the UK. Ae companies in this division have 
similar distribution and installer channels ". 
(1996 Annual Report: 2) 
2.5.3 Divisional Strategy -a Dilemma 
The M-form organisation evolved in response to managerial difficulties inherent in the 
complexities of growing and diversifying companies (Chandler, 1962). i. e. as an 
efficiency enhancing structure which reduced diseconomies of scope by fomialising 
23 A GKN produced guide to the GKN group and its products and services worldwide. 
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horizontal (product, region etc. ) and vertical (strategic vs operational responsibilities) 
task and role differentiation and focus. The "autonomy" that was consequently ceded 
to various units, however, changed from being a an organisational"tactic" to 
becoming a theoretically important property underpinning the "arms-length", 
governance-derived value of &versifled multiclivisional firms over a the same set of 
individually owned (by the shareholder) businesses (Williamson, 1975). Hence 'M- 
form" came to entail a philosophy and culture which institutionalised autonomous 
functioning of sub-units as an end and value in itself Athemethathasrun 
throughout this chapter has been the dilemma or tension that, therefore, exists 
between this ideal of autonomy and efficiency-enhancing "splitting", and the holistic 
integration of knowledge and skill suggested by some to be the basis of the value of 
related businesses under one management (e. g. Teece, 1982). i. e. whereas the M-form 
decomposes complex processes and organisations into simpler management tasks and 
sub units, the know-how and learning processes theorised to create value from 
relatedness of business units is dependant on connection and conjunction. 
This is a particular issue for divisions which, by design, are made up of related 
business units. Theory and research outlined in the foregoing review indicates that 
relatedness has the potential to underpin additional value (synergy) if it is 
appropriately exploited through cooperative processes, systems and structures. But 
the division is an off-spring of the M-form. It has feasibly been created purely in the 
interests of administrative efficiency. If this is the case then it is possible that the 
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inherited competitive perspectives and patterns of the traditional M-form will still be 
manifest as divisional strategy despite the relatedness of the business units. 
The following chapter expands further on this dilemma. 
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Chapter 3 
DIVISIONAL STRATEGY - SCOPE ECONOMIES AND COOPERATION 
"But before we get carried away with the heroic nature of choice, 
we should be sure what we mean by this... Are these values-in-tension 
really alternatives, one of which must be chopped off by the 'sword 
of decision'? 
(Hampden-Tumer, 1990: 8) 
The first question this thesis addressed itself to was 'Vhat is 'divisional strategy' in 
theory? " (An answer to this, detailed below, is derived from the Chapter 2 review of 
literature and research on the multidivisional firm and gives emphasis to the creation 
of additional value through the exploitation of economies of scope embedded in the 
relatedness of the business units. This answer, however, leads to the question of how 
this theory is supported by practice and particularly in the views and practices of 
divisional managing directors. 
3.1 Divisional Strategy 
In discussing strategic management Hampden-Turner (1990) identifies eight "key 
dilemmae'of which the first is "functional coordination" which, following Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967), is: 
"Given the pressure forevermore differentiatýdfiunctions to pursue 
their own criteria of specialized excellence, is it also possible to 
integrate these divisions of Jabour at equally high levels of coordination 
and balance? " (p. 35) 
This is a dilemma facing divisional management but at a higher level of choice than 
that of the business manager. The functions of a business unit are, by dýfinifion, 
interdependent None of the functional specialities has stand-alone existence without 
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the others. The survival of each, and of the whole business, is contingent on some 
degree of cooperation'. This is not necessarily so within divisions. Divisional business 
units are related but not necessarily interdependent, except perhaps in the weakest 
sense of "pooled interdependence" (Thompson, 1967) wherein the failure of one unit 
rnight endanger the financial viability of the division as a whole'. Thus, while the 
necessity for some form of cooperation only leaves the business manager with choices 
about how to manage linkages, divisional management has the more fundamental 
choice about whether to manage linkages at all. i. e. divisional management chooses 
the extent to which the businesses become dependent on facilities, expertise or 
functions outside of themselves. 
One of these themes reviewed in Chapter 2 concerned the elusiveness of any 
consistent empirical demonstration of a positive relationship between relatedness and 
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performance. Both for researchers and practitioners it has seemed intuitively 
'obvious' that synergy (variously referred to as econornies of scoPe, the whole being 
greater than the sum of the parts, 2+2+5, and so on) is derived from relatedness 
(sameness or commonality), 
i. e. "Operationally, diversification to realize economies of scope requires 
the sharing of resources andlor transfer of skills between two or more 
otherwise distinct businesses. Authors in the management literature 
"ically refer to such diversification as related diversification... 
1 Note that the trend to "outsourcing7 does not negate this. 
2 Under typical circumstances even vertically integrated, intcr-trading businesses within divisions 
could operate on a stand-alone basis by trading with outside firms. Indeed experience suggests that 
sister businesses would often prefer to trade in the open market and often do so if corporate policy 
allows it even if such outside trading is clearly to the detriment of the division/corporation as a 
whole. 
3 Ansoff (1965) is an example who represents a conjunction of both academic and practitioner 
having been general manager of the Lockheed Electronic Company (New Jersey). 
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By definition such diversification must occur in an area that has some 
commonality with the existing businesses of thefinn whether in terms 
of manufacturing, marketing, R&A or some other area ". 
(Hill, 1994: 301 - emphasis in original) 
Following this line it has been suggested that, to realise the additional value inherent 
in relatedness, strategic management of such businesses needs to be grounded in 
perspectives and patterns of cooperation between the units (Hill, 1994). This despite 
the fact that such organisational cooperation entails the addition of costly mechanisms 
of linkage, integration and control; increased ambiguity of measurement and increased 
complexity and tensions in business - Centre relationshipe. i. e. the economic value- 
logic of relatedness acts as an imperative for cooperative philosophies, structures etc. 
despite the attendant organisational complexities. 
3.2 Divisional Economic Value - Membership Benefits 
The value-logic of divisions can be represented in an equation where, in parallel with 
the value logic of corporations, the division is designed to be worth more5 than the 
sum of its stand-alone operations. 
To fulfil this divisions create synergy or membership benefits where% 
Vdi, a. b. 
4 Conversely the optimal orientation for unrelated businesses is proposed to be a competitive one 
where the businesses are managed at arms length as stand-alone entities with few, if any, ongoing 
intcr-connections (IEU, 19941). Costly integrating/linking mechanisms, including head office staff, 
need not be established; performance is business specific and easily measured as financial outputs; 
and the "decentralisation contract7 (Goold et al., 1994) is more clearly delineated and less subject to 
ongoing haggle and Conflict. In the purest sense of a competitive structure the businesses receive 
capital on a "best use" basis (Williamson, 1975) i. e. those that can make the best returns on the 
capital are first in line when it is allocated. 
I The niceties of equal value or relative value (to other divisions) arc ignored here but the logic is the 
same. 
in this case "stand-alone' can mean autonomous functioning inside or outside of the corporation. 
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withVdiv= the value of the division 
a,, b,, c,, = the stand-alone value of the divisional business units a, b and c. 
or Vdiv =%+b. + c. + N4div 
where NU,, = the net value of divisional membership. 
Divisions are created by putting related businesses under one line of management with 
the expectation of gaining additional value or synergyfrom that relatedness. 
Membership value is then a (significant) function of business relatedness. 
Mi, = (ab, c) 
3.2.1 Sources of Divisional Value (Mdj, ) 
The economic rationale of the division is based on economies of scope inherent in the 
relatedness of its component businesses. The research on the performance-relatedness 
link has shown that relatedness per se is no guarantee of added value. Sfinflarity on a 
number of dimensions does not necessarily ensure the achievement of economics of 
scope. The way that managers conceive and perceive relatedness, Le. their mental 
maps or "dominant logics". and manage it have been argued to be key catalysts in the 
transformation of relatedness-as-similarity to relatedness-as-value or exploitable 
relatedness (Lernelin, 1982; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Nayyar, 1992; Markides and 
Williamson, 1994; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997). 
The corporate strategy literature has tended to focus on how the centre manages its 
group of businesses and the value added by the corporate level (e. g. Porter 1987; 
Goold et al.., 1994). In the previous chapter, three broad categories summarisirig such 
multi-business 'Wue rolee' were suggested: Managerial, Functional and Inter- 
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business. The Managerial role incorporates the direct influence the centre has on 
business management or functions; the Functional role comprises management of 
functions, services or business activities at the centre and the Inter-business role 
represents central management of linkages between the business units. Inherent in 
these roles are sources of membership benefits that are being exploited i. e. the value 
gained from membershipftom the perspective of the businesses. 
Membership categories are contingent on the exploitation of business relatedness but 
differ in terms of 1) the direction of interaction that underpins the value and 2) the 
degree to which the value originates ftom aprocess orpositional characteristic. 
1) Direction: 
Membership benefits are logically derived from the interaction of the business and the 
divisional level (i. e. a vertical "synergy) or on interactions with the other businesses 
(i. e. horizontal "synergy"). While value from horizontal interactions may still require 
aggressive divisional (vertical) management for it to become manifest the source of 
the values Hes in the relationships between the businesses. 
2) Process or Positional: 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) define managerial and organisational processes as 
"the way things are done in thefirm... its routines or patterns of 
currentpractice and learning" (p. 518) 
and position as 
"current specific endowments of technoloV, intellectualproperty, 
complementary assets, customer base and its external relationships 
with suppliers and complementors. " (p 118). 
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Whileprocess-based value is more akin to a dynamic capability, based on ongoing, 
mutual learning, position-based value derives from specific endowments, 
characteristics, assets or attributes and is more fixed and tangible although (often) the 
current outcome of past processes. The boundary between these two value domains is 
blurred but still sufficient to support conceptual distinction. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the interactions of value source and direction of interaction and 
suggests four broad categories of membership benefits at the intersections. (The 
broken lines in the table indicate the overlap of the categories and the permeability of 
the boundaries between them. ) 
Source of Value 
Process Position 
Vertical GUIDANCE FACILITIES 
Direction of 
........................... ------------------------- 
Interaction Horizontal TEAM GROUP 
Figgre 3.1 A Matrix of Divisional Membership Benefits 
Guidance: 
Consistent with Managerial and some Functional roles of the divisional level this 
category of value is derived from the ongoing interactions of the businesses with 
divisional expertise. This expertise can be in the form of general management or it can 
be in the form of functional/process support. These membership benefits arise from 
the division augmenting the ongoing functions or capabilities of the businesses. 
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Guidance exploits vertically transmitted, knowledge-based economies of scope 
wherein the relatedness of the businesses enable the leverage of divisional level 
knowledge across the grouping. 
An often cited example of Guidance in a corporate context is the Manufacturing 
Services Group of Cooper IndustrieS7 which, on an invited basis for existing 
businesses but on a 'no-choice' basis for newly acquired ones, 
"... stepped in and worked with EVPs (Executive Vice Presidents) 
and their operating managers to improve plant efficiency and 
to transfer Cooper's manufacturing know-how andprocesses... 
at all stages of the manufacturing improvement process, the group 
relied heavily on the participation of local personnel, attempting 
to give them ownership of the project ". (p. 14) 
Facilities: 
In this category, consistent with a more stand-alone Functional role, the divisional 
level manages a function, service or facility on behat(of the business. The business is 
a user of the service with the divisional level replacing the business facility. This 
category reflects the dynamic of centralisation where the division is responsible for 
both the day-to-day efficiency of the facility and its strategic effectiveness and 
capability. While this category might include various non-strategic services, its major 
value-adding potential lies in facilities that are strategically fundamental to business 
success such as R&D, distribution, brand management etc. 
As well as economies of scope, value in this category arises from utilisation and scale 
efficiencies as the relatedness of the several businesses enable them to make use of the 
7 Cooper Industries Corporate Strategy (A). Case 9-3 91-095 Harvard Business School. 
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same centralised service which they no longer have to develop or maintain on an 
individual basis. 
An example of a Facility benefit from the corporate strategy literature is given by 
Porter (1987) who cites Proctor and Gamble which 
"employs a common physical distribution system and salesforce 
in both paper towels and disposable diapers. " (p. 5 6) 
which lowers costs for both of these businesses. 
Team: 
Facilitated by the Inter-Business value role of divisional management, Team benefits 
are derived from ongoing interactions of the businesses with each other. This may 
involve the sharing of capital equipment but is more generally the sharing of 
knowledge and capabilities entailing mutual learning and development. These are the 
type of benefits gained from strategic alliances and partnerships between different 
companies (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989). They are also manifest in the so-called 
"horizontal" organisationwithin businesses (Ostroff and Smith, 1996) and "N-forne' 
organisations between businesses in the same firm (Hedlund, 1994). The divisional 
level acts as a facilitator and driver of the necessary inter-business systems and 
processes. If carried far enough the Team orientation implies that the businesses 
become manifestations of an integrated set of capabilities wherein each is mutually 
dependant on the others for the integrity and development of strategic advantage. 
This category exploits horizontally transmitted, economies of scope in the form of 
firm specific learning and knowledge. The relatedness of the businesses enable them 
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to benefit from a pan-divisional, mutually created and maintained capability common 
to each. This category captures many of the benefits proselytized by proponents of the 
"core competence" perspective. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) cite Sony as an example 
of a company 
"... which has traditionally granted total autonomy to individual 
product development teams, has realized that more and more of its 
products mustfunction as part of complex systems. It has therefore 
moved to restructure its audio, video, and computer groupsfor better 
coordination of new product development. " (p. 3 3). 
Group: 
This category describes the more passive benefits of membership that accrue to 
businesses in the divisiong because they are part of a sizeable group able to exert 
power over suppliers or customers and/or part of a group with a well established 
reputation. Although the value must be actively exploited i. e. purchasing discounts 
must be negotiated and inter-businessfinter-regional pricing discipline must be actively 
maintained, active creation of the value-producing characteristic is beyond the 
capability of the individual business. Being part of the (large) group is sufficient for 
the business to gain benefits. 
Value for the individual business is derived from position and market power influences 
of the group as the relatedness of the businesses enable a pooling of their input 
requirements and/or a linking of their outputs in terms of volume, price, territory, etc! 
8 Reputation is a complex attribute which is defined here as being a Group benefit whereas it could 
be argued to be a FaciNy. Although the interaction between divisional reputation and divisional 
brand (a Facility) is significant, brand can be managed divisionally in a way that reputation cannot. 
i. e. it as a more tenuous attribute which emerges through ongoing transactions over time. As Kay 
(1993) points out "In the long run, reputation can only be based on the provision ofhigh-quality in 
repeated trials". (p. 93) 
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3.2.2 Managing Membership Benefits - Cooperation. 
A dominant value-logic based on commonality or relatedness is insufficient to realise 
value. Following the dictum of structure following strategy, achieving the dormant 
value inherent in the underlying econornics of relatedness is contingent on appropriate 
management processes and systems. IEll (1994), building on an early review and 
model of value linkages (Hoskisson, Hill and Kim, 1993), indicates that a 
$cooperative' orientation is necessary for the optimisation of the value of relatedness 
(whereas unrelated businesses are best managed within a 'competitive' perspective). 
A cooperative orientation is reflected in philosophies, structures, behaviours and 
systems grounded in sharing, centre-business linkages, inter-business linkages and, the 
dominance of group goals over unit (sub-goal) optimisation. As divisions are groups 
of related businesses if follows that strategic management within divisions should be 
characterised by a cooperative perspective. Implicit in the categories of relatedness- 
based, membership benefits outlined above, are the cooperative mechanisms needed to 
realise them. 
3.3 Divisional Strategy - Summary 
Combining synergy, membership benefits and cooperative management gives an 
overall perspective of divisional strategy at a theoretical level as 
a) the perception and creation of exploitahle relale&iess ftom common 
processes and capabilities of business units and 
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b) the 'cooperative'management of those processes and capabilities to 
c) create membership benefits such that the ongoing value of the division is 
greater than the sum of the stand-alone businesses. 
3.4 Real-Life Divisional Strategy. 
3.4.1 Divisions as Cooperatives 
Deriving a theoretical perspective on divisional strategy is one thing but how is this 
perspective reflected in divisional practice? A researchable proposition that arises 
from this theory is that 
"Divisions, (i. e. groups of related businesses within multidivisional 
firms) will be characterised by cooperative patterns andperspectives. 
Cooperativeness, however, presents a dilemma for the managers of divisions. The 
division exists as part of an M-form organisation and is structured itself on M-fonn 
lines. Historically and by design the organisational imperatives of the M-form are 
forces for splitting, autonomy and (business) individualism. However the theoretical 
(economic) imperatives for realising the potential added-value from relatedness-based 
econoýnies of scope, require organisational forces for conjunction, integration and 
collectivism, i. e. cooperation. 
3.4.2 The Cooperative Perspective 
A cooperative perspective is manifest as an holistic pattern, texture or syndrome of 
attributes rather than as any one critical characteristics (Collis, 1991c; 1-fill, 1994). 
Several fi7ameworks of organisational design variables have been estabfished, and used 
as templates for examining organisations. Probably the most well known of these is 
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the McKinsey "Seven SV of Strategy, Structure, Systems, Style, Superordinate 
Goals, Staff and SHIs (Waterman, Peters and Phillips, 1980) while Collis (1991 c) 
uses the set of Organisational. Structure, Planning and Control systems, ERM and 
Culture and Style. In their paper on corporate strategy, Goold et al. (1994) use five 
sets of characteristics as lenses through which to understand the parenting behaviour 
of the corporate level: the Parents' Mental Maps; Parenting Structures, Systems and 
Processes; Functions, Central Services and Resources; People and Skills; and 
Decentralisation Contracts. 
Dra, wing on these approaches there are several interacting facets of divisions in which 
logic and theory indicate that a cooperative (or otherwise) perspective will be 
manifest: 
1) the mental maps or managerialphilosophies of the divisional management and in 
particular the divisional managing director; 2) the degree to whichfunctions, services 
and resources are supplied or controlled from the divisional level; and 3) existing 
structures, systems andprocesses that drive, facilitate and augment inter-business 
cooperation or a pan-divisional view i. e. integrating mechanisms, measurement 
systems and rewards and incentives. 
1. Managerial Philosophy. 
Cooperation as a key tenet of divisional strategy will be reflected in the expressed 
views and behaviours of divisional managers who will espouse, promote and 
encourage teamwork, organisational. sharing and inter-linkages at the level of 
divisional-business interaction and/or at the inter-business level. This will reflect a 
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belief in the value of synergy to be gained from integrating aspects of business 
functioning. As so much of what happens in an organisation is dependent on the 
actions of the senior executive the views of the divisional managing director 
(DMD) will be a, if not Me, critical influence. This is not only because his/her 
views will influence the views of other managers but also because they will have a 
significant bearing on the structures, systems etc. that are put in place. 
2. Divisional Functions, Services and Resources. 
The divisional level as a source of capabilities or functions is reflected in divisional 
staff operating functions on behalf of the businesses (i. e. centralisation) or 
augmenting business unit processes. A key resource, given the operational nature 
of the 'cooperative' framework, is often the industry specific experience of the 
divisional MD (Porter, 1987; Goold et al., 1994). 
3. Pan-Divisional Structures, Systems and Processes. 
Various aspects of structure, system and process characterising 'cooperative' 
orientations include: 
A. Integrating Mechanisms of different kinds promoting pan divisional sharing 
and lateral communication. These can take various forms such as meetings; 
permanent or temporary task forces; staff relocations; permanent haison roles at 
divisional level; etc. and aim to achieve the "tight coupling" needed to benefit from 
relatedness (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, Luke, Begun and Pointer, 1989; 
Alexander, 1993). 
B. Measurement Systems that focus on broader and more subjective outcome 
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measures than the financial numbers and on shared as well as individual business 
performance. A mix of objective and subjective criteria is required to audit the 
necessary processes as well as outputs important to business and divisional 
cooperative functioning (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986; Collis, 199 1 c). 
C. Rewards and Incentives that emphasise interbusiness cooperation and pan- 
divisional goals rather than the single minded pursuit of business excellence 
(Lorsch and Allen, 1973; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986). Where pan-divisional 
process capability is a key strategic dynan* then group based rewards are likely 
to be implemented at the congruent process/functional levels of the business units. 
3.4.3 Specific Questions 
In pursuing the broader themes and propositions of divisional strategy detailed so far; 
the research that follows attempts to investigate and clarify the perspectives and 
perceived benefits of cooperativeness in divisions of related businesses in 
multidivisional firms. Using the categories of membership benefits and the dimensions 
of cooperative perspective detailed above to concentrate and structure the enquiry, 
the specific questions that frame the following empirical investigations are: 
1. What are the views of DMDs on the membership benefits for divisional business 
units, the role of the divisional level and the businesses in achieving those benefits 
and, in particular, the extent to which inter-business or business-division 
cooperation is important. 
2. What specific structures, processes, mechanisms etc. are planned or in place to 
encourage, facilitate or drive intra-divisional cooperation. 
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3. How are the views, roles etc. espoused by the DMD reflected at business level and 
in particular to what extent is the divisional commitment to cooperation supported 
and manifest? 
The following chapters detail discussion and analysis of real world divisions in 
attempts to answer these questions. 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY 
"People who write about methodoloSD, oftenforget that it is a 
matter of stratea, not of morals. " 
(Homans, 1949: 330) 
"Fieldwork is permeated with the conflict between what is 
theoretically desirable on the one hand and what is practically 
possible on the other. It is desirable to ensure representativeness 
in the sample, uniformity in interview procedures, adequate data 
collection across the range of topics to be explored, and so on. 
But the members of organizations block access to information, 
constrain the time allowedfor interviews, lose your questionnaires, 
go on holi&ý andjoin other organizations in the middle ofyour 
unfinished study. In the conflict between the desirable and the 
possible, the possible always wins. " 
(Buchanan, Boddy and McCalman, 1988) 
In the centuries of research in the natural sciences empirical evidence of 'concrete' 
phenomena overcame, and continues to overcome, ignorance, mysticism and dogma. 
The confinnation of inducted theories by the replication of predicted effects through 
observation and experiment enabled the postulation, testing and promulgation of 
general 'laws' of science. Over those same centuries philosophers asserted and argued 
the nature of reality (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology). Whether a 'real' 
world existed that was independent of human perception or whether knowledge 
existed as facts separate from values were two major and interconnected strands of 
debate. Science and philosophy, as branches of intellectual endeavour, co-existed, 
with one (science) neatly contained within the empirical-positivist category of the 
other. Scientists created the basis for bridges, engines, drugs etc. without the need to 
surface their underpinning view of reality or knowledge. 
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The growth of the social 'sciences' has intertwined philosophy and research to a 
greater extent. The definition of social 'reality', the reflexive nature of human beings, 
the role of social scientists as observers of processes to which they themselves are 
subject, the influencing effects of values, belief systems and other cognitive 
frameworks are all examples of factors that have been argued to substantially 
adulterate the capacity of social scientists to know their chosen research world and 
make it knowable to others (May, 1993). The natural sciences are not immune to 
these potential sources of distortion and 'wrong' paradigms remain consensual 
greality' over long periods (Kuhn, 1970). However, the process of human beings 
studying themselves raises more complex questions than when they are studying non- 
human objects or systems. These issues are seen as being sufficiently important for it 
to be suggested to be "good medicine' for social science researchers to specify the 
philosophical underpinnings of their enquiry (Miles and Hubennan, 1994). 
This research is based on a view of knowledge and reality akin to that termed 
'Iranscendental realism" (Bhaskar, 1978; Nfiles and Huberman, 1994) and a 
combination of "non-positivism"I and "internal realiSM"2 by Archer (198 8). It is 
grounded in the following 'philosophical' premises: 
1. Social phenomena exist in the objective world as well as in the minds of actors. 
2. Actors are cognitively bounded (Simon, 1961) but not blind in knowing their social 
world. 
I i. e. "Facts and values are intertwined and hard to disentangle; both are involved in scientific 
knowledge. " (p. 273) 
2 i. e. "Reality-for-us is an intcrsubjective construction of the shared human cognitive apparatus. " 
(p. 273) 
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3. 'Knowledge' is not necessarily congruent with behaviour (Argyris, 1992). 
4. While the specific content of social systems may be diverse, discoverable 
regularities or constructs underlie outputs but these may be invisible to actors; 
5. Knowledge can be improved by the interaction of actors in social systems with 
observers who know of, but are not part of, the particular system under study. 
These assumptions operate at different levels of the research domain. I and 4 provide 
the philosophical basis for research aimed at discovery that transcends the 
idiosyncrasies of the specific organisation. 2 and 3, combined with the potential 
invisibility of underlying constructs (4) accentuate the problem of finding out about 
humans from humans whatever the research methodology. Finally assumption 5, with 
emphasis on the knowledgeable but uninvolved observer, offers a mechanism to 
pursue knowledge based on I and 4 while ameliorating (although not overcoming) 
these problems. 
4.1 The Quantitative vs Qualitative Debate 
Many of the substantive issues of these philosophical dilernmas have been poMsed in 
the vigorous quantitative vs qualitative methodology debate (Bryman, 1988). At one 
extreme this discourse can be seen to be a clash between two opposed philosophies 
reflected in fundamentally different methodologies. At the other pole it is an argument 
reflecting different ways of looking at different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
Strategy researchers have been parties to this disagreement and some notable actors 
have become proponents of opposing views. While Camerer (198 5: 1), for example, 
believes that the "deductive use of mathematics and economic concepts it the best 
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way to answer (and ask) corporate strategy questions, " Mintzberg (1979) champions 
rich description and 'soft' data arguing strongly that "the field of organization theory 
has ... paid 
dearly for the obsession with rigor in the choice of methodology. " (p. 583). 
Harrigan (1983) prefers "hybrid" methodologies on the basis that the more "fine 
grained" approaches such as case studies are not generalisable. Yet Kirk and Miller 
(1986) suggest that "theoretical validity, unfortunately, is difficult to detennine by 
methods other than qualitative research. " (p. 25). Viewing the argument as simply the 
qualitative vs the quantitative 'school' is misleading. Within the qualitative domain 
alone Tesch (1990) identifies 27 types of qualitative research based on different 
research purposes while Wolcott (1992) define 23 types based on differing methods. 
4.2 Positioning the Methodology. 
This research is a qualitative study based on broad theoretical propositions rather than 
specific hypotheses (Yin, 1989). 'Qualitative' has proven a contentious tenn which 
has defied consensual definition but is instead associated with a number of identifying 
characteristics. Amongst these are non-numerical analysis, a focus on the nature as 
opposed to the amount of something and, perhaps primarily, interacting with people in 
their own setting, in their own language and on their own terms (Kirk and Miller, 
1986; Bryman, 1988, Robson, 1993). 
Whatever the state of the debate but there is little doubt that qualitative research has 
gained in stature as a paradigm. Formerly the "precursor and poor relation" of "real" 
research (Archer, 1988) it no longer needs prolonged justification as a primary 
approach (Wolcott, 1990). Authors are as prone now to be critical of the bias towards 
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the quantitative approach with its over-emphasis on large sample, questionnaire 
surveys or its mining of secondary data bases. Snow and Thomas, (1994) for example 
argue that the current focus on this type of research may be resulting in a stagnant 
base of knowledge in strategic management. 
Not only is qualitative methodology increasingly accepted as a robust source of 
knowledge it has also been argued to be the optimal approach to some issues i. e. it is 
not philosophical nuance that should drive methodology but the content and form of 
the research questions and the context of the researched phenomena (Nliles and 
Huberman, 1994). Congruent with this fine of thinking Snow and Thomas (1994) 
, classified 
research into 6 categories by goal, ( theory building or theory testing), and 
by purpose, (description, explanation or prediction). (Table 4.1) 
Description Explanation Prediction 
Theory 1. Key question is 2. Key questions are 3. Key questions are 
Building 'what'. 'how'and'why'. 'who, 'where' and 
Identify key constructs. Establish relationships 'when'. 
Usually observations among constructs and Examine boundary 
and/or interviewing. provide theoretical conditions of a theory. 
rationale for observed Usually observations, 
relationships. questionnaire surveys 
Usually observations and interviews 
and/or interviews. 
Theory 4. Focus is on developing 5. Focus is on 6. Focus is on testing 
Testing and validating measures documenting competing theories of the 
of key constructs. relationships among same phenomenon 
Usually questionnaire variables through through crucial 
surveys and/or hypothesis testing. experiments. No pattern 
interviews. Usually large samples of field work discernible 
with questionnaire due to the dearth of this 
surveys or field type of study. 
simulations. 
Table 4.1 Field Research Methods and Theojy Development in Strategic Management 
(adapted from Snow and Thomas, 1994) 
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They showed the relationship between the style of research and its generic position in 
tenns of questions asked and theoretical position. The questions asked in the research 
in this thesis are explicitly of the 'what' and 'how' variety in the relatively 
unresearched (theory building) arena of divisional strategy. i. e. cells I and 2. 
Yin (1989) adds the dimensions of the control required over behavioural events and 
the degree of focus on contemporary matters as two other factors to consider in the 
choice of research strategies between experiment, survey, archival analysis, history 
and case study. In his view, a lack of control over behavioural events and a focus on 
contemporary issues, linked with descriptive and/or explanatory oriented research 
questions, makes case studies the method of choice. This is particularly so where the 
"Phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context. " (Yin, 1993: 
3). Divisional strategy has been specifically argued to be such a context dependent 
manifestation of interacting mindsets and organisational processes. 
A combination of the above views oriented this research towards collecting qualitative 
data via interviews/observation within a case study context. 
4.3 The Sample 
4.3.1 Theoretical Issues 
Sampling of cases for this research followed the theory of sampling associated with 
qualitative research in general. i. e. it was purposive rather than random, building on a 
logic of replication with a goal of generalising to theory rather than a logic of 
statistics with a goal of generalising to populations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin 1989; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). According to Yin (1989), cases are not "sampling unite' 
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and as such it is a "fatal flaw"' to conceive "statistical generalisatiorf' rather than 
"analytic generalisation7 from the results of case research (p. 3 8). Using statistical 
generalisations, inferences are made about populations on the basis of empirical data. 
Using analytic generalisations, inferences are made about a previously developed 
theory from empirical results. Cases are more Eke (multiple) experiments than a 
collection of data points. It is the replicability and robustness of the theoretical 
constructs that are assessed. To this end cases are chosen such that their i priori 
characteristics are germane to the investigation being undertaken. 
4.3.2 Unit of analysis 
case, as a unit of analysis, can be an individual in a defined context, a role, a small 
group, an organisation, a community, a nation etc. (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
cases in this research are "typical" division in a multidivisional, diversified company 
where "typical" means "normal" or "'average" Mles and Huberman, op cit: 28) and 
exhibit characteristics consistent with the earlier definition of a division as 
"a self contained, semi-autonomous, organisational unit within a 
diversified company. It has mi M-form structure and comprises a 
group of related businesses which arejunctionally organised (Ti-form) 
and which directly interact with the customers, competitors, suppliers 
etc. of their particular productImarket. " 
To be 'light" a definition should include all the relevant entities whilst excluding all 
non-relevant entities. As such this is not a tight definition but it is arguably one which 
encompasses enough of the real world under study to act as a solid basis for initial 
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theorising about that real world'. The main selection criteria within the definition are 
that divisions are 1) a semi-autonomous grouping of a diversified firm, 2) M-form in 
organisation and 3) are comprised of related businesses. 
1. A semi-autonomous grouping of a &versifiedfinn 
The context of this enquiry is M-form which, as discussed in Chapter 2, dominates as 
the preferred form for large companies in western economies. The trend to further 
sub-divide large firms into groupings of businesses under separate management arose 
as a result of increased diversification and growth, resulting in what are being termed 
"divisione' in this thesis. i. e. internal quasi corporations without the investor etc. 
responsibilities of the corporation. The term "semi-autonomous! 
A designates a 
(divisional) management layer with significant devolved corporate authority and 
responsibility (e. g. capital approval, budgetary discretion, etc. ) and even higher levels 
of discretion in managing operational (manufacturing, marketing etc. ) matters. 
2. M-fonn in organisation 
This signifies that the division, itself a semi-autonomous'I)usinese',, is made up of a 
number of semi-autonomous, functionaUy structured (i. e. U-form) business units. 
Each of these units is (usually) run by a management team. The team, led by a general 
manager/managing director is responsible for developing and delivering the product- 
3A problem with much research relying on statistical finesse as a basis for findings is that fact that 
Light" definitions of units under study reduces variance and enhances the probability of 
"significance. " Unfortunately for practitioners the "noise" that is controlled or defined away often 
has more real world significance than the uncovered nuances. This of course has been the criticism 
of a generation of psychology research. 
4 IbS is a difficult term to operationalise precisely as it carries connotations that, in practice, 
understate the stand-alone responsibility/authority of divisional managing directors. 
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market strategies of the business and achieving targeted level of budgeted 
performance. Normally operating on an annual budget cycle, such businesses are 
monitored, usually on a monthly basis, by the divisional level. 
3. Comprised of related businesses. 
Whilst it has been argued earlier that divisions as described are generally made up of 
related businesses it is still specified as an i priori criterion for inclusion in the study. 
Specifically, to examine the proposition that divisions of related businesses are 
cooperatives, relatedness here is specified as relatedness at the level of 
product/market and process congruence. i. e. businesses producing/marketing similar 
products to similar end-users through similar distribution channels under similar 
strategic assumptions (i. e. positioning, critical success factors etc. ) and using similar 
operational processes. Note that "similar" in this study does not preclude "same"; in 
fact the more "sameness" that exists between the businesses the more "related" they 
are. Such divisions are often characterised by a name that signifies the nature of the 
product-relatedness of their business units. e. g. "AUtegoods Division"; 'Explosives 
Division", - Aircraft 
Components DivisioW' are examples from my own experience. 
While . this product/market similarity is the norm basis for a divisions, this set of 
criteria specifically excludes "divisions" that are groupings purely on a geographic 
basis (e. g. the "IJK Division) unless the businesses contained are also related as 
above. This is the most critical of the criteria as it defines divisions with business 
similarities (relatedness) that, from a theoretical perspective at least, would seem to be 
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most likely to exhibit cooperative interaction to gain the benefits of synergies 
(econonýes of scope). 
4.4 Overall Structure and Perspective. 
This is cross-sectional research aimed at further development of a theoretical 
perspective of divisions through two stages. The design is diagramatically illustrated 
in Figure 4.1 and comprised two stages: 
4.4.1 Stage I 
Tl-ýs stage took a 'horizontal' perspective and comprised semi-structured interviews 
with divisional level managers from 12 typical divisions. It aimed to investigate, 
through comparative replication, how the dilemma of horizontal (relatedness) value 
and vertical (M-fonn) organisation was reflected in real world divisional functioning. 
4.4.2 Stage 2 
To deepen understanding of divisional strategy a more in-depth comparative 
investigation, again through sený-structured interviews was undertaken of two 
divisions which demonstrated distinctly different approaches to divisional strategy. 
Divisional, business and functional managers were included as informants to help 
understand how major divisional dynamics were manifest at subordinate levels of the 
organisation. i. e. a 'vertical' perspective. 
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Fiwire 4.1 Schematic Representation of the Overall Research Design 
4.5 Access 
Access, or more accurately, the lack of company access is a significant problem for 
management researchers. The proliferation of management studies at undergraduate 
and postgraduate levels has led to an exponential increase in the number of research 
"projects" seeking management participation. From the perspective of the firm, the 
final year project of an undergraduate, accompanied by the introductory letter on 
university headed paper, is indistinguishable from higher level initiatives. Added to 
these activities is the increasing level of research-oriented approaches from 
consultants and goverment agencies. 
One of the consequences of this is an increase in those companies refusing, as a matter 
of policy, to participate in research and an increase, as a matter of practice, in non- 
response to questionnaire surveys. Low response rate has become a major problem 
for authors seeking to make population generalisations from random samples. Snow 
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and Thomas (1994) suggest that "for a properly constituted random sample' response 
rates of 55% are low enough to raise questions about external validity. Figures much 
lower than this are common in recently published research. As an example Stimpert 
and Duhaime's (1997) overall return rate was 19% which reduced to 12% if their 
target informants were the only ones counted'. The difficulties of access are 
compounded when the target informants are senior managers. My own experience 
confirmed tfiýs problem. 
'Cold calling' the divisional heads of in large multidivisional companies quickly 
proved to be an exercise in futility. The first difficulty was getting past the executive's 
personal assistant (PA) or secretary, part of whose role is to 'protect' he? boss fTom 
just such intrusions on hiS7 valuable time. If I managed to speak to the divisional head 
they proved unwilling to donate an hour or so of their time. The introductory letter 
(Appendix A) proved a moot tactic also as it was too easy to scribble "say no nicely"' 
in the margin and leave it to the PA to deflect the phone call. Having occupied such a 
role (divisional head) I was not completely surprised at the difficulty of "getting in" 
(Buchanan et al., 1988). Only 'important' people e. g. customers, more senior 
-' The common defence that such return rates are consistent with other published studies is a 
Tationalisation that still begs the question of theoretical validity. i. e. a sample, by definition, is an 
inexact representation of a population. Statistical techniques based on random selection compensate 
for this inexactness. When the actual level of return represents a sinalL self selected, sample ofthe 
sample then some heroic assumptions must be made to make the increased inexactness trivial. It 
seems easier to support a logical argument that the 20% or less of those that respond arc specifically 
non-representative i. e. in fact different in some way to the other (representative) 80+%. 
6 The use of 'her' in this case is an empirical reflection that all of these roles contacted were filled by 
females. 
All the divisional heads who were written to were male. 
One PA told me that this is what her boss had written on the letter. 
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managers, politically important outsiders etc. get to see senior managers through their 
own direct efforts. 
Given these barriers to entry I resorted to a 'relationship' model of gaining access. 
For those familiar with Japanese business practices it is congruent with the 
introduction that is essential before contact is granted uith potential 
customers/partners etc. in that country. In theoretical sampling terms, it is akin to the 
"snowball or chain" type of sampling which "identifies cases of interest from people 
who know people who know what cases are information rich. " (NUes and Huberman, 
1994: 28). Contacting five consultants I asked them for 'personal' introductions to 
managers of divisions meeting the criteria for relatedness as specified early (Section 
4.3) . These consultants, sending my 
introductory letter and adding supportive and 
encouraging comments (e. g. Appendix B), generated a fist of initial contacts from 
twenty-one divisions from fifteen different companies as well as six corporate level 
managers in multidivisional firms. i. e. a total of twenty-seven introductions. From tWs 
total a final group of seventeen divisions from thirteen companies agreed to 
participate in the research. Of these, three did not eventuafly take part due to the 
consistent lack of availability of the senior executive-interviewee? and two were - 
discarded (post-interview) as not being related divisions but rather functionally 
structured business units. Finally then twelve typical divisions from ten different 
companies allowed access for investigation. 
9 Typically the intcrviewswith senior divisional people were arranged a month to 6 weeks ahead of 
time. In the event of last minute postponements the next interview was again made for 4-6 weeks 
hence. By the fifth postponement 30-40 weeks can pass from the time the initial appointment was 
made. 
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4.6 Informants. 
4.6.1 Organisational Titles and Levels 
To reduce confusion in an already confused area I have chosen to harmonise titles and 
categorisation where different titles or names describe similar positions. As such: 
Corporate level refers to the highest level of executive management in the firm and 
incorporates the chief executive officer (CEO) and all the executives reporting to him. 
Divisional level is the organisational level incorporating all the executives reporting to 
and including the head of the division. 
DivisiotialManaging Director (DMD) denotes the manager in charge of the division. 
The title of this position varies between, and even within companies but it is often 
some variant of DMD e. g. Managing Director - Plastics Division, Divisional 
Managing Director - Plastics etc. In some companies the DMD is part of the 
corporate level. 
Business Managers are managers in charge of businesses or business units reporting 
to the DMD. Again titles vary between and within companies and include 'General 
Manager' and 'Managing Director. ' 
Divisional Functional Heacls denotes managers reporting to the DMD responsible for 
divisional functions or processes. These positions are often known as Divisional 
Directors e. g. Divisional Manufacturing Director. 
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Business Functional Heads denotes the heads of business functions who report to the 
Business Manager. In the UK these positions are often known as 'Directors"'. ' e. g. 
Sales and Marketing Director. 
4.6.2 Stage 1 Informants 
As a comparative (case) description of the division, both in terms of "collective mind" 
(Weick, and Roberts, 1993) and organisational behaviour, was to be developed from 
the information provided by one divisional level manager it was highly preferable that 
that manager was the Divisional Managing Director (DMD). This follows a common 
practice and belief in strategic management research that 'lop managers have the best 
vantage point for viewing the entire organisational system. " (Snow and lirebiniak, 
1980: 320). In practice the DMI)s were not always available. Of the twelve 
divisional level managers finally interviewed, eight of them were DMDs, while the 
others comprised a divisional finance director, a business manager, a human resources 
director and a manufacturing services director. Each was interviewed as an informant 
on general divisional practices rather than their on their own functional domain.. 
4.6.3 Stage 2 Informants 
Two divisions were chosen for t. sp ase. 
From Division F2, the DMD, the deputy, DMD, the divisional Business Development 
Manager and twelve business managers were interviewed. (total fourteen) (Final case 
in Chapter 6) 
" To one from a different (Australian) business culture the proliferation of the 'Director' title in UK 
businesses is a bemusing phenomenon. 
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From Division J, the DMD, four divisional functional heads, four business managers 
and twenty-one business level functional managers were interviewed. (total of thirty). 
(Final case in Chapter 5). 
4.7 Data Collection 
Annual reports, other internal company documents and external company reports 
Cournals, newspapers, etc. ) were aU used as a source of information to both give 
background, general descriptive data and market/industry context. 
The prime data for the research came ftorn semi-structured interviews with company 
executives. The specific content of the interview was dependant on the level of 
executive being interviewed but the principles underpinning the style of interview 
remained the same. 
4.7.1 The Interviewer-as-Instrument 
Most interview-based research is silent on the issue of the interviewer(s) and as such 
implicitly suggests interviewing as a non-problematic component. This is not so on at 
least two levels; familiarity with the field and familiarity with the interview process. 
4.7.1.1 Familiarity with the Field. 
The history of social research contains many examples of the difficulties researcher 
have in interpreting findings when investigators are insufficiently sensitive to the 
organisational. or cultural context within which observed phenomena are embedded 
(Kirk and Miller, 1986). In anthropology for example Freeman (1983) attacked 
Mead's (1928) classical Samoan studies as being inaccurate due to her position as an 
expatriate with no knowledge of Samoan language or prior familiarity with Samoan 
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culture and society. Thus the "teasing" of teenage girls possibly gave rise to a thesis 
of adolescent free lovel I. 
While cultural incompatibilities may be more likely in anthropological studies they 
provide an extreme example of similar problems facing researchers in the management 
field. To at least enable 'common-sense checking' the researcher needs to have 
appropriate background in the management area under research (Archer, 1988). This 
background should be sufficient for hini/he to have credence as a knowledgeable co- 
conversant without the need for translation or explanation. 
A free flowing 'conversation' cannot take place without a common language and 
shared understanding of context. As the researcher is seeking understanding of, often 
tacit, constructs underlying content, it is preferable that such content should be as 
non-problematic for him/her as for the informant. The necessity to explain or translate 
'everyday' language puts the informant into a teaching and hence simplifying role 
instead of the role of co-discussant with one of equal knowledge but from a different 
sphere. i. e. an 'outsider' who has 'insider' characteristics. As an "insider"the 
researcher has sufficient credibility to ask questions demanding meaningful rather than 
glib answers as it is likely that he/she will know the difference. From the perspective 
of the researcher an appropriate background enables hhn/her to feel confident and 
comfortable or 'at home' on the research site and thus free from the distractions of 
being in an "alien' place. 
11 Kirk and Miller (1986) point out that the contrast between Mead, as a young woman tallcing with 
adolescent girls, and Freeman as a high-ranldng adult tallcing with male parents, raises the 
possibility that both sets of findings have validity as "different investigators observing different parts 
of the same Samoan scene" (p. 46). 
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Whyte (1984) refers to the need for "intimate, habitual, intuitive familiarity with 
thinge' (p. 282) while Miles and Huberman (1994) list the following as "markers" of a 
"good qualitative-researcher as instrument": 
e "somefamiliarity with the phenomenon and the selling understudy 
9 strong conceptual interests 
*a mulfidisciplitia7y approach, as opposed to a narrow grounding orfocus ma 
single discipline 
* good "investigative " skills, including doggedness, the ability to draw people out, 
and the ability to ward offpremature closure ", (p. 3 8) 
and conclude that on balance 
"a laiawledgeable practitioner withconceptual interests and more 
thanjust one disciplinary perspective isoflen a better research, 
"instrument" in a qualitative study". (p. 38) 
The somewhat convoluted professional, educational and business experience of the 
researcher in this study (i. e. from clinical psychologist to industrial relations manager 
to business manager to divisional managing director to academic researcher) seems an 
ideal fit with this description and with the phenomenon and context under 
investigation. This is not to lay claims to superior research or research process but to 
a serendipitously suitable background. 
4.7.1.2 Familiarity with the Process. 
Even the most structured of questionnaire style interviews require basic interviewing 
skills if the appropriate information and degree of information is to be elicited. The 
more unstructured the interview, however, the broader is the skiff and experience level 
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required and the more the information gleaned is dependent on the interviewer as 
much as the interview schedule or guide (Fielding, 1993; May, 1993; Robson, 1993). 
The judicious use ofprobes (interventions to encourage the informant to expand 
further), and prompts, (close ended enquires for specific facts) are a particular facet of 
less structured interviews. How and when to question, stay silent, summarise, 
encourage, confront inconsistencies, use non-verbal cues etc. are sUls that only 
develop with training and practice. '7he use of probes is something of an art-forin 
and difficult to transmit to the novice interviewee, (Robson, op. cit. p. 234). Where 
underlying constructs, mental maps etc. are the domain of interest, as well as content, 
then active 'clinical' skiHs are necessary particularly when such constructs are out of 
articulahle range of the informant. 
Again the clinical background of the researcher and wide experience over a variety of 
psychological interview contexts has provided many years of the necessary training 
and practice. 
4.7.2 The Interviews 
Texts often suggest three styles of interview, the structured or standardised, the sený- 
structured or semi-standardised and the unstructured, non-standardised or focus 
interview (e. g. Fielding, 1993). The underlying dimensions of this continuum have 
been variously described as quantitative/qualitative, (May, 1993); forinaLlinformal and 
directive/non-directive (Robson, 1993); close-ended/open-ended (Whyte, 1982) and 
interviewee-as-respondentfmterviewee-as-informant (Powney and Watts, 1987). The 
typical tripartite division tends to hide the fact that both the structure and nature of 
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interviews fall along continua and are more idiosyncratic to particular research than is 
generally acknowledged. 
"Interviewing is like marriage: everybody knows what it is, an awful 
lot ofpeople do it, andyet behind each closedftont door there is a 
world of secrets. " (Oakley, 1988: 3 1) 
Following Lofland (197 1) the interviews in this research are "guided conversatione' 
that fall towards the unstructured end of the continua in style but nevertheless are 
constructed to pursue a pre-established agenda and set of topics driven by the 
research questions. While becoming less "'open-ended"' with lower level (functional) 
managers they were stifl oriented to pursue Lofland's objective of the non- 
standardised (qualitative) format which is 
"tofind out what kinds o things are happening rather than to determine )f 
theftequency ofpredetermined kinds of things that the researcher believes 
can happen. "(1971: 76) 
The interviews aimed to elicit, in the language of the informant, the shared divisional 
constructs of divisional roles, functions and strategies. As such, each interview started 
from a different point dependent on the initial responses of the informant. For example 
one manager who was presenting his strategic review to the main board on the 
following day had a voluminous set of presentation slides on his desk when I arrived. 
Following the ritualistic pleasantries and the arrival of coffee he proceeded to take me 
through the detailed presentation while I prompted the conversation beyond the 
specifics of his strategic plan. Another informant arranged a tour of a factory on the 
site before expounding at length on his view of divisional strategy while illustrating 
points on his large whiteboard. At another extreme I was led into the DMD's office in 
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relative silence, given coffee, fixed with an enquiring stare and asked, in a not 
unfiiendly tone, 'Vell, what can I do for you? " 
At the lower organisational levels in Stage 2 the interviews followed a more standard 
format dictated by the interview and interview guide. In these cases (unlike with the 
initial DMDs) the interviews had been arranged through a higher authority and I 
suspect that such 'authority' became vested in the researcher who was seen to be 
there to 'ask questions'. In the case of the DMI)s the power relationship was clearly 
in the other direction! 
Three interview guides were used (Appendices C, D and E) which were based on the 
same principles but move from a more to a less freely discursive orientation with 
lower level managers. The guides are divided into sections of focus with each section 
addressing a major thematic question. A series of probes and prompt indicators are on 
the guides as an aide-memoir to the researcher to be used if the interviewee did not 
6spontaneously' address the matter at hand and as a way of opening up new areas. 
These probes sometimes address the same issue in a different way, but are included to 
enable a best fit with the conversational flow. The guides in the appendices represent 
the final product of the organic growth of such instruments that is a feature of open 
ended, case based enquiry (Nliles and Huberman, 1994). 
4.7.2.1 Divisional Level Interviews (Stage I and 2) 
The length of interview varied from 15 minutes (over a hectic 2.5 hour visit) to over 2 
hours. The major themes pursued were the value of the division over the sum of the 
businesses and the management of the division to achieve that value. Included were 
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questions about the role of the corporate level in divisional value creation. Informants 
were encouraged to contextualise their current view of the division in its (and their) 
history (Appendix C). A pointed aspect of this level of perspective was the value 
added by the divisional level itself i. e. "what do you and your fellow divisional 
managers do to add value? " 
4.7.2.2 Business and Functional Level Interviews (Stage 2) 
These interviews tended to be shorter than the divisional level on average due to being 
more constrained in focus but stiH averaged about an hour. Whilst the issues of 
divisional value-added (membership benefits) and the organisational. mechanisms 
involved were still the major guiding themes the perspective was changed to asking 
"how does divisional membership benefit your business? " (Business Managers - 
Appendix D) and "how does being part of the division help you in your role as it 
pertains to competitive advantage of the business? " (Functional Manager - Appendix 
E). Also disadvantages of being part of the division were discussed. 
4.8 Data and Analysis 
4.8.1 Data and Write-up 
Data for this research is derived predominantly from the interviews described above 
all of which were taped 12 and transcribed by the researcher". The transcriptions, plus 
12 Two interviews were not recorded clue to technical failure in one case and trying to follow a 
harried divisional manager through the building and interview at the same time in the other. Taping 
has several advantages over notc-taking particularly in a setting where the 'naturalness' of the 
conversation is deemed important (Gilbert, 1993; May, 1993). In particular taping allows more 
ground to be covered than is possible with note taking. Perhaps even more critically taping allows a 
faithful reproduction of the interview and guards against (but does not eliminate) the interviewer 
noting what he is biased towards hearing All interviewees seemed comfortable with being taped 
although I was asked on several occasions for reassurance of confidentiality when the interviewee 
4-22 
other data on the division/company from internal and external reports then became the 
basis for divisional descriptions and analysis. The case descriptions are made up of 
two interacting components of the interview: 
1. "Factual" Content Unless self contradiction or other negative evidence 
emerged then what the interviewee stated as a potentiafly veriflablefact was accepted 
as such. e. g. "we have a meeting each month with all of the divisional people", 
"business managers are paid on the basis of the financial results of their business 
only",, etc. These 'facts' of organisational structure, process and systems build up to 
give an overall pattern of behaviour which can then be set against the theoretical 
patterns being tested. 
2. Interpreted Content. When interviewees were stating underpinning 
divisional constructs (e. g. "teamwork". "morale) then behavioural evidence of 
consistency with these mindsets was sought before they were accepted or used as a 
strong statement in the case. i. e. "'can you give me a couple of examples that have 
happened recently? " 
i. e. whereas verifiable behaviours were accepted as stated, less visible organisational 
characteristics were probed. 
seemed to think he had been a little too frank On one occasion I was asked to turn the recorder off 
while the respondent told me of his views on one particular aspect of the divisional/corporate 
relationship. 
13 "Fully" here means that the content was reproduced but vocal mannerisms (e. g, "you know") and 
speech fillers e. g. umm, ahh. were left out Despite this and a reasonable level of typing sIdUs 
transcription was as onerous as has been noted (May, 1993) and the rule of thumb of 7-8 hrs of 
transcription per one hour of tape was about Tight. 
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Each case is made up of a brief description of the parent company as aU divisions 
operative within a corporate context. After a short introduction an overall analysis in 
the form of a divisional benefits matrix and an organisational orientation table is 
presented followed by description of the division written, as far as sensible, through 
the words of the informant(s) but supplemented by my own summaries as well as 
input from internal documents. Although written to emphasise areas of focus I have 
attempted to nuadntain the flow of the specific discussion and to not disguise the 
complexity of divisional management as experienced by divisional staff. This 
complexity is sometimes reflected in apparently self contradictory statements by 
infomiants. e. g. without apparent awareness of the contradictions a DMD wiU speak 
of the value of sharing and cooperation in the division and yet maintain that a BM's 
ongoing career is contingent on him/her "hitting the numbers" in his/her own business. 
Fina. Hy an overview of the case is presented and in some instances a postscript of - 
events of interest that occurred after the interviews. 
4.8.2 Analysis 
The data from the cases was analysed into themes and patterns under two broad 
categories; 
1) Membership benefits i. e. the value to the businesses of belonging to the division 
from the stated and inferred view of the DMD or his substitute and for two of the 
cases from the interviews with other business and functionalmana ers. 
2) Perspective andpatterns ie. the philosophies, processes, systems, structures in 
place and the degree to which these reflect and/or facilitate cooperativeness within the 
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division. The specific areas of focus are those organisational dimensions detailed in 
Chapter 3. 
4.8.2.1 Analysis - Membership Benefits 
The presence or absence of the following identified values/benefits are used to 
categorise the espoused presence, and at an interpretative level, the degree of actual 
divisional value. 
Guidance: Questions sought to gain data to indicate the extent to which direct inputs 
from divisional staff to existing functions/processes in the businesses are seen to add 
value. The DMD is included in divisional staff and it was expected that all of the 
occupants of these positions would see themselves as adding value in some way but 
how they saw themselves as doing this was of interest both in terms of direct guidance 
and also in terms of the facilitation of the other membership benefits outlined below. 
The benefits conferred by other divisional people are also a potential divisional value 
source. 
Facilities: Data was sought here on the value-adding activities that the divisional level 
carries out on behalf of (i. e. instead oo the businesses. This captures those functions 
that are centralised whether they be administrative services e. g. legal staff, tax office 
or processes more strategically central e. g. purchasing, distribution. It is important to 
differentiate here between those activities that are membership benefits for the 
businesses in for example reducing costs or enhancing revenue (e. g. brand 
management) and those activities that 'merely' facilitate divisional administration or 
control such as audit or report coUation services. The costs of these centralised 
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overheads are often aflocated to businesses and if the services provided can be 
obtained at the same or lower costs on an out-sourcing basis then little if any value is 
added. 
Group: In this category was place those expressions of value that derived from a 
passive membership of a bigger, more powerfW entity or one with a "good" 
reputation. e. g. in general larger organisations might attract more able managers and 
staff who see more opportunities for advancement; have more power with respect to 
suppliers, government agencies, customers, etc. have access to more funds and thus 
be able to back more investment which can, in turn be important to other significant 
players etc. The key element that differentiates this category from the others is that it 
is a property of the grouping rather than an activity or process that the businesses 
engage in between themselves or with the divisional level. Some properties e. g. 
reputation, may be the intangible results of many years of product-market interactions. 
Managers sometimes speak of "critical" mass to indicate a supposed break-point 
wherein size becomes a valuable property per se. 
Team: In this last component of membership benefits is data indicating value from 
interactions of the businesses with each other. This interaction can be a the level of 
physical sharing (e. g. cross business teams; inter-business systems; shared technology; 
shared capital etc. ) or at the more intangible level of sharing knowledge, 
competencies, learning etc. 
While the data is classified into these categories it is important to note that this 
classification is based on either what is espoused by the management or inferred by 
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the researcher from the responses of the management. There is no measurement of the 
actual value of the activities/properties so classified; the data merely reflects the 
claiminglinference of value. 
4.8.2.2 Analysis - Perspective and Patterns of Cooperation 
The organisational dimensions to be used as an analytic framework are expanded in 
Table 4.2 below. For each pattern or theme the type of responses/findings classified as 
indicating a 'cooperative' orientation is shown. Also, under the heading, 'non- 
cooperative' are the types of responses classified as more indicative of a stand-alone 
orientation wherein the divisional management acts predominantly as a controller, 
"information buffer and condenser" (Collis, 1991c: 10) and devolved representative of 
the corporate centre. 
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Dimension Cooperative indicators Non-cooperative indicators 
Managerial Philosqphy. ý The DMD will express positive The businesses are viewed as self- 
valueslorientations towards sharing, contained, stand-alone entities with 
interaction and cooperation between primary responsibility for their own 
the businesses. The emphasis is on the profitability and managed at arms 
whole being more than the set of its length accordingly. Cooperation is 
component businesses. The business incidental or crisis driven as the whole 
GM is viewed as the nominated is the sum of the parts.. The business 
steward of part of the division with GM is seen as the delegated "owner" 
ongoing responsibilities to the rest. of the business to be left alone as long 
Inter-business trading will be seen as as budgets are met. Inter-business 
an important sharing mechanism for trkling will be a commercial 
the development of competences/skills. relationship crystallised by "transfer" 
Where vertical integration does exist pricing. Businesses may be allowed to 
internal trading will generally be take the "commercial" decision to 
compulsory. trade in the open market instead. 
Divisional Functions, There will be staff at divisional level There will be few staff at divisional 
Services and Resources: (other than the DMD) with level and what there-arc will be in 
responsibility for strategic (i. e. not just financial/control positions. There may 
control) inputs to business plans and - be the provision of incidental services 
performance. These inputs (-"on-call" generally of a "non-strategic" nature. 
or compulsory) may augment or Businesses may be given the "right" to 
replace existing business processes. go "outside" for these services. 
Pan-Divisional Processes: 
integrating Systems Inter-business task forces; sharing key Ad-hoc, crisis-driven project teams 
people; Mson roles at divisional level, may be in evidence but the norm will 
standardised operational systems; be for a purposive separation of 
divisional wide training in businesses and a lack of any 
standardised skills/knowledgc etc. are integrating devices. In general, 
examples of ongoing integrative monthly divisional "board' meetings 
activities in cooperative divisions. and annual "strategy" conferences will 
These occur at levels other than the be the sole, structural, inter- 
GM. connections generally between 
business GMs. 
Measurement Systems A focus on broad subjective and A focus on business specific financial 
objective measures and group based outputs unless these are unsatisfactory' 
goals- A "balanced scorecard" in whichL case a crisis intervention 
cmphasising process inputs and mode will bring attention to other 
outputs as well as financial parameters operating parameters but still within 
the individual business. 
Rewards and incentives GMs' incentives are linked to- GMs' incentives are based on the 
divisional performance. profit performance of their own 
business. Any divisional component 
will be small with mom a flavour of 
"profit sharing" than incentive, 
Table 4.2 
----Classification of 
Cooperative and Non-cooperative-Pattems and Themes 
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The overall classification of a division as a "cooperative" organisation is not 
contingent on all of the above indicators being noted but more on the basis of 
14 
sufficient of them being present to constitute a "syndrome' of cooperativeness . In 
particular it is insufficient that a DMD espouses a view of cooperation if he/she does 
not indicate the presence of significant structures/processes/systems to enable 
cooperation within the division. 
14 Inevitably the classification of divisions involves a degree ofjudgement by the researcher but the 
basis for such judgements are presented in the cases for others to evaluate. 
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Chapter 5 
COOPERATIVE DIVISIONS 
"There is no reasonfor Divisional Office to be here unless we 
are pan-European. In my view administering and controlling 
is not enough. 
(Human Resource Director - Division G) 
The divisions in the study are powerful organisations that can stand alone as medium 
to large independent companies (Table 5.1). Their turnovers range from E80mil to 
L41 00mil and employee numbers from I 100 to 6600 with the scope of their 
operations being world-wide in some cases and limited to the UK in others. 
Customers include large industrial purchasers, wholesale and retail distributors and 
consumers. Other than a personal assistant (PA) other ftmctional and process 
personnel reporting to the Divisional Managing Director (DMD) vary between 
divisions. While the DMD-Division D I, for example has a part-time financial 
controller as his only other direct report his company colleague, the DMD-Division 
D2 had four other functional reports but eschews a finance director. Size and scope 
offers little guidance in terms of divisional structure with some large, international 
divisions having fewer divisional staff than small UK based ones. The DMDs 
themselves are all males, aged in their mid-40s or older who have risen through the 
ranks of business management often in the company they are now with. 
The twelve divisions can be categorised into two broad types. The first category is 
consistent with the division as an expression of an integrated business, exploiting 
capability-linked, economies of scope between the individual units or between the 
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units and divisional level expertise. i. e. An emphasis on divisional value from 
conjoint activity. This category is referred to as the 'cooperative' division and is the 
focus of this chapter. 
The second type is consistent with the division being a set of stand-alone businesses 
which are under one management for reasons of administrative efficiency and ease of 
general management control. i. e. An emphasis on divisional value from separate 
business activity. The businesses are not managed in the classically "competitive" 
way (Hill, 1994) as divisional managers are not arms length but are actively, 
operationally interventionist and are notjust in place to correct poor performance or 
remove under-performing management. These are labelled 'non-cooperative' to 
reflect the purposively stand-alone, separated nature of the businesses and the 
limited nature of their interactions. This category is the focus of the next chapter. 
5.1 The Cooperative Division 
The five divisions described in this chapter display a 'cooperative' orientation in 
terms of divisional management, organisational structures, processes, systems and 
mindsets. Typically these divisions exhibit the following broad similarities which 
differentiate them from the non-cooperative category. 
The primary source of divisional value is seen to derived from the common 
capabilities and processes that underlie the disparate produci outputs of the 
businesses. While the uniqueness of the market activities of the businesses are left 
to the business to manage, the underlying capabilities are aggressively managed at 
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divisional level. Divisional control tends to be systematically (i. e. not just fire- 
fighting) oriented to less objective behavioural inputs (e. g. processes, requisite 
skills, people development) associated with these capabilities as well as the 
traditional M-fonn output measures. 
2. The benefits of divisional membership are primarily derived from functional and 
process guidance from the divisional level experts and the team benefits of 
interaction and sharing between the businesses. These divisions reflect 
organisational attempts to harness conjoint learning between the businesses and/or 
between the businesses and the divisional level. In some case strategic functions 
are removed from the businesses and become a primaryfacility benefit ( carried 
out on behalf of the businesses rather than in conjunction with them). Secondary 
benefits arise from the centralisation of service basedfacilities such as computing 
or training/personnel and group value such as the purchasing of common inputs. 
3. Strategic management of the cooPerative division is oriented towards the division 
as a whole. Whilst the business managers still have authority and responsibility 
for their individual businesses, this is established within a context of the business 
being a component of the division wherein responsibilities for specific divisional 
goals and active participation in pan-divisional processes are as important. The 
divisional team view the division as one business of which the business managers 
have stewardship of an integral part. 
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4. Organisational structure reflects the integration of the business units each other or 
with the divisional level with divisional staff having responsibility and authority 
for processes and/or functions that are strategically important for business success. 
The Divisional Managing Director (DMD) is a prime driver of inter-business 
processes and pan-divisionalism as well as being actively interventionist at the 
business unit level. The administrative duties of monitoring outputs and 
intervening when these outputs are unsatisfactory is not neglected but is not seen 
as the primary role of the position. Performance bonuses tend to linked to 
divisional as well as business unit performance. 
5.2 The Cases 
The first four cases are based on interviews with one divisional level executive and 
the fifth comprises discussions with other divisional staff, the business managers of 
units and members of their management team who are in charge of functional areas 
in the business. 
5.3 Division D2 - Manufacturing Automotive Components 
"It's structured that way because it is process related.. certain 
products use the processes that we know .. ifI was going tofocus on 
where we shouldput our real value added activity it's in the process 
The parent' company is a broadly based engineering group with four divisions 
operating from over thirty locations throughout Europe. The company. has grown by 
acquisition and employs 5000 people generating a turnover of L400mil. The route to 
1 Unless otherwise noted all figures and quotes for all parent companies in the research are from 
their 1997 Annual Report. 
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being world class is stated to be the provision of "innovative solutions" to 
customers' problems and through 'focus(ing) more tightly on the group's core 
engineering competences which offer the most attractive returns in global markets. 
The company is seen as one that has promised much but delivered little, 
e. g. "(Company) has been a company in recoveryfor as long as any 
investor can care to remember .. much of (Company's) work will be to change its culture to work as a coherent group - rather than 
disparate companies - over the medium term ". 
(Financial Times, November, 1997) 
Employing 2000 people Division D2 generated 1996 revenues of E130m from 
businesses with operations throughout Western Europe. Throughout 1995-1996 the 
division had undergone a period of rationalisation by selling off "non-core " 
businesses. 
"We initially started with afocus on having three businesses which 
were sort of counter cyclical, you know all the good words you get 
out of the books ... you've got to 
have three legs ofa stool haven't 
you? We quickly came to the conclusion that you can only be 
specialist in onefield. " 
The division now comprises four businesses which manufacture and market 
automotive components from ten manufacturing locations in what is a global, capital 
intensive, mature and increasingly concentrated industry. The businesses sell to car 
manufacturers who are also part of a global, mature, capital intensive, concentrated 
industry that is additionally characterised by over-capacity and intense rivalry. 
Customers are engaged in an ongoing process of rationalising suppliers, "when they 
design a model they only want to talk to ten people about dividing up the bits 
5-6 
betweenthem". and are highly demanding in terms of service, just in time (JIT) 
delivery, quality and real price reductions. The customer cooperate with their 
suppliers to develop cost improvements as a driver of price reductions, i. e. "cost 
down-price down". 
The DMD has been with the company for four years having spent a considerable part 
of his earlier career working in the automobile industry. Reporting to him are the four 
Business Managers (BMs), a Commercial Director, who has helped develop the 
division to its current fonn, and four other "specialists in certain areas that are 
availablefor, loan to individual companies that need specialist information ". 
One is a Computer Aided Design (CAD) expert, another a press and press work 
specialist, a third is an expert in facilities engineering and factory layouts while the 
fourth is an ex-MD of one of the businesses who is available for more general input. 
As well as specialist process inputs to the businesses and manufacturing locations, 
this cadre of divisional staff serves as a bank of available resource to deal with crises 
in the business units. 
" Where we've had a problem with a company we've been able to put 
one ofthese guys in to actually go and run the company. So, business 
goes off; fire the BM, - put one ofthese guys in; go andfind an BM.. 
interim management. " 
Whilst a useful stop-gap during crises, these specialists are primarily in place "to 
bring expertise and knowledge and train the people" and as such are significant 
components of "the value added bit that we think we bring". 
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Unlike his counterpart in Division DI (described in Chapter 6) the DMD has no 
finance staff, preferring that function to be carried out on his behalf by the corporate 
finance group. 
5.3.1 Membership Benefits 
The matrix of benefits is set out within the general matrix detailed in Chapter 3 Le.: 
Source of Value 
Process Position 
Vertical FACILITIES GUIDANCE 
Direction of 
. ................. .............................. . ... .............................. . .................. 
Interaction Horizontal TEAM GROUP 
Guidance: Facilities: 
" General management support and e Replacement BMs for under- 
advice from the DMD and performing units. 
another divisional General 0 (Planned) centralisation of sales 
Manager including future and design functions. 
orientation. 
" CAD, Press and Engineering 
support and development. 
Team: Group: 
Capacity coordination and * Discount on steel purchases. 
sharing.. * Order winning from the 
credibility of being part of a 
larger group. 
As well as the standard general management inputs the businesses benefit from the 
guidance of divisional experts in strategic processes. These experts work with their 
functional counterparts in the business units. By linking the capacity planning of 
common equipment each business gains from available capacity in other units when 
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it needs it but also from the potential utilisation of its own spare capacity in quiet 
times. Furtherfacifily benefits are planned in the development of one integrated sales 
teams and fewer design centres. In the longer term this implies significantly 
increased business inter-dependence. The group value from common purchasing has 
only recently been realised. 
5.3.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy 0 The division needs to be an integrated whole within 
which the businesses carry out a divisionally 
specified role. 
0 The businesses are components of the division and 
should be integrated as such. 
0A prime source of value comes from the process 
capability of the businesses which are similar 
(related) and so can be pan-divisionally linked and 
improved. 
Divisional Functions 0 Several strategic process support executives are in 
place at divisional level. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 Structured linkages are limited to a monthly 
meeting of BMs at which a divisional agenda is 
formulated and forwarded. 
Measurement *A variety of financial and non-financial measures 
of business performanc 
*e 
are in place. 
0 The division is measured by means of the sum of 
the individual businesses. i. e. no integrated 
divisional measures are currently used. 
Performance incentives 9 50% of the performance bonus of the BMs is linked 
to divisional profit performance and 50% to the 
profit performance of their business. The 
management team of the BM have 25% of their 
performance bonus linked to the divisional results. 
This division can be seen to be in transition from the M-form practice and philosophy 
of separate units towards attempting to establish processes integration and linkage. 
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The functional staff at divisional level, the change to divisionally oriented 
performance bonuses and the espoused divisional "agenda7' are initial moves towards 
a structure and philosophy of cooperation to exploit connnon functions, processes 
and capital equipment underpinning the disparate product outputs of the businesses. 
5.3.3 Description 
The Divisional Managing Director (DMD) was interviewed at his office on one of 
the business sites in Birmingham. From customers, competitors and other global 
industry sources the divisional level imposes a number of financial and non-financial 
benchmarks as operational performance hurdles for the businesses. "Utilisation of 
space, parts per million quality, utilisation oflabour number ofsuggestions per 
factory and so on ". As such the Division is "sort ofhalfway between totally process 
and some product as well" in its current strategic orientation. Expertise in process 
rather than specific product is seen to underpin the ability to offer "packages " rather 
than individual parts. This bundling enhances the value-added of the offering and has 
significant logistic and internal efficiency benefits for customers. The perceived 
value of such bundling, however, is not unanimous amongst the customers. "They 
like in the UK, they like it in Europe but the Americans don't like it one little bit". 
The (larger) American customers prefer the specialisation and volume benefits of 
individual component supply. 
Future orientation from the divisional level is seen to be an essential input to the 
businesses because the people in the operating units are "too busy looking at what 
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they are doing today to view the global scene ýs well as divisional level managers 
who are able go "get out a bit more on global basis and visit America, visit Japan, 
visit Brazil". The view that the operating BMs have neither the time nor the global 
exposure to develop an appropriate future orientation is not shared by them. "Some 
very lively debate " ensues "when they think they know where we should be going". 
An example of informal pressure to widen business horizons was when the DMD 
became concerned at the lack of any European (as opposed to UK) based orders for 
one of the businesses. At a monthly meeting in front of all the divisional team he 
challenged the BM to gain a European order and "put a bottle ofthampagne on it". 
The European order duly arrived and the bottle of champagne claimed. "It was light 
hearted, joking, but itfocused his mind ... that's why I use the word 'direction'. " 
A recently conducted internal survey has shown capacity imbalances across the 
business units. "Some areas are working overtime because they have a lack of 
capacity in a particular area and others have got machines sitting idle ". A nqw role 
for the divisional centre will be centred on capacity coordination across the factories 
to maximise utilisation and minimise costs. Another membership benefit accrues 
from the size of the division both from the additional central resources the division 
can support and from a market place perspective. 
"Size per se is an advantage. Critical mass in this business is crucial. 
We're pulling in work nowpurely because ofour size, no other reason. 
The individual companies would not have got it. " 
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An individual business that left the divisional 'fold' would "take afull order book 
which would runfor three orfour years " but would be unlikely to gain new long 
term business due to a lack of credible resource relative to the size of its potential 
customers. Centralising the price negotiation of steel enabled the Commercial 
Director to "save about ten times his salary" with cost reduction based on total 
volume discounts that no individual business could obtain on its own. 
The division also adds through "growing the people that will take over" and giving 
direction in development of the process needed for the future. 
" Ourjob is to get the engineers, get people trained and get the 
knowledge of those processes so that in ten years time we're here 
and we have been winning orders on the capability ofdoing that. 
That's what I mean by direction. " 
The DMD is purposively moving towards a more integrated division as opposed to a 
collection of stand-alone units. This is partly in response to market demands and 
pard y "because having been at the other end of the business I know what's 
required". In the proposed divisional structure there will be a reduced number of 
quoting ccntres, more centralised design functions and increased amalgamation of 
businesses into larger, more functionally organised units. Such an holistic view is in 
contradiction of historical (and current) functioning and perspectives. "There's still a 
culture around here that wants individual operating units with their own P and Ls, 
it's outdated". 
The next step "breaks the links on the commercialftont which starts it all. " 
Currently each of the businesses has separate sales people calling on the same 
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customers. The businesses use the argument that with 2 or even 3 quotes for the same 
work then the chances of one of the divisional units winning the order is increased. 
"'Ifyou make us one we shall automatically lose two opportunities "'. The 
duplicated, wasted effort and the fact that "we should be able to decide where it's 
cheapest to make it andpick that one anyway" has a compelling logic for the DMD 
which is yet to be fully endorsed by his BMs. At a more subtle level the prevention 
of multi-quoting removes the potential of competition between the business units. 
"Competition's with the outside world not within. " The organisational and cultural 
changes needed to bring about a more integrated approach cannot happen "without a 
certain amount ofpain in some areas " and at times "will have to be imposed and we 
take the consequences ". 
To cncouragc a broadcr divisional pcrspcctivc the bonus clements of the BMs has 
been changed from being totally related to individual business performance to being 
50% related to divisional performance. The management level below the BM have 
25% of their bonus related to divisional performance. Currently bonuses are related 
to financial performance only but "the next step I believe should be to take a 
proportion that's linked to management task". Annual financial performance is seen 
to be a short term measure whereas the "ahead looking has to comefrom 
management tasks". Rewards based on inputs rather than outputs will always 
involve "a level ofgreyness. "A manager will "always think he's done more than 
you do, but it's the principle that counts, thefact that you'vefocused his mind " 
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Other than a monthly divisional meeting there are no formal inter-linkages between 
the businesses and little exchange of staff. Internal movements are rare because 
"while you're a bit tight on people you're causing yourseýf another problem " if 
people are moved around. A new monthly forum has been established between the 
glbig " BMs and some of the divisional staff to discuss future divisional direction. 
One of the purposes of this operating committee is achieve commitment to an agreed 
divisional agenda through encouraging input and participation by operating business 
heads. After the joint decision, it is expected that 'cabinet' solidarity will be 
forthcoming even from dissenters. "You can sayyourpiece but then ifyoufindyou 
can't accept this and go along with it then you resign. Because that's the way the 
game'splayed". 
The divisional results are reported as a set of separate company figures. "They go in 
as separate companies which I don't agree with. They should. go in altogether, we'll 
never get them altogether unless theygo in all together. " 
One of the problems arising from this is the time spent explaining the negative 
variance from budget of individual companies when others are ahead of budget and 
the division as a whole is achieving it's targets. "... you've got a balancing act going 
on haven't you and isn't that yourjob, to determine the balancing act? " 
5.3.4 Summary 
Division D2 is in a state of flux from being a collection of autonomous, 'competitive9 
units to an arnalgam of 'cooperative' partners. The relatedness of the businesses is 
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seen to be most exploitable at the level of process capability and so divisional 
functions are in place to help with process improvement. Further systems and 
procedures are being introduced to promote more pan-divisional orientation and 
behaviour. 
Tension exists between the desire of the BMs for the businesses to remain stand- 
alone and the actions and proposals of the DMD. This tension is such that the DMD 
has to "impose" his ideas and "take the consequences" of unhappy operational 
managers. i. e. behaviour is being imposed first - hearts and minds must follow (or 
leave). 
5.4 Division G- Manufacturing Vehicles 
"We have some very competent people but major issue is getting them 
comfortable with cross-border minds. I don'tjust mean countries when 
I say 'cross-border'I'm talking offunctions, I'm talking of businesses... 
being willing and able to throw your thoughts across. " 
(Human Resource Director) 
The parent company is an international firm of 91,000 employees with a turnover of 
L27,000m from 3 business sectors in four regional divisions. The corporate 
philosophy is esp4sed as "supplying products of the highest efficiency yet at a 
reasonable price. " (Company Handbook). Globalisation has been a company goal 
since its inception and it now manufactures in 36 countries and maintains sales 
outlets in many more in an industry of "borderless mega-competition. " In 1996 the 
company achieved record sales and operating income through its operating strategies 
of "competitive and innovative technologies " and "product development suited to 
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the characteristics of each individual market. " Despite awareness of local needs the 
company states its intention to "promote not onl self-reliance " in the four regional Y 
operations but also "intracompany product complementation worldwide. " 
"We havefocused our attention on quickening our response to 
changes in the global business environment while promoting 
the autonomy ofourfour major regional operations. 
(President's Message) 
Division G is one of the four regional divisions. It employs 6600 people and 
generated 1996 revenues of L4100m from 24 businesses across Europe. Selling 
through 2000 distributors in mature, concentrated markets the businesses compete by 
differentiating their products through brand image, and product features underpinned 
by technical (engineering) excellence. "We market ourselves on an 'advanced' 
concept .. we are ahead .. we 
have something more to offer. " 
Three product categories are manufactured and marketed by the businesses. Despite 
apparent dissimilarity at a product market level. (i. e. functions-benefits, customers, 
competitors etc. ) the businesses are related through the same technological capability 
in that motors that are part of each of the product categories i. e. a 'classical' 2 core 
competence. This is not without its drawbacks as 
"there are new themes we've got to pushforward, but there is this 
solid base of excellence ofa product driven item as our priorityfor 
customer service and support .. at the same time we are trying to lever 
ourselves more towards a marketing oriented company, we have to do that. 
Divisional staff are numerous and organised in a complex "matrix arrangement". 
The Business Managers (BMs) report to the Divisional Managing Director (DMD) 
2 'Classical' in the sense of core competence as proposed by Prahalad and Hamel (1990). 
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who also assumes functional oversight of Marketing and Sales. He also has a deputy 
DMD in charge of Research and Development and a deputy DMD in charge of 
Engineering and Manufacturing. The DMD and his deputies form an executive team. 
Also reporting to the DMD are Product Directors. of the three major product groups 
as well as the Directors of Business Administration, Finance, Human Resources and 
Service and Parts. 
"... we have a Business Manager of Germany and he's responsiblefor 
car sales, power equipment motor cycle sales. So he has a dotted line 
relationship with the directors ofeach ofthose productfunctions to make 
sure he is coordinating the goals and directions ofeach of them. " 
5.4.1 Membership Benefits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
General management support and * R&D 
input including future orientation. 9 Distribution arrangements and 
Engineering and Manufacturing cost allocation 
support and development. 9 Pricing 
Human resource development 0 Brand Management 
Team: Group: 
" Capability enhancement from Reputation 
transferring knowledge and skills 
" Sharing of product knowledge and 
skills. 
This is a division which has a value perspective dominated by adding value over that 
of the stand-alone businesses. Aggressive guidance in key strategic functions is 
supplemented by enforcing team benefits embodied in human capital (trans-location) 
and pan-divisional integration of common capabilities and products (matrix). In 
addition, among otherfacility benefits, the division takes the issue of pricing as its 
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responsibility to optimise divisional returns and not allow local marketing and 
currency issues to take precedence. 
5.4.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy 0 The division is an integrated whole with the 
business units as components of that whole under 
the stewardship of the BM. 
0 The prime source of value resides in the pan- 
divisional capabilities of which each businesses is 
an expression. 
Divisional Functions 0 Many strategic pýocess support executives are at 
divisional level. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 An extensive horizontal matrix organisation with 
staff responsible for pan-divisional products and 
processes. 
0A system of staff trans-location as well as ad hoc 
trans-business taskforces for particular issues. 
A Divisional newsletter reinforces an integrated 
view. 
Pan-divisional "requirements" promulgated to the 
BMs 
Measurement o Businesses are controlled through financial 
measures. 
0A variety of behavioural and organisational 
activities are required of the BMs 
0 The division is measured as the sum of the 
individual businesses. 
Performance incentives o The performance bonus of BMs is based entirely on 
I the profitability of their business. 
Many organisational features of this division are aimed at promoting and maintaining 
an integrated, pan-divisional orientation from its component businesses. The matrix 
structure (horizontal processes overseen from outside the business) is almost the 
antithesis of the M-form philosophy. Across selected areas it organisationally joins 
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together what the traditional M-form has disconnected. It thus takes away the 
strategic and operational autonomy of the BMs and leaves them accountable for, but 
not necessarily in control of, important parts of their business. This is not a trivial 
matter and the need for a new form of business thinking is brought out more fully in 
the description below. 
5.4.3 Description 
The Divisional Human Resources Director (HRD) was interviewed in his office at 
the divisional headquarters. He has been with the company since 1989 when he 
joined the division as it was undergoing a change in organisational perspective. In the 
history of Division G the "big move " to such a complex divisional structure has been 
relatively recent. The first business established was a sales and service activity in one 
European country in 1962. From there the division evolved until, in the mid 1980's, a 
collection of "individualfiefdonis " existed in various countries across Europe. Some 
of these business including the manufacturing of "relatively routine " products. In the 
mid 1980's the establishment of a major manufacturing facility of "core products ", 
allied to the vision of Europe post- 1992, caused the need to look at marketing, 
logistics and manufacturing "in a much more pan-European way. " Some major 
customers were becoming pan-European in their purchasing and this seemed a 
precursor of all large customers doing the same. Previously happy to have "national 
local activity" the company established a European Divisional Office in 1990 with 
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the specific role of coordinating current actions within Europe and looking for 
"maximum customer service capability. " 
Every six months all the BMs, and other divisional level staff, attend a2 day group 
meeting with the DMD and his deputies to review overall results, look at major 
operational issues and review 3 year strategic horizons. While profit performance 
remains the major control measure of the businesses there are also a variety of non 
financial requirements which are discusses at the meeting. This is the only formal 
divisional meeting between the heads of the businesses although the 6 monthly 
European Works Council meetings, attended by the BM and an elected member of 
the workforce, acts as another structured contact. The BMs, however, have "a very 
good network among themselves. " 
The divisional level is proactively influential in the businesses, 
I'... we have a three times a year employee magazine in seven languages 
which gives information about pan-European direction, business activities 
etc. Each location generally has aformal structure ofa monthly meetingfor 
all people at the locationfor review ofthe past month and major issuesfor 
the coming month and anypan-European issues impacting on that location. 
We also require a weekly meeting ofthe localpresident and his managers. 
(emphasis added) 
Focusing on the development of pan-European efficiency and capability the 
Divisional Office has attempted to influence through consensus seeking rather than 
"diktat .. a gentle 
balance... supporting rather than driving". Developing a sense of 
future needs from the business and its customers, it has seen its role as supporting the 
businesses in meeting those requirements and the associated three year goals. The 
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various functions of the Divisional Office take the responsibility for developing 
business capability where it is perceived to be lacking. Relying on self-initiated 
business inter-relating is seen as insufficient as a process to achieve this. 
"We mayfind that in Germany they are lacking in certain (people) 
capabilities which we might have elsewhere in Europe. In that case we 
look at cross borderfertilisation. We either establish some sort of project 
group which brings that capability to Germany or we will do a longer term 
assignment to Germany where somebody goes overfor 2 to 3 years and 
does that rolefor somebody in Germany tofollow up. We might coordinate 
that need amongst 2 or 3 locations ofthey're lacking in that capability. " 
While there is still a degree of "relative defensiveness" and "this is my kingdom', 
from some of the individual businesses the adjustment to a matrix style of 
management continues. "Increasingly people are realising that although they are P 
and L responsible, more and more of what they do is driven by matrix. " Pricing for 
example, is geared to cross country currency issues, and various costs that are borne 
by the business such as distribution charges, are controlled from an overall 
divisional perspective rather than that of the individual business. In some cases 
individual business performance is purposely sub-optimised relative to its stand- 
alone potential. 
"Once it was about making enough profit in the business, now it's 
about pan-European success. We can afford to take a little less profit 
in one country in order to develop sales in another. " 
(emphasis added), 
In a similar vein a single European currency will entail a careful look at required 
profits from various regions with a view to shifting profit where necessary. i. e. 
whereas the individual businesses presently make profits (and losses) from currency 
5-21 
movements this too will become a pan-divisional matter that will influence business 
performance outside of the control, and perhaps contrary to the instincts and 
perceived self-interest, of the business manager. 
The need for "lateral cross-border minds " in the broadest sense is seen to be a 
challenge that may be beyond some of the division's "most loyal, hardworking and 
long serving citizens ". The switch from "one man one boss " to "one man and many 
bosses " and the need for people to "think; plan, act and decide a lot more on their 
own " and yet "to take into account many contexts " has brought requirements for 
new forms of business thinking and management which some "very competent" 
senior people are ill equipped to meet. In some cases the problems are motivational 
and philosophical rather than behavioural. The willingness of people formerly 
focused in one product area, to learn from something that has been achieved in a 
traditionally separate product area is a necessary re-orientation i. e. the development 
of an appropriate pan-divisional "mind set". 
Despite the need for a divisional perspective from local managers there are issues 
where the choice of "driving" or "supporting" by Divisional Office is far from clear 
cut. At the level of product for example, there continues to be "constant debate about 
European image verses local image, the modification ofaproductfrom a basic core 
to what each national activity requires ". While seen by the Divisional Office to be 
an issue that is best handled centrally to take advantage of a broader information 
base, local marketing managers have their own strong motives for retaining control. 
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Notwithstanding the divisional focus on lateral processes and linkages the 
performance incentive systems for BMs are still geared entirely to the performance of 
their stand-alone business. This paradox is recognised at divisional level where the 
incentive system for business management is currently under examination. The short 
term aim is to bring reward in line with overall divisional philosophy and hence 
91 encourage lateral thinking and getpeople more willing to be active and interested 
outside their local domain "3 . The practical difficulties of rearranging managerial 
pay systems are significant however. Similarly the practice of the division reporting 
to corporate as a set of individual business (country) results continues. 
Despite the commitment to a cooperative, pan-divisional perspective the value-added 
by divisional interventions is not manifestly clear. 
"What does Divisional Office bring to the game? 
Well I think thejury's still out on that after seven years. 
5.4.4 Summary 
The division exhibits a strongly integrating orientation as it attempts to optimise total 
organisational value, even at the expense of an individual business. It maintains a 
focus on underlying, shared competences as the key to competitive success. Both of 
these factors are consistent with the division as a cooperative enterprise exploiting 
non-tradeable, firm-specific knowledge as economies of scope for several business 
units (Teece, 1982; Hill, 1994). 
3 At a dinner 12 months after the interview the HRD informed me that the BMs now have 30% of 
their total remuneration linked to divisional results. 
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What is also evident however is that achieving and maintaining such an orientation is 
a battle against the preferences of the businesses. Cooperation does not appear to be a 
self-evidently, mutually beneficial dynamic - it need to be enforced through 
hierarchy. This general paradox/dilemma will be taken up later. 
5.5 Division H- Distribution of Branded Alcoholic Drinks 
"Ifsomebody uses that expression in this business, 'he's not a team 
player', that individual has a big, bigproblem with our culture because 
everything is about 'hey, we're all in this together' " 
CEO - Company H* 
Business Services Finance Legal Human Resources Marketing & Strategy 
Other Divisions (3) DMD - Division H 
. 
Putiness Development Dep4ty DMD Finance Personnel Sales Development I Systems.... 
other Businesses (4) BM-UK 
Systems Finance Personnel Purcha; ing/ supply Marýeting 
Selling com panies 
reports to the group board 
bold = divisional members 
The parent group is a global conglomerate made up of two major food and one drinks 
company with a combined turnover of L9000mil and employing 64000 people. The 
group is "is grasping the concept ofshareholder value with the zeal ofa religious 
convert" (Financial Times, December, 1996) to lift its return on capital which is 
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perceived as mediocre by the City. The drinks company, of which Division 11 is a 
part, has a turnover of E3500mil from four regionally based divisions employing 
I 1000 people. The company adheres to four strategic themes throughout its 
divisions; "building existing brands through continued investment; developing new 
brands; strengthening its presence in new and emerging markets and growing 
through relevant add-on acquisitions and alliances ". It has been created out "a 
hodgepodge ofacquired companies and brews ". (Financial Times, December 1996) 
Division H is made up of six "national marketing companies Py or country based 
businesses which have a combined turnover of L860mil and staff of 2700. The 
Divisional Managing Director (DMD) has Directors of Finance, Personnel, Sales 
Development, Systems and Business Development reporting to him as well as a 
Deputy DMD and the five BMs. The deputy DMD acts as the head of an aggregated 
business made up of several of the smaller (sales) countries as well as Eurasia. 
(Figure 5.1 ). The UK business constitutes the original core of the company and is the 
second largest business in the company in terms of sales. Because of its importance 
in the overall portfolio its annual strategic plan is presented directly to the Executive 
Committee of the parent group. The BM of the UK company (informant) joined the 
company 5 years ago in his current role. As BM he co-ordinates activities within his 
business and between the business and the divisional and corporate functions. His 
major role is 
"about setting direction, defining the targets and measuring 
performance against the plan. Are we on track? Are we on track? 
Are we on track? " 
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He has Directors of Marketing, Systems, Finance, Personnel and Purchasing/Supply 
giving functional and service support to the managers of his three "selling 
companies ". Selling through a variety of distributors the business competes through 
product differentiation based primarily on brand development and promotion, "we 
are always doing things on the back ofa brand". 
While the overall market is mature, the product segments are volatile. The industry is 
concentrated with the UK company having an increasingly strong position against a 
few other major players. 
"Overfour years now we are growing share andpulling away. The 
distributive competition are weak and in disarray. They've given up their 
field salesforces, they've turned in on themselves and are cutting costs. 
They're in a downward spiral, " 
The most significant competitive threat comes from customers' own label product 
which is making market gains on the basis of price. The major strategic challenge for 
the UK business is to maintain future sales and margin growth at past levels. 
5.5.1 Membership Benefits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
" General management support. * Manufacturing (C) 
" Human resource support * Brands management (C) 
" Sales support and development. * Training 
" Marketing support (C) 
Team: Group: 
Capability enhancement from Price maintenance 
transferring knowledge and skills 
(embodied in people). 
This is a complex division where some of the benefits derive from the company (C) 
level, some from the divisional level and some from inter-business relationships i. e. 
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the divisions themselves are an expression of the company's quest to optimise value 
through integrated activities and processes. In all benefit categories there is at least 
one major process aimed to enhance the value of the stand-alone businesses. Whether 
this value is greater than the allocated costs may be a moot point in the eyes of 
business managers (see description below) but begging the question of such 
measurement is typical of other divisions working within integrated value paradigms. 
5.5.2 Perspective and Pattern 
"... basically it all seems very straightforward to me but it's not really. " 
Divisional Philosophy * The division is an integrated whole wherein the 
businesses are operational expressions of the 
divisional strategy. 
0 The prime source of value resides in the pan- 
divisional brand capabilities 
I Divisional Functions 0 Many strategic process support executives are at 
divisional and group level. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 An extensively inter-linked organisation with staff 
responsible for pan-divisional product positioning, 
pricing and brand management. 
0 Ongoing requirements for inter-business and inter- 
divisional staff transfer. 
Measurement * Businesses (BMs) are controlled through various 
financial and non-financial measures. 
*A variety of behavioural and organisational 
activities are required of the BMs. i. e. inputs are 
also the subject of divisional influence. 
* The division is measured as the sum of the 
individual businesses. 
Performance incentives *A complex system of performance bonuses are in 
place for the BMs which includes business 
performance but is quantitative loaded towards 
divisional and longer term (3 year) company 
performance 
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The organisational structures, processes and systems of this division are manifestly 
integrative. It is a complex hybrid of M-fonn and functional separation. e. g. 
manufacturing is a separate function and brand management is managed centrally 
while local product/market activities (sales, promotion, customer relations, etc. ) are 
the responsibility of the businesses. A complex system of behavioural and financial 
output measures reflect the systematic intervention of the divisional level, and multi- 
component performance bonuses orient BMs to divisional (and company) 
perfoimance over that of their individual business. This is an unusually integrated 
organisation which is indeed difficult to understand from the outside however simple 
it appears to the BM - informant. 
5.5.3 Description 
The business manager (BM) of the UK business was interviewed at his business 
headquarters in Essex. He was presenting his strategic plan to the parent company 
Board on the next day and took me through his voluminous set of slides during our 
lengthy conversation. There are "two sets of ýpartnersthe businesses have outside 
of their own divisional structure, one set is the marketing people as and the other is 
the manufacturing operations controlled by a separate Corporate Director. This latter 
partnership addresses "cost ofgoods, lead times on replenishment, quality ofgoods ". 
The group level Marketing and Strategy Director has overall responsibility for brands 
throughout the group. He oversees a number of "Brand Directors - with 
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responsibility for the established "global" brands and the smaller "promise " brands. 
The Brand Director 
"is responsiblefor defining a global strategyfor the brand So that will 
be its positioning statement. He will make sure that any advertising 
campaigns, whether he generates them within his team, or in any ofthe 
national marketing companies, is consistent with brand strategy. " 
The teams involved with particular brands are "beginning to be made quite small" 
so that "covering the world" are groups of fifteen to eighteen people at group level 
for each of the major brands. Thus while the divisions (and businesses) have 
stewardship of the brands they do not have ownership. This is an important pan- 
divisional issue because there are differences in product and brand positioning from 
.. country to country. 
One particular brand, for example, is deliberately priced too high 
for the market in the UK in order to support its premium position in Spain where it 
has a larger market share. This 'sacrifice' in the UK is reflective of brand marketing, 
management and strategy as an interactive process between the corporate level, the 
divisions and the businesses. 
The BM meets with his fellow BMs regularly, as he does with the brand teams, to 
pursue mutual "strategic imperatives ". The selling companies within the business 
are in constant meeting and review with the group marketing people. 
"So we're always attacking cost ofgoods, lead time and quality through 
these (operational) people. We're always looking at strategy, advertising and 
communication with these (marketing) people. Anything Ipresent to him 
(DMD) or him (Group CEO) or to the parent company can only be presented 
on the understanding the these (marketing) people have signed it off So one 
ofour core cultures as a consequence is partnership, teamwork. 
(emphasis added) 
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The various levels of support, partnership and teamwork do not come without cost or 
question however, "our overheads are coming down but the central overhead 
allocation goes up ... which really pisses me offas you can imagine ". 
The Division is heavily committed to training and people development as a strategic 
process "that leads to a shared responsibilityfor delivering results" (emphasis 
added). For the past five years an average of over f 1000 per employee per year has 
been spent on training. 
"We've had initiatives on selling, trade marketing, category management.. 
we've put together some visions andprinciples teamwork partnership, 
open communication, fteedom to experiment, people with skills, recognition 
of the importance ofpeople, developing this culture ofshared responsibility. 
There is an ongoing focus on "developing world class people " within a formal 
framework of management development. A measure is taken, every year, of the 
extent to which managerial and senior functional roles can be covered by existing 
peoPle. BMs are measured on the extent to which they have internal cover for all 
seniorjobs. While the divisional structure has remained the same, and this constancy 
is seen to be important, "one of the reasons we put down to our success is the 
stability of our structure ", people are constantly being moved between businesses . 
The UK BM sees himself as one of the "long service people " in his business having 
been there for five years. This movement of people is a purposive part of 
organisational development. 
"I also get measured on the number ofpeople I export. So I am not 
allowed to say, and sometimes Ifeel like saying, 'I need himfor 
another year'O that's not an option I get. " 
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The "synergistic benefits" of cost savings through common delivery systems, 
invoice and credit systems, etc. add value to the selling companies within the 
business. Also "new ideas, newpeople moving acrossftom the different businesses " 
are seen to be important benefits of belonging to the Division which would be lost to 
any part of the organisation that operated on a stand-alone basis. 
The bonus system for managers is a complex amalgam of measures, organisational 
levels and time span. Split between typical financial indices as well as "personal 
objectives ", the bonus of the UK BM is weighted to reflect business performance, 
divisional performance and company performance. Whereas the business and 
divisional components are annual measures the company factor is based on a rolling 
three year figure and is leveraged such that "you can earn potentially 165% ofyour 
annual salary each year ". This multi-level, multi-focus, multi-time frame bonus 
system is common across the group, 
"... this rolling three years is every year over the past three years and that 
is huge. Everybody in the company is being measured on the same measure. 
So when you start looking at this structure here with these partnership 
arrangements and 'what's the bottom line positionfor the company? 
then everybody's very keen to track it because it's big. It's big cash. " 
5.5.4 Summary 
This is a complex, cooperative divisional structure based on shared accountabilities 
both at a horizontal level (i. e. between businesses) and a vertical level (division- 
business, corporate-division and corporate-business). Although a complicated 
interweaving of process, structure and function, the mix is an internally consistent 
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reflection of a strong orientation towards integrated functioning and a pan-divisional 
perspective. An emphasis on shared accountability and teamwork is bolstered by the 
requirement for multi-level strategic inputs and an incentive system loaded towards 
group results. Although the market is where the competitive battles take place the 
capability of the division in handling its major competitive weapon (i. e. brands) is 
the edge it has over rivals and one that is driven by shared knowledge and leaming. 
While the cost burden of division/corporate was raised as a bone of contention by the 
BM-informant there was not the sense of a thwarted quest for business autonomy or 
the business verses the division that is apparent in other cooperative divisions. 
Factors that may play a part include the long term nature of the culture of integration 
and the relative newness of the BM-informant. Perhaps, however, the opportunity to 
earn an annual bonus of 165% ofsalary based on total company performance plays 
some part in encouraging a more wholehearted commitment to cooperation. 
5.6 Division I- Manufacturing Pharmaceuticals 
Information in this case is relatively sparse mith the paucity of data being a function 
4 
of some real-life problems of interview-based research . Rather than discard it as 
4 This was an already rescheduled appointment with a7 week "lead-time". Arriving just prior to the 
scheduled interview time I waited in the reception area for 45 minutes before being shown to the 0 
informant's office. Having introduced himself he then left (in a harried state) to continue dealing with 
the international crisis of the day. Returning some 20 minutes later he suggested we go and have 
lunch and that I leave my recorder etc. in his office. At lunch in the canteen we spoke briefly and 
generally (having been joined by others not relevant to the research) before returning to his office 
where once again he was immediately forced to leave. He returned and we engaged in further brief 
and interrupted discourse during which he provided organisational charts etc. before regretfully 
announcing that he had to attend an important meeting for the rest of the afternoon. He also suggested 
he was envious of my 'academic' life free from the stress of management -I believe he was sincere! 
In the 3.0 hrs I spent on site I had managed approximately 20 minutes of fragmented 'interviewing'. 
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"incomplete" however it is retained as it does demonstrate some of the issues in the 
development of a cooperative division particularly the battle with the businesses. 
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Fig ure 5.2. Orga nisational Chart - Division I (si mplified) 
Division J is part of international company (turnover E4800mil) that belongs to an 
intemational health care group with 60,000 employees and a tumover of E8,500mil. 
Operating in 145 countries the group has continued a programme of divestment of 
non-core businesses to focus on its five major product segments. Company J 
develops, manufactures and globally markets a wide range of ethical 
pharmaceuticals New product development is a key strategic focus with its ability to 
"discover and commercialize " new products being considerably strengthened by 
"the largest annual research and development expenditure" in its history. With 
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1996 revenues of E3200m from 7300 employees Division J is the Europe division 
and comprises 5 country based businesses and II manufacturing facilities. 
5.6.1 Membership Benefits (for the manufacturing "division"). 
Guidance: Facilities: 
" Management advice and assistance Purchasing 
" Various technical and functional 
inputs. 
Team: Group: 
41 New product release capability. None ascertained 
Cost reductions through capacity 
sharing. 
What was a set of stand-alone factories have become geographically separate sites of 
the same manufacturing/supply capability. The country based businesses enjoy 
reduced costs and enhanced product release capability perhaps at the expense of the 
flexibility to meet last minute changes in customer mix or volume requirements. 
5.6.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy * Operations are pan-divisional capabilities rather 
than business-level functions. 
Divisional Functions 0 Significant numbers of support functions and 
personnel are in place to maintain the integrity 
and development of the operations. 
Pan-divisional Dynamics 
Integration * An extensively inter-linked organisation with 
staff responsible inter-business (factory) 
communication and activities. 
0 Ongoing and frequent meetings between factory 
managers. 
Measurement 0 Manufacturing is measured as a divisional activity 
with the individual factory measurements a 
component of this. 
Performance incentives 0 Factory managers are rewarded on the 
performance achievements of their own factories. 
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The focus on pan-unit processes and the systems and structures that develop and 
maintain interactive dynamics is clear. Again, consistent with other cooperative 
orientations in the study, inter-units cooperation has to be aggressively managed 
against autonomy-seeking business managers. In, a sense the 'default' organisational 
state seems to be towards stand-alone functioning. 
5.6.3. Description 
The Manufacturing Director was interviewed at divisional HQ. A major process in 
developing pan-divisional cooperation has been the inter-linking of the 
manufacturing capability of the businesses. The factories had once been under the 
control of the relevant business(country) manager (13M) but, for the past seven years, 
have been under the direct management of the Manufacturing Director while 
retaining links to the country-businesses. The move to separate the factories from 
business control had been vehemently resisted by the BMs and even seven years later 
remained a smouldering issue with some. 
When the factories were country based they had, due to the influence of the BM, 
focused their attention on that particular country and produced the array of products 
required. While other BMs could place orders these tended to be viewed as lower 
priority than the demands of the 'home' business. While the current Manufacturing 
Director had not been the incumbent when the initial integration of the factories into 
a manufacturing 'division' had been made, he has been in the position of managing 
the ongoing process of integration of II formerly separate operations. This has not 
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been an easy process as the BMs as a group viewed "manufacturing" as a necessary 
but constantly problematic part of their value chain activities which they believed 
they needed to directly control. In initial monthly meetings the manufacturing head 
felt that he spent all his time defending specific charges of poor quality, poor delivery 
and generally poor perfon-nance. (By implication many of these problems were 
deemed resolvable by shifting the factories back under business control). 
Despite these early difficulties he sees several, significant gains from combining the 
plants into one structure and believes that some of the BMs had now conceded as 
much. The most obvious benefit has been the significant cost savings enabled by a 
combined approach to capacity utilisation. One plant can now focus on a narrower 
range of products most suited to its technology and reap the benefits of scale and 
learning effects associated with reduced variety. At the same time this has enabled a 
more aggregated approach to demand management with consequent improvements in 
delivery and customer service. As well as these clear economic and service gains the 
Manufacturing Director attests strongly to the benefits of "shared learning". The 
factories are now focusing on world class manufacturing rather than on responding 
to business-specific product demands and particularly to last minute changes in 
schedules and product mix. They are now able to interact with each other and 
develop ideas and processes within a group context that was not feasible in the earlier 
organisation. 
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A significant number of staff (e. g. Planning, Production, Technology Transfer, 
Technical, Supply Directors) support the Manufacturing Director in what he 
described as a "matrix" organisatign. (Figure 5.2). While trying to avoid "micro- 
managing" specific factories he sees his divisional role in terins of setting overall 
frameworks and "conducting the orchestra" or "traffic management. " Developing 
operational and improvement targets and plans with his managers he monitors 
performance through real time measurement systems which he describes as a "core 
competence " of his division. He aggressively manages the linkages between the 
plants through group and one-on-one meetings with factory managers. 
One of the major problems that had been a constant feature of the division has been 
its inability to manage new product launches. New products had, inevitably, missed 
their launch dates and, once launched, had been routinely bedevilled by shortages of 
supply and costly, crisis management of product allocation. Despite many 
interactional causes, the bulk of the blame had been laid squarely at the door of 
"manufacturing" as the "last ones with the ball". In response to this problem the 
Manufacturing Director had made "new product release" a "divisional responsibility 
andpriority. "A team has been created at divisional level dedicated to a pan- 
divisional improvement in this critical activity. Tbrough detailed analysis of past and 
ongoing problems and the integration of a variety of processes the problems has been 
resolved such that a level of divisional skill had evolved (over repeated launches) that 
had turned a manifest weakness into a valuable "divisional level capability". 
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5.6.4 Summary 
Division J has become a 'cooperative' organisation with manufacturing and product 
launch as key process-dependant linkages. 'Cooperation' at this level, and now at the 
level of the manufacturing 'division', has required aggressive management and a 
fulsome complement of dedicated staff. The pull to return to individual business 
orientation is an ongoing pressure from BMs which is seemingly little reduced by the 
apparent success of group-based organisation. 
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5.7 Inside a Cooperative Division: 
Division J- Manufacturing Automotive Components 
"Because we have shared learning we are considerably bigger as a 
division than we would be asfour individual businesses. " 
"The thing I think I've got working very, very well in the organisation 
is a real level ofteamwork amongst the senior people. I've managed 
to get rid of the turf wars... " 
(Divisional Managing Director - emphasis added) 
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The parent of the division is a non-listed UK company of 3600 employees generating 
L1000m sales from five divisions. It is committed to education and learning 
throughout the organisation in order to "develop, train and inspire by spreading 
world class principles throughout the organisation " on the premise that 
"humanware, not mechanical hardware, is the wealth-creatingfoundation of the 
future. " With record profits and sales announced for 1996 the company is pursuing a 
strategy of growth through diversification with the formation of four new 
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international joint ventures. The company sees itself as committed to the "long term " 
view. "Short-term, narrow minded strategies geared solely to profit and shareholder 
returns cannotprovide sustainable answers. " 
"Our Stakeholder philosophy goes to the heart ofour company 
mission. It is underpinned by our values and led on a daily basis 
by our people ". (Chief Executive's Comments) 
Division J employs I 100 people and generates fI 60mil of revenue from sales in the 
UK. The division receives significant training and education support from the 
5 
corporate centre. Not only are the educational facilities and staff available at 
corporate head office but the corporate philosophy of training and educating all its 
employees is one which the divisions have no choice but to actively endorse and 
implement. 
The division is made up of four stand-alone business which operate in the capital 
intensive, mature, increasingly concentrated industry supplying different automotive 
components to car companies which themselves operate in an industry with similar 
characteristics but burdened also by global over-capacity. Continuous cost, quality 
and service improvement are generic customer demands but long term competitive 
advantage is based on "manufacturing excellence, process innovation andproduct 
innovation. " 
The level of commitment of the company to internal education and training is such that it is held, in 
texts and the press, to be an archetypal "learning organisation". 
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5.7.1 Membcrship Benerits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
General management support and 9 Computing 
advice from the DMD including * Training and development 
future orientation. 
IT Guidance and Support 
Kaizen Team 
Team: Group: 
Pan-divisional production process. Order-winning benefits of 
Business based pan-divisional being in a larger group. (i. e. 
resource (e. g. BM as quality expert) with capital back-up) 
Best practice sharing and other 
knowledge transfer. 
The major benefits of divisional membership lie in the team (horizontal) based 
exchange of various aspects of knowledge and learning and the direct guidance from 
general management, IT specialists and the kaizen divisional team. As well as these 
sources of divisional value there are organisational. learning benefits from the 
division as the vehicle for the corporate training and developmentfacility. 
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5.7.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy 0 The businesses are divisional components, not 
stand-alone entities. 
0 The BM has the responsibility and authority to 
manage local product/market issues but only 
within the context of pan-divisional processes. 
0 The prime source of competitive advantage 
business units lies in their common operational 
process capability which can be pan-divisionally 
linked and improved. 
Divisional Functions 0A kaizen function is in place with ongoing 
operational accountability for the kaizen 
operations in the business. 
9 Divisional HR oversees training which in this 
division is viewed as a strategic essential. 
9 Divisional IT staff interact with the IT functions 
in the businesses. 
Pan-divisional dynamics 
Integration * The DMD actively operates as a business- 
integrating influence. 
The Divisional Production System (DPS) is a 
formalised and standardised system of operating 
processes. 
BMs have standing pan-divisional responsibilities. 
Ad hoc task forces of BMs and others are formed 
to deal with pan-divisional issues. 
Where necessary people are transferred between 
businesses to facilitate capability transfer. 
The operational monthly meeting is one 
specifically dedicated to knowledge transfer. 
(note: business control meetings are business 
specific and separate events) 
Measurement 0A large variety of financial and non-financial 
measures of business performance are in place. 
0 Both input (behavioural) and output 
(performance) requirements are in place. 
0 The division is measured by means of the sum of 
the individual businesses. i. e. no integrated 
divisional measures are currently used. 
Performance incentives 0 40% of the performance incentives of the BMs are 
linked to divisional measures. 
0 Measures are both financial and non-financial 
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The organisational systems and processes support and drive inter-business 
transactions and are significantly 'cooperative' in nature. As well as the number and 
variety of pan-divisional influences a notable feature of this division compared with 
others is the way it differentiates between the business control meetings (profit and 
loss analysis etc. ) and operational improvement meetings. Whilst these latter are 
group meetings of the BMs and sometimes some of their functional staff, the control 
meetings involve only representatives of the business unit concerned. 
5.7.3. Description - The DMD 
The interview with the Divisional Managing Director (DMD) took place in his office 
following an extensive site tour. The divisional organisation consists of the DMD 
and, reporting to him, the four Business Managers (BM), a Human Resources 
Manager (HR) and a Kaizen Manager. The division is part of a group, the head of 
which reports to the corporate level of the company. At group level. - reporting to the 
Group MD , is a Finance Director. Two of his subordinates, the Divisional Controller 
and the IT Director provide direct services are under 'dotted line' control of the 
DMD. (Figure 5.7) While the division is made up of the existing operating 
businesses, a series of fourjoint ventures (JVs) are being established under the direct 
control of the Group MD who is "looking at the acquisitions and the ten yearfuture 
strategies. " These JVs are currently at the project development stage. Once they are 
fully operational it is planned that they will become part of the operating division. 
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The DMD has been -Aith the company for 9 years and in his current role for nearly 
four, having headed one of the operating businesses previously. When promoted to 
take responsibility for the division he ýelieved that the first thing he should do was 
"to read sip on what do divisional managing directors do " and found "absolutely 
nothing, any-is-here ". After that he went to talk to others in similar positions and 
found a polarisation of orientation. 
" 7hey are either extremely strategic and have no idea what's going on in 
the business or they're trying to run the business on a hands-on basis.. 
so I haveforged out my own little way. " 
As a BM when he first joined the company he had little or no contact with other 
divisional businesses. Even in the case of a business that was located nearby, the 
other BM and he "never met each other .. other than his name I did not know who he 
was. " In contrast to this, on a visit to "the best ten companies in Japan, the Hondas, 
the Toyotas, the Kawasakis ", he was struck by the fact that all of these companies 
"had a ivay ofdoing things. " He compared this to English companies where 
different business units in the same company have different policies and practices 
dependant on "what the guy in charge wants them to be " even where the businesses 
are in the same industry. Thus, when he became the DMD, he "tried to pull it 
together" based around the key strategic process underpinning the long term success 
of the division. 
"The bedrock is manufacturing excellence and what I didfor thefirst 
two years, and am still in the process ofdoing to an extent, is build 
manufacturing excellence across the division ". (emphasis added) 
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Through conscnsusAith his senior managers, a framework of consistent polices and 
practices was developed and put in place across all the business units. The policies, 
once in place, arc not a matter of choice for the BMs although some flexibility of 
expression is allowed at local level, i. e. " aphilosophy and way ofdoing things 
within which there is lots ofroom ". So for example uniforms will be worn but style 
and colour is a local issue, and "how they use the kaizen department is up to the BM, 
but kaizen department the), will have" (emphasis added). This acknowledgement of 
local nuance is to avoid the perceived dangers of the policy structure becoming like 
those of the Japanese, "light and structured and claustrophobic.. you can't breathe 
without being authorised. " 
Once the division was operating in a "consistent way" it became important to have 
systems that could identify, codify and spread "bestpractice " between the business 
units. 
"For example one operation is byfar the best at inventory management. 
They have touched stockturns offifly... from a divisional perspective, 
brilliant! Now what we do is get into that particular business, understand 
how they do their material control and ive then standardise that across 
all the other businesses. " (emphasis added) 
Standardisation of operational systems and processes is seen as a key requirement for 
inter-business and pan-divisional learning. In pursuit of such standardisation the 
DMD and his BMs have conjointly developed the Divisional Pýoduction System. 
(DPS) 
" This is a benchmarking systernfor everyfactory and it's in great detail. 
There are some 150 areas ofmanufacturing excellence within it. The 
businesses chose their own haýfa dozen critical areas they wish to improve 
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during the year, the real criticalfactors within the business, I then expect 
the business unit to develop aplan ofhow to improve in that area " 
Inherent in the DPS is not only a comprehensive set of benchmarks but also 
prescribed systems of operation incorporating such factors as "single pieceflow 
where it is humanly possible, team leaders with off-line support, kaizen 
departments. " 
An important divisional input into the DPS is the newly appointed Kaizen Director 
40a real expert we've hiredfrom Toyota " At the same level of senioritY as the BMs 
he, and his team of four, have specific expertise in the key process of 
44 manufaciuring cxcellence ". Ovcrviewing all the kaizen functions (kaizen managers 
report to the manufacturing managers of the businesses) they give "help and advice " 
as well as acting as extra resource to help the businesses achieve their annual kaizen 
plans. The kaizen plans are expected to try and "push the boundaries" both in terms 
of available knowledge and resource. At a more strategic level the divisional kaizcn 
team is expected to help the business achieve its DPS goals for the year. Most of the 
time the businesses will need additional help. V don't want to call in outside 
consultants so I have my own people ". The team also works on long tenn issues, 
"so ifthere's a shortageftont a supplier I would not expect the divisional 
people to even know about it. If, though, as a result ofcontinued shortages, 
St jy, 6 I it is apparent that this particular supplier needs to under andJ singe 
pieceflow etceteras, that might be a six month or two yearprogramme and 
that the divisional people would work with. " 
jUSt in Time. 
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Underpinning all the processes leading to manufacturing excellence "ifyou were 
really lookingfor a core conipetency " is the "way we treat people ". Training7, 
equality of treatment, (no directors canteens or car parks for example) fair share in 
rewards, and empowerment are ongoing features of the culture of the division and the 
company. 
I ou have got to be supplying customers that are going to be there in the 
long term. I ou have to ha ve suppliers that are good at what they do... 
you've got to have the right strategies but withoutpeople you haven't got 
anything. " 
The businesses are all linked by email and video confercncing as well as sharing the 
same brand name. Tbc DMD attempts to foster team work- and a unified culture at all 
levels. If a business is performing well in a particular area and it is decided to spread 
this best practice "ive it-ill choose a champion " who may be the BM but usually is 
"somebody lower in the organisation who is actually doing the work " The 
"champion " is then seconded into other units. An example of this at a lower level is 
a female team leader who is "brilliant at engendering enough enthusiasm to make 
quality circles work " and is currently spending 3 or 4 months is the other businesses 
to share her knowledge and skills. In a similar way if it is apparent that in a particular 
area "none ofthe businesses is doing particularly well" a business is chosen to pilot 
the needed improvement and the designated champion oversees the piloting and then 
spreads the knowledge. 
7 There is a mandatory requirement for each employee to undergo a minimum of 5 days work related 
training per annum. The division/company is obliged to provide the training but the employee is 
obliged to proactively arrange it. The training requirement form part of each employee's annual 
assessment. 
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Although the relevant senior people are encouraged to develop such approaches 
"without it beingformalised, " most change is still initiated from "top down. " 
Weekly operating reports from the business or a monthly benchmarking report will 
indicate either a needed improvement or a sustained, individual out-performance 
which suggests potential bcncf it for others. As well as individual performance 
meetings, the BNIs meet monthly with all the other members of the divisional team 
as a Divisional Operating Committee (DOC). At this meeting, often attended by key 
functional personnel from the businesses, strategic and operating directional issues 
are discussed and shared. 
All business unit numbers are available to each of the BMs in the hope that this 
"engendcrs cnthuslasmfor thcm to want to improvc thcir own busincss. " 
Performance indicators are used to drive desire for improvement rather than fear of 
non-perfonnance. 
"I don't do this BTR stuffof 'look at these *** *ing numbers what do you 
thinkyou're doing? Ifhe can do it why can't you? 'I think that in the long 
term People then become defensive. " 
To further encourage a broad, pan-divisional perspective the perfonnance incentives 
of the BMs are based on a mixture of financial and non -financial measures with a 
40% weighting based on divisional performance. Below the BM level all 
performance incentives relate to the business unit of the manager only. Despite the 
internal drive for a pan-divisional perspective the divisional results are reported to 
corporate and explained as a set of individual business units. 
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A pan-divisional approach is not vAthout its dilemmas or problems. Sometimes, for 
example, it is a difficult decision as to whether to let a business go with it's own 
performance "and try and drag tip the others later " or to insist on sharing which 
tends to slow down the high performer. The decision needs to be taken at divisional 
lcvel bccausc "the star always wants to steam ahead, they never ivant to slow down 
for the others ". At such times "we take the divisional responsibilioý ofsaying 'no '" 
(emphasis added). 
As well as driving a divisional "way" the divisional level has other value-adding 
roles. In the past the DNID has acted in a "stand-in" capacity to run one of the 
business units because "it it-as in the crap to be honest. " Using his business 
management knowledge and skills he was able to put the business in shape prior to a 
new BM taking over. In his current divisional role the DMD has time to think about 
longer term strategic issues as "the BAfs are almost totallyfocused on operations. " 
Currently he is examining the divisional characteristics that are needed for sustained 
success in the long term. On a more industry specific matter, the long term trend to 
': full system support .. supplying solutions" rather than single components is one 
which has implications for the business units and which needs to be proactively 
managed. The BMs "haven't got enough time or even width ofresponsibility to 
develop those kinds ofstrategies ". 
5.7.4 Description - Divisional Staff 
"So the divisional strateSy is to pull them all together and look at 
one common method ofimprovement. " 
(Kaizen Director) 
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"There is a parado. v here. We expect them to operate as separate 
businesses andyet ive sayyou've go to act as a division as well... if 
the BAI isfocused on one year budgets ho iv will ive ever get that sort 
oflong term thinking? Ifind that difficult to reconcile. " 
(IT Director - emphasis added) 
The four divisional staff have functional or process responsibility across the division 
and all bold regular group and individual meetings with their business counterparts. 
Tbus, as explained by the divisional HR Director, the HR, Finance, Systems and 
Kaizen managers in the businesses "uorkfor other masters " as well as the BM.. The 
Kaizcn Director has been a recent appointment and joined the division bringing 
kaizen experience from previous employment. He has joined because it was 
recognised %vithin the division that, in terms of continuous improvement, the 
businesses 
"were OK individually but there's nobodypulling them together and 
trying to moveforward with a single strategy ofhow they will implement 
thephilosophy ofkaizen throughout the organisation. At the coalface 
they're all making improvements but they're all going off in completely 
different directiom " 
(Kaizen Director - emphasis added) 
The businesses were not sharing their learning sufficiently with the result that there 
were differing levels of expertise between them. While "pockets ofexcellence " 
might be of benefit to the individual business, "integrating different approaches " is 
good for all. The Kaizen Director has been overseeing the development and 
promulgation of the Divisional Production System (DPS) as a major integrating 
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mechanism for shared learning. The brainchild of the DMD, the DPS is a pan- 
divisional manufacturing process orientation which is 
'I ... a single philosophy, a single approach which evelybody is aware 
of .. and regardless of what meetings or what discussion you're having 
at any level ofthe organisation, ifthere's conflict you always come 
back to the principle ofDPS. " 
(Kaizen Director - emphasis added) 
The original DPS manual was, "Titten by the BMs who had codified, in various areas, 
best operational practice. A major input of the Kaizcn Director has been in editing 
and re-witing the manual which originally "looked like it had been written byfour 
orfive different people uIlh different levels of understanding". Now that this task is 
complete there is a need to prioritise the tasks or "cherrypick among the elements. " 
While standardisation across all the businesses is seen as the first major step, 
developing a common understanding of the term "standardisation" is an essential pre- 
requisite. 
"This term is used in all the sites with different levels ofunderstanding 
and meaning dependent on who you're talking to and at what level of 
the organisation. " 
The need to standardise processes and systems across the businesses to promote 
sharing and learning is a theme that is endorsed by the other divisional staff. 
'We are now moving towards a higher degree ofconsistency and 
standardisation across the business units-to take bestpractice 
in an one business and replicate that in the others. y 
(HR Director - emphasis added) 
"*.. the advantage ofme being here is that I can see everything that's 
being developed andput the best into each business, So you get a lot 
of synergy out of it. " 
(Financial Controller - emphasis added) 
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But linked to this commitment to pan-divisional processes is a strong sense of having 
to fight the business's desire for specific custornisation, 
must be human nature or something, to want control. I'm not 
sure there is always a good business rationalefor all this tweaking 
and wanting things different. Sometimes it'sjust because they (BAls) 
feel better, more comfortable with something they own or they 
suggested " 
(IT Director) 
"... we developed a policy on absence control but each ofthe businesses 
treated it differently, from total indifference to local changes. So there 
arefour different policies andpractices and measurement in absence 
confrol. " 
(HR Director) 
"... because we're lookingfor things where they need to makefirther 
improvements this is an area ofconflict. "How dare you come in here 
and suggest improvement, I've already got my own people working on 
that and they're doing a superbjob. " So there is a bit ofresistance. 
(Kaizen Director) 
As the IJR Director explained the businesses had become 'feudal kingdoms " in the 
past where the BMs had enjoyed "almost totalfteedom to implementpolicy and 
procedures within their businesses ". Consequently he was sure that they resented 
the degree of standardisation and the requirement to adapt their systems to the 
decreed "best practice" "particularly if it's not invented here. " The newest business, 
K, acquired two years previously, "(is) desperately trying not to change and we're 
dragging them kicking and screaming, into a divisional structure. " (emphasis 
added). The sense of separateness of K is also exacerbated by the distance between it 
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and the other businesses, "it's sofar away it might as well be in a different country. " 
(Kaizen Nlanagcr). This 'distance' is 150 miles. 
The tension between the divisional requirement and business-specific focus is an 
ongoing dynamic which iS Tecognised as needing continual management, 
"It's a classic case ofautonomy verses control. Im treading a very 
thin line in terms oftrying to provide cohesion, common direction and 
control of ITfor the whole of the division and allowing the business 
units to have enough control so that they develop strategies relevant 
to their business. " (IT Director - emphasis added) 
"We are not sayingyou must go in this direction. We are saying - this 
is a group standard but ifyou can demonstrate that it is not going to 
workforyou thenyou can deviate anddoYOur own thing. The easy 
option is to go their own way. We're tPying to make them think more 
deeply about it before they do so. " 
(Financial Controller - emphasis added)) 
Without proactive and forceful divisional management the sharing of knowledge and 
learning would not occur even between the functional managers in the businesses. 
"..., formerly they (kalzen managers) did not meet together, did not share, 
because no one drove it". 
(Kaizen Director - emphasis added) 
Despite this, the value of shared leaming, "Ihe crossfertilisation of ideas " (HR 
Director) is seen as a significant divisional benefit for each of the businesses. In the 
eyes of the divisional staff the BMs, however, did not place sufficient value on such 
sharing. As we] I as being "very competitive with each other" (Kaizen Director) the 
BMs were not seen to promote inter-business linkages below their level without 
being specifically directed to do so. "... you have to question the degree of interaction 
between the businesses at the lower levels .... very little". (IT Director) 
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5.7.5 Description -Business Managers 
There are four business comprising the division. Business 0 was the first unit from 
which Business P, originally a satellite manufacturing site, evolved and still 
purchases some components from Business 0. Business A was acquired four years 
ago and Business K is the most recent addition having been part of the division for 
two years. For all the businesses, cost quality and service delivery are seen as the 
bedrock competitive requirements. 
"... a high quality service in terms ofparts per million quality and in 
terms ofdelivcry. Price is also very important and becoming more so. 
It's always been vety important but there was a spell where they 
(customers) wanted other things as well but they are swinging back to 
being very, veryprice driven. " 
(BM - Business P) 
The "manufacturing system " is the major process that enables the businesses to meet 
these strategic requirements better than competition. 
"... this is your intellectual property that people can't see by walking 
around. This is your competitive advantage, how thefactory is put 
together and how it links. " 
(BM - Business A) 
The BMs were unanimous in espousing the value of shared knowledge within the 
division as augmenting their competitive advantage and being the major benefit of 
divisional membership. Unlike the view of their competitiveness espoused by the 
Kaizen Director the BMs viewed their relationships as mutually cooperative and 
supportive without "the competitive element". The DMD was seen to have 
significant skills at 'facilitating open meetings " (BM - Business 0) and had selected 
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a group of BMs "ofsimilar age, different backgrounds but automatically a degree of 
synergy in personality". (BM - Business 0) 
Even the BM - Business K, the newest member, whose initial evaluation of 
divisional membership was lukewarm "I don't think it brings anything to the 
business other than the company name, " felt compelled to acknowledge the benefits 
of inter-business leaming. 
"Ifyou want to get a one plus one equals three then you have to share 
learning and knowledge so you don't have to reinvent the wheel every 
time. So being part of the divisionftom that point of view has to be a 
good thing. It should drive us to be better on a quantum leap rather 
than an incremenial basis which we can do on our own. " (emphasis added) 
Despite espousing the value of shared learning the BMs do not spend very much time 
at sites other than their own. The major enabling mechanism of pan-divisional 
learning is the monthly DMC. "Weformally transfer learning in all areas at the 
DMC, (which) adds a prescriptive elentent where necessaty. " (BM - Business A- 
emphasis added). The integrating function of this monthly meeting has grown as the 
businesses have moved from autonomous functioning to operating in more pan- 
divisional ways. Initially, even though the DMC took place monthly, the BM - 
Business A, for example, was "totally autonomous, had a totallyftee hand " As 
standardisation of operating procedures became seen as a pre-requisite for pan- 
divisional improvement, the DMC, under the auspices of the DMD, became a more 
uniting force. 
"A lot ofnetworking would occur without the DMC but there is a 
needfor someone to say - these are the things we can do and will do. 
(BM - Business A- emphasis added) 
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While accepted as an essential framework, the standardisation required by the DPS 
carries some disadvantages at local business level in that it "can stifle innovation " if 
not "managed correctly" and "reduce theflexibility " of the business in responding 
to specific market requirements. (BM - Business 0). Outside the processes and 
systems required under DPS the businesses are being given increasing authority in 
other areas. e. g. the sales and engineering functions for Businesses 0, A and P had 
been divisional but are now being devolved to those businesses. The functions with a 
divisional representation are primarily under business rather than divisional control. 
There is an ambivalent attitude of the BMs towards the divisional staff. Whereas the 
Kaizen Director is seen to offer a valuable service by bringing a "wealth ofpractical 
knowledge " (BM - Business K), the central Finance, IT and HR roles are regarded 
more as control functions. "(HR) keeps me on track.. (Finance) does nothingfor me 
at aIL " The value of a formal divisional structure is questioned if the role of the BMs 
continues to broaden. 
'7 don't thinkyou need aformal divisional structure once you've 
mastered the interactional side ofthings. You can move away to a 
virtual organisation... Movingforward I think that managers will 
have to become divisional in their way of thinking and be able to 
separate thatfroinjust being operational. " 
(BM - Business 0- emphasis added) 
5.7.6 Description - Functional Managers 
"... the principle ofhaving DPS as a standardised system was imposed 
at that (divisional) IeveL " 
(Manufacturing Manager - Business P- emphasis added) 
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Below the level of the BMs there is a dichotomy of views about the existence of 
shared learning. Those functional managers with a divisional manager have a 
positive perspective. 
"The HR meetings are quite good at sharing things, how we go 
forward as a business. " 
(HR Manager - Business 0) 
"The knowledge level across thefour companies I believe increases 
and allows us to go up the learning curve much quicker than ifyou Ire 
an isolated company. " 
(Kaizen Manager - Business P-emphasis added) 
" We have a monthly meeting which is proving useful. We're learning 
ftom each other's audits and. making things common across the 
businesses. " 
(Financial Controller 8_ Business K) 
But there is little evidence of structured interaction and sharing between business 
functions which lack a divisional level representative. 
"I think there's very little sharing ofknowledge and experience and 
best practice. I think it's quite effective at BM level but it's almost 
non-existent at my level of management .. I think we should be sharing 
right down to team leader, visiting other sites, seeing how they control 
scrap and quality. Seeing ideas in practice is very helpful. " 
(Manufacturing Manager - Business 0) 
"Since I've been here I'vefound it very strange that I don't talk to my 
counterparts in the other businesses. It seems to befrowned upon. 
There's a competitive edge between each of the businesses and the one 
time I took time out to go to 0 and meet my counterpart there it was 
not well received here. " 
(Engineering Manager - Business K- emphasis added) 
' This person has only been in the role for ten months in a business which is the most recent addition 
to the divisional portfolio. 
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The Supplier Development Manager for Business 0 had formerly filled a divisional 
Supply Manager role. Due to a move to decentralise the function by "BMs who very 
much wanted to look after their own purchasing" this is now a business function 
without any divisional overview. As a consequence "economies ofscale and 
synergies that have to be brought together" are being eroded. Purchasing is now 
viewed as a reactive role without any "strategic direction. " The value of being part 
of the division had been that "one could learnfrom another .. but it got lost". This 
sense of a potential loss of strategic guidance is shared by Purchasing Managers at 
business level. "We're almost now intofirefighting... " (Logistics Manager - 
Business 0). Whereas the day-to-day requirements of the business can dominate the 
local perspective a "divisional guy " can 'force "a longer term view to be taken and 
drive the benefits of "shared learning". A problem foreseen by complete localisation 
of the function lies in moving from a specialist to a non-specialist overview. 
"In our team we've got a divisional purchasing guy with at lot of 
experience andfour purchasing managers. Suddenly the team is going 
to be the BM who hasn't got the experience in purchasing and one 
purchasing manager. " (Purchasing Manager - Business P) 
Although there is an ongoing Purchasing Committee which currently meets regularly 
and at which pan-divisional duties (e. g. volume purchasing of common inputs) are 
shared, there is a feeling that this will erode over time without focused divisional 
oversight. In other functions this has been the history when efforts have been made to 
meet and regularly interchange views without a divisional guide. 
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"I've met all the quality managers and we did get together at the 
beginning of the year to set up what we called a 'monthly quality 
meeting'. We had one of those Oaughs). " 
(Quality Manager - Business K) 
"... we used to have quarterly meetings and P PMC 9 managers would 
get together. People changed their roles and like all these things it 
just stopped, itjustfaded off 
(PMC Manager - Business P) 
In these non-divisionally supported functions the concept of shared knowledge and 
learning is strongly supported, "there's got to be benefits in sharing bestpractice 
ideas. " (Manufacturing Manager - Business 0). However, few managers had made 
the self-initiated effort to generate interaction with their functional counterparts 
except on an ad hoc, problem solving basis, '7 have been to other plants and it has 
helped but it has been on a needs driven basis ". (Manuf. Manager - Business P). 
Various reasons are given for this lack of contact including the pressure of local 
workload, the perceived lack of receptivity of other businesses, the belief that such 
interchange is not supported within the business, and the social difficulty of 
telephoning a "complete stranger and saying 'how do you do this?. " (HR Manager - 
Business K). Despite this general view, some individuals use other businesses as 
el role models " and take staff to view a "centre of excellence and say 'we can be like 
this. " (Manufacturing Manager - Business K)'o 
The sharing of personnel among the businesses does happen but is not a common 
occurrence. One woman, who has particular skills in quality circle management has 
9 Production Material Control. 
10 It is perhaps not a coincidence that this individual was a recent appointment (three months) from a 
Japanese company wherein cross functional and cross business teams were the norm. 
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spent time in other business units developing the necessary skills in team leaders. 
The primary sharing of people is through the BMs acting as pan-divisional trainers 
and champions in particular skills or processes. 
"(BAV ftom (Business A) will come and teach 'world class production 
systems'herefor example and (BM - Business 0) hasjust developed a 
course on ýproblem solving' he's actuall training the managers to Py 
deliver that course to the workforce. " 
(HR Manager - Business P) 
Amongst the functional managers, being part of the company is seen as an advantage 
of divisional membership. The company culture of employee care, particularly as 
reflected in ongoing training and education, is a highly valued divisional attribute as 
was the company size and reputation. 
"... training andpeople orientation ofthe company are a major plus. 
(Quality Manager - Business 0) 
"The help is that the company has a tremendous PR out there in 
the marketplace. " 
(Sales and Marketing Manager - Company K) 
"... the company has deep pockets. " 
(Engineering Manager - Business K) 
5.7.7 The Joint Ventures -a Looming Paradox 
The growth strategy of the division is through the formation ofjoint ventures. There 
are four of these currently in their infancy with project teams working with divisional 
staff to develop the terms and conditions that will apply to each. The management of 
these ventures will be between two co-Business Managers, one from each joint 
venture partner. When they are in full operational mode it is intended to bring these 
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ventures under direct divisional control. Already a number of problems have been 
foreseen and experienced with these new entities by the HR Director who is working 
closely with them.. 
In the context of the shared learning being at the heart of the divisional strategy, it is 
highly problematic that the joint venture partners will become part of the culture. 
Some are specifically opposed to sharing knowledge particularly where that 
knowledge might be made available to other partners. 
"They are allfairlyjealous of their industry knowledge and the 
Japanese managing directors are particularly keen that you don't 
divulge anything between the companies. " 
(HR Director) 
This contradiction of divisional culture may force a different structural arrangement 
whereby for the joint ventures 
"... there may be no divisional structure at all. It mayjust be 
autonomous businesses straight into some loose top management 
structure. " 
(HR Director) 
Die autonomy and separateness of the joint ventures is currently being emphasised in 
two ways. One is an infonnal assertion of independence by the British Project 
Leaders who are to become the co-BM of the JVs. Despite being "invited" to the 
DMC, they have maintained a "patchy attendance level up to date " with some 
declining to attend at all and others attending on an occasional basis. The other more 
formal issue is that employees of the joint ventures will be employed by the joint 
venture and not by the company/division. 
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"We have a whole tranche ofpcople who are currently employed by 
the company, thefamily. We arejust about to issue thefirst contracts 
ofemployment where they will no longer be part ofthe company 
pension scheme, they will be employed by thejoint venture. You're part 
of thefamily but notpart ofthe in-crowd There's going to be a lot of 
problems. " 
(HR Director) 
These problems, whilst operations and employee focused at this early phase, are the 
seeds of strategic problems in the future. The opposition to knowledge transfer, the 
implied independence of the BMs and the stand-alone contracts of the employees are 
all precursors of operating independence and as such are the antithesis of the current 
espoused and enacted divisional rationale. The final outcome is seen by some to be 
inevitable. 
"It looks to me that the division is becoming a small holding company 
with a multitude ofstandalone business units. 
(HR Director) 
".., informal discussions and chats with the senior executives ... 
led me 
to understand the move towards stand-alone operations. 
(IT Director) 
5.7.8 Summary 
At divisional, business management and functional levels the process based view of 
competitive advantage, underpinned by dynamics of learning/knowledge, is a 
consistent perspective. So too is the divisional benefit from the acknowledged value 
of inter-business cooperation and sharing. The structures and processes of sharing are 
fostered by the DMD in his role as integrator, coach, chainnan with the drivers of 
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shared knowledge and learning being the DMD himself and the systems (e. g. DPS) 
put in place by him, the divisional staff and the BMs. 
However, it is clear from the comments of many divisional members that they see 
shared learning and cooperation as requiring continuous, active management to 
overcome organisational inertia and the ongoing quest for autonomy of BMs. Below 
the level of the BMs, the strength of inter-business linkages, other than customer- 
suppler issues, tend to reflect the degree of external (divisional) management of that 
linkage. i. e. where there is no divisional management there are no ongoing linkages 
despite the espoused value of such linkages by the functional managers. Without 
external structuring and support, cooperative initiatives by individual functional 
managers are spasmodic, problem-driven contacts with ongoing relationships 
stymied by the primacy of internal focus, inertia and organisational antipathy. The 
transition of purchasing from a centrally coordinated to a locally focused operation 
epitomises the degeneration of the sharing ethos when external management is 
removed. 
The BMs espouse the value of shared learning and pan-divisional cooperation but 
continually seek to add to their degree of autonomous functioning. Their ambivalent 
attitudes towards inter-business linkage is interpreted as antipathy by some of their 
functional managers who feel actively discouraged from making contact with other 
businesses. The seeking of autonomy is seen by divisional functional managers as an 
ongoing dynamic which pan-divisional initiatives must constantly overcome. 
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The incoming Ws will be a major test of the longer term viability of the 
cooperativeness of this division as some of the joint venture partners are actively 
opposed to sharing information with other business units not directly involved in the 
partnership. 
5.8 Overview of the Cooperative Division 
The cooperative divisions in this chapter share a number of characteristics reflecting 
the general perspective that the added-value from divisional membership lies in 
linking or enhancing the common capabilities and processes of its set of businesses. 
The division is viewed as a whole with business units being interacting components 
of that whole i. e. autonomy is a secondary mechanism rather than a primary guiding 
force. Divisional level staff are responsible for strategic processes or functions either 
as direct inputs to separate businesses or as inputs to processes that connect all the 
units. 
While benefits of membership include the general management guidance of the 
DMD this is not viewed as the key divisional value. More benefit is gained from the 
guidance from divisional level functional/process expertise and the direct sharing of 
knowledge, skills, processes and the interactions between the business units (i. e. 
team based benefits). 
5.8.1 Tensions and Trade-Offs 
It is apparent through all the interviews that a ma or role of the DMD, and one that j 
was evident in his discussions rather than specifically articulated by him, lies in 
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managing the dynamic tensions and trade-offs inherent in the cooperative 
management of separate businesses. Although most clearly manifest in the 
autonomy-seeking behaviour of the BMs it also comes through in divisional 
decisions which sub-optimise unit performance in the interest of the divisional 
"good". 
e. g. ".. the star always wants to steam ahead, they never want to slow down 
for the others .. we take the divisional responsibility ofsaying no. (DMD - Division J) 
"We can afford to take a little less profit in one country in order to 
develop sales in another. " (HRD - Division G) 
While divisional policies apparently offer guidelines in practice there are no set rules 
or standards for resolving such tensions nor for directing the trade-offs to be made. 
e. g. "We developed a policy on absence control but each ofthe businesses 
treated it differently ... so there arefour different policies andpractices 
and measurement in absence control. " (HRD Division J- emphasis added) 
On a case-by-case, issue-by-issue basis trade-offs are contingent on the situation, the 
business involved, the time etc. and hence are dealt with as a dynamic process of 
divisional/business dialogue, negotiation and, sometimes, fiat or what might be 
described as push, persuasion andplea. It is the strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1989) or dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) of the divisional level that offer 
the prime "policy" guidelines. What is clear is the business managers' desire for 
increased autonomy is an implacable force needing constant management. 
e. g. It must be human nature or something, to want control. I'm not 
sure there is always a good business rationalefor all this 
tweaking and wanting things different. " 
(IT Director - Division J) 
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Chapter 8 explores this issue of autonomy seeking BMs further. 
5.8.2 Is It Worth It? 
Managing cooperation increases the complexity of the division (Division H is a 
particularly apt example) and entails non-trivial costs of hierarcby. The "battle" 
between businesses and division over autonomy is also a "cost" distracting the 
attention of managers from more comPetitively focused activities. While there is 
some research evidence (Davis, Robinson, Pearce and Park, 1992; Hoskisson, Hill 
and Kim, 1993) suggesting the performance advantages of cooperative 
multidivisional there is no measurement available to the managers in these divisions 
to indicate the value of cooperation over a more hands-off approach. Nor was it 
feasible for this researcher to gain even an intuitive sense of a positive causal 
relationship between cooperation and performance. Divisional commitment to 
cooperation is founded in belief and intuitive logic rather than operating or financial 
data. The measurement issue is an important theoretical and practical problem and 
one that is again taken up in Chapter 7 where the nature of value and membership 
benefits for cooperative and competitive divisions is examined in more depth and in 
Chapter 8 where the costs vs gains argument is revisited. 
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Chapter 6 
NON-COOPERATIVE DIVISIONS 
"As long as the man who's running the business is a good all-round 
'chap' good all-roundperformer I don't see that you can add value 
to tha; Ifeel ourjob at the centre is merely to put in place the correct 
person to run that business and don't get involved anymore andjust 
make sure we monitor hisfinancial activity. " 
(DMD - Division F2) 
This chapter details the seven divisions displaying a 'non-cooperative' orientation. 
The descriptor "non-cooperative" is used because these divisions are not organised 
with the competitive orientation suggested by Hill (1994) and Williamson (1975) as 
the model for M-form management of constituent businesses (non-related businesses 
in Hill's case). In particular: 
1. They are not managed at "arms-length7'by a distant divisional office that 
intervenes only to replace poor performing managers. Although this latter role is 
certainly performed by all divisional management (including those of cooperative 
divisions) the DMDs of non-cooperative divisions are actively operationally 
interventionist. 
2. Capital is not allocated to businesses on a "best-use" basis as the divisional level 
is not the final arbiter of capital allocation; the corporate level is. Typically capital 
requirements are developed for all businesses in the annual budget round 
dependant on the perceived need of that business and within the context of the 
corporate capital limits. Divisions battle with each other for their share of the 
capital cake. 
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6.1 The Non-Cooperative Division 
Typically these divisions exhibit the following broad similarities which differentiate 
them from the cooperative category described in the previous chapter. 
1. The primary source of divisional value is seen to lie in the autonomous product- 
market activities of the individual business units and optimising the stand-alone 
businesses is the major focus of the division. Control tends to be against budgeted 
financial targets with intervention on a "by exception" basis. i. e. as long as the 
business in "hitting the numbers" its autonomy is respected. In contrast with 
cooperative divisions the internal functioning of the businesses i. e. behavioural 
control (Collis, 1991c) is predominantly left to the businesses. 
2. The benefits of divisional membership are primarily derived from general 
management guidance from the Divisional Managing Director (DMD). Secondary 
benefits in the form of cost savings arise from the centralisation of service based 
facilities such as computing or training/personnel and group value from the 
coordinated purchasing of common inputs and market based collaboration over 
customers, territories and pricing. 
3. Strategic management of the non-cooperative division predominantly reflects the 
imperatives and philosophies of pure M-form organisation. i. e. Stand-alone, scmi- 
autonomous business units with clear responsibilities and authority for the 
profitability vested in the business manager (BM) whose accountability to 
6-2 
divisional performance is wholly discharged through his/her stewardship of that 
business unit. 
4. Organisational structure reflects the autonomy of the business units with no 
strategic functional or process support staff at divisional level. While it is common 
for a finance person to be a divisional level staff, this is in controlling/reporting 
capacity in line with the more administrative orientation of the divisional role. The 
DMD is the prime (only) source of support and is actively interventionist with his 
BMs. i. e. he is not "hands-off. " 
6.2 The Cases 
The first six cases are based on interviews with one divisional executive and the 
seventh on discussions with the divisional managing director, other divisional staff 
and the business managers of units. This last case gives a sense of the tensions and 
dilemmas at other levels of the division. 
6.3 Division A- Agricultural Commodities 
"It is a question of being in touch with the businesses but not 
interfering and having a handle on the tiller which enable you 
to adjust this way and adjust that way without people actually 
understanding that you've really done it. It's like conducting 
an orchestra, it can actuallyplay without the conductor, but 
sometimes the percussion has to be geed up and the strings 
have to be quietened down. " (DMD) 
The parent company of the division is a multinational employing 22,000 employees 
and generating revenues of L4400m and operating profit of ; E122.4m from 6 product 
divisions in Europe, US and Asia. The company has been oriented towards 
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becoming "morefocused on its core businesses" through divesting 15 "non-core " 
businesses over 1994-1996 and acquiring increased positions in its 3 core areas. In 
1997 it entered the third year of its four year, business efficiency programme aimed 
to "refocus the business and in7prove returns to shareholders. " The company 
espouses a commitment to corporate sponsored management training through its 
internal management development centre and senior management programmes with a 
major European business school. 
Its medium term performance has not been regarded favourably 
"Gearing is astronomical ... and interest cover isjust over 3 times, 
leaving little marginforfurther error ... 
Sofar the bears have been spot 
on in ignoring endless promises ofjam tomorrow. " 
(Financial Times, September, 1997) 
This followed on from cautious responses to a major merger in 1996. 
"The downside is a stretched balance sheetfollowing the deal. Given 
its shares8 per cent dividendyield, (Company A) must be loath to issue 
new shares andpredicts 'comfortable'interest cover offour times by the 
end of 1997. But anyfailure to achieve integration benefits on time, or a 
rise in interest rates, could leave shareholdersfilingfor divorce. " 
(Financial Times, September, 1996) 
Division A employs 1900 people with revenues of fI 80m. It is made up of three 
businesses which develop, grow and market, agricultural commodities through 
operations in UK, Europe and US. One develops and farms and markets salmon, 
another does the same with horticultural seeds and the final one is a sugar business. 
The three Business Managers (BMs) report to the DMD along with the Finance 
Director (FD) and a Personnel/Training Advisor. Competing primarily on price, the 
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businesses sell through distributors in a mixture of mature and growth markets 
dominated by large players. Efficient 'farming" is the key business process but 
genetic engineering is also significant in this business, "an understanding ofplant 
and animal genetics runs through all the businesses. " 
6.3.1 Membership Benefits: 
Guidance: Facilities: 
Varied inputs from the DMD to the Training advice/support 
individual BMs. Much of this input 
is general in nature but includes 
taking a longer term view and cross- 
pollinating relevant knowledge from 
business to business. 
Team: Group: 
A temporary supervisory link None 
between the genetics department of 
one business and the inexperienced 
geneticist of another. 
Informal sharing between BMs based 
on "friendship. " 
The primary value for the businesses of belonging to the division resides in the 
guidance given by the DMD. The staff link of genetics departments is specifically a 
temporary supervisory connection and the "sharing" between BMs does not 
constitute a divisionally specific process. Thefacilities benefits are strategically non- 
material and of the type that might well be bought in by stand-alone businesses. 
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6.3.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy The division is a collection of stand-alone 
businesses that operate autonomously within a 
negotiated framework of required returns, capital 
expenditure, employment policies etc. 
"Friendship" between the businesses is encouraged 
in dealing with common external problems and 
similar operational processes but these are 
subordinate issues to business-specific 
product/market dynamics. 
Divisional value stems from the individual 
businesses and the value-added by the divisional 
level is the control and guidance of the DMD. 
Divisional Functions No strategic functional or process support staff or 
facilities are in place at divisional level. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration Structured linkages are limited to a monthly 
meeting of BMs where common external factors are 
discussed. The DMD is the most active "integrating 
mechanism" but his role is more that of 
guide/mentor/coach to individual BMs than an 
active guardian of pan-divislonal dynamics. 
Measurement Formal divisional control is based on the financial 
outputs of the individual businesses which also 
comprise the divisional performance measures at 
the corporate level. The DMD operates as a non- 
structured guidance and feedback system based on 
more behavioural/input parameters. 
Performance incentives 20% of the performance bonuses of the BMs is 
linked to the overall divisional profit performance 
and 80% to their own business profits. 
In intent and manifestation this division shows many classical M-form characteristics 
with the sharing between businesses limited to cross-pollination by the DMD. The 
actively involved DMD corrupts a completely stand-alone orientation but the 
businesses are truly stand-alonefrom each other. 
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6.3.3 Description 
The staff, structures and systems of the division are long standing and no operational 
services or support are provided from the divisional or corporate level other than 'on- 
call' assistance from the Personnel/Training Adviser and the financial/accounting 
overview from the FD. The DMD, who was interviewed in the boardroom of the 
company headquarters in London has spent 15 years in "the personnelfunction " and 
a further 21 years in line management with the company and had been persuaded by 
the company CEO to postpone his age-related retirement until the end of 1997 
because of his experience and stature within the company and industry. ' Over his 
extended work life he had developed "a very clear way" on how to run his collection 
of busincsscs. 
"We really do run them as separate businesses with separate 
strategies, separate policies and soon... we give people maximum 
fteedom ofactivity within a clearly defined and mutually discussed 
and mutually acceptedftamework.. people get their hands chopped 
offat best ifthey go outside thatframework.. 
I think that's the way to run a division. " (emphasis added) 
Each business is required to have its own strategy and plans which end in a financial 
plan with a commentary for the annual budget. The DMD "translates the 
understanding ofthe company's strategy into guidelines " for the businesses. This 
means that the targets and objectives of each business are the result of negotiations 
between the BM, representing the business. and the DMD in his role as corporate 
overseer. 
1 This reason for non-retirement was given to me by the CEO of the company through whom I had 
arranged the interview. 
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"their budget is my budget, it's my budget because my bonus depends 
on it and it's their budget because their performance and theirfuture 
depends on it as well. " 
The developed budgets and strategies of the businesses are presented to the Board 
with explanation from the DMD. "IfI'm paid to do anything it's to understand the 
businessesfor which I am responsible. " Monthly meetings of the BMs are held for 
discussion of "things that are common to all the businesses ". such as currency issues 
or Common Agricultural Policy changes, and to fulfil the more subtle need 'for 
people toftel that they belong to something greater than themselves. " The meeting is 
specifically not to "interfere with each other's business " because 
"there's nothing more ridiculous than someone running a beef 
company having a say on capital expenditure in another company 
which he doesn't know anything about. " 
Paradoxically, in the light of this statement, the DMD sees the businesses as being 
similar in a number of ways which makes it sensible to have them in the same 
division. They are related in terms of. 
"trade(ing) in the same countries ... market knowledge... genetics based.. 
long time scales ... technically based .. 
highly skilledpeoplefrom PhDs 
down ... management style. 
" 
and it is these similarities that underpin his divisional perspective.. 
"When people ask me what I've been doing, I've been running a 
mini-conglomerate. That is a division comprising a number of discrete 
businesses but with a good deal of synergy between them ... (but) ... there's 
no single reason why they're all together. It's a whole string ofreasons 
that lead to common markets, similar products, similar ideas, similar 
people that hang naturally together. " (emphasis added) 
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Despite these stated similarities and the espoused synergy between the businesses the 
structure and systems of the division are consistent with the management of a set of 
stand-alone units. There are no structured mechanisms for lateral sharing between the 
businesses other than the monthly meeting of BMs (which specifically does not 
discuss internal business issues). A temporary link has been recently established as 
one of the businesses has started its own genetics department and has employed a 
young, recently qualified geneticist. During the initial developmental phase his work 
is being directed by the experienced genetics director of another business. The 
medium term aim is for the new genetics department to be independent however. 
The perceived added-value of belonging to the division comes from sharing 
knowledge and a "common understanding ofproblems. " If the businesses were 
stand-alone or owned by separate companies there would be no "cross-fertilisation, 
no reference points, nothing. " Cross fertilisation happens because divisional 
membership leads to meetings of BMs who are "allpretty goodftiends. " When this 
is not enough to promote sufficient sharing then "on occasion I make it happen. " By 
this the DMD means that by spending at least two days a month with each business 
he acts as a catalyst and facilitator of inter-business conununications as well as being 
a source of knowledge in different ways for each business. 
"Maybe one MD's a numbers man, not good with HR but good 
commercially so maybe I make a contribution there. In some business 
where I've worked overseas and travelled the world I've probably got a 
perspective that an engineering division ofa salmonjarmer in Scotland 
couldn't possibly have in that business. That is helpful if they're talking 
about developing their export strategy. " 
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Maintaining rapport with the BM and his team "without in any way interfering" is 
seen to be an important skill in maintaining positive relationships with the 
businesses. The dilemma of business autonomy and the right of the divisional level 
to intervene is constantly being managed. A totally hands-off relationship, using only 
the monthly business reports as the information and control mechanism is inadequate 
as a mechanism of divisional influence. "You can control through the numbers but 
you cannot influence through the numbers. " (emphasis added). 
A particular danger of a "hands-off 'division lies the potential for the development of 
barriers between the businesses and between the divisional level and the businesses. 
"Baronies " are an inevitable consequence of stand-alone businesses not actively 
controlled by the divisional level, 
."* You 
have to aggressively manage it otherwise it becomes anarchy.. 
I've seen enough to know that you can letpeople have their head too 
much ... people 
have the maximumfteedomfor initiative and action but, 
in the greater divisional interestfor which I happen to be responsible, 
I simply am ruthless ifanybody steps out offine ." 
80% of the performance incentives of the BMs is based on their business results and 
20% on the perfonnance of the division. The BMs have questioned the relevance of 
this divisional component but have been told that 
9CY you re part ofa bigger thing chum andyou're partly paid to cooperate 
and take an interest outside ofyour own business. But essentially you are 
there to bejudged on the success or otherwise ofyour business. 
(emphasis added) 
The divisional results are reported to the corporate level as a set of business results 
which are consolidated into a divisional number. Due to a specific problem this year 
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in the salmon business, caused by currency movements and product dumping by a 
competitor subsidised by its national government, the DMD is having to handle the 
anxiety of the company CEO and Board over the long term future of the business. 
"My view is that you can only take the long term. On the other hand if 
you're a group chiefexecutive and have to explain a bigprofit hit you 
getfairly belligerent .. the stockmarket doesn't like it and the rest of it. 
By the "long term" view he was referring to the fact that his business had a 
demonstrable cost advantage over its subsidised competitor and when 
political/legislative forces finally ensured a "level playingfield " i. e. free of 
government subsidy, then this cost advantage would ensure high profitability. On the 
other hand the current losses were such that shareholders would be very unhappy 
now, thus giving the company CEO a difficult problem. This reassurance role is two- 
way one; on one hand convincing the corporate board of the strategic sense of long 
term commitment to the business, and on the other supporting a BM who finds 
himself running an under-performing business, the competitive advantage of which 
(lower unit costs) is being off-set by (illegal? ) goverranent subsidies about which he 
can do nothing.. 
The value added by the divisional level is difficult to measure or estimate, "I 
couldn't attribute whether I've had 50% or 10% or 5% influence. " The potential 
value of divisional membership also varies over business and time, 
"it's a process that differs according to each business and according 
to the state ofdevelopment ofa company and its circumstances ... the 
whole thing is a dynamic evolving thing andyou can onlyjudge things 
as they are at the time. " 
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6.3.4 Summary 
This division is not a 'cooperative' enterprise as is suggested to be the most 
appropriate organisational orientation to exploit the value of relatedness (e. g. Hill, 
1994). The perception of relatedness is dominated by market and industry features 
rather than congruent capabilities 2 which is again, according to some authors, not 
conducive to synergy between the businesses (e. g. Markides and Williamson, 1994). 
The dilemma of the strategic management of multi-business units is reflected in the 
DMD's attempts to run "separate businesses" whilst "encouraging" cooperation and 
his confidence in the "synergy" between the businesses coexisting with his 
bernusement at the idea of one business having input into the capital requirements of 
another due to lack ofappropriate knowledge. The place of shared knowledge and 
cooperation is strongly espoused but at the same time there are no structural sharing 
and integrating mechanisms to facilitate the interaction that is essential for such 
organisational learning (Teece et al., 1997). Nor are there any direct functional or 
process inputs from the divisional level to the process/functional areas of the 
businesses. The only guidance is from the DMD, a 36 year veteran of company and 
industry, to the individual BMs. 
In theoretical terms the value of inter-business, scope economies gained through 
integration and interconnection of non-tradeable knowledge and learning is espoused; 
2 Even under strong prompting genetics was seen by the DMD as a common business technology but 
not a pan-divisional "core competence. " i. e. each businesses has a genetics departments in the same 
way a manufacturing business has a factory but there was no perceived gain from linking these 
departments in an ongoing interactional way nor of having divisional level genetics staff. 
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but the value of specialisation and focus of the M-form organisation dominates in 
practice. Overall it is difficult to make a logical case for this group of related 
businesses being any more valuable as a divisional set than as a group of stand-alone 
units. 
6.3.5 Postscript 
It was mentioned above that the salmon business in the division was performing 
poorly at least partly due to competition from 'dumped' overseas product and the 
appreciation of the pound. This problem continued and, along with shortfalls in other 
parts of the corporation, led to two profit warnings in less than three months in late 
1997 and the consequent dismissal of the CEO in early 1998. Another profit warning 
followed in mid 1998. Paradoxically the share price rose after an initial fall to reflect 
the break-up value placed on the firm by analysts who believed that disposals or 
dernergers would be the results of an announced strategic review. The strategic 
review concluded that there was little merit in having the three businesses in Division 
A under one manageinent and at least one of them (the salmon business) was a prime 
candidate for disposal. 
i. e. The strategic review could see no Mdiv in Division A. 
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6.4 Division B 3_ Manufacturing Building Products 
"Our goal is to develop our businesses to achieve market leadership in 
their markets and to benefitfrom economies ofscale ... The Group is now 
managed through a more streamlined organisational structure with 
significantlyfewer operating businesses ... reflects the increasing integration 
of certain companies within larger operating businesses. 
(CEO's Review) 
The parent company of Division B employs over 21,500 people in operations in 
Europe and the US with a total turnover of over L2 1 00m from thirty companies 
organised into five product divisions. In 1996 the company announced the disposal 
of eighteen UK and European businesses which were "outside our mainstream 
activitiesý9 and as such "significantly" increased the focus on 'fewer but larger 
businesses. " Improved profits in 1996 were "substantially driven by the cost 
reduction programmes " initiated in 1995. These progranimes, in concert with other 
continuous improvement activities are aimed at benefiting from "economies of 
scale " and "international bestpractice. " The CEO noted in the 1997 annual report 
that "All our businesses are committed to increasing productivity through process 
improvement designed to reduce manufacturing costs. " 
The company in 1996 developed a "more streamlined organisation structure " 
reflecting not only the major disposals but also "the increasing integration of 
certain companies within larger operating businesses. " The long term training 
programme of the company continued despite difficult times and reaped observable 
3 Technology failure (the tape recorder did not record) means that this case is reconstructed from 
notes, memory and supplied documents and so lacks some of the more illuminating quotes that are t' 
present in other cases. Quotes here are comments I wrote down during the interview in order to probe 
later. 
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benefits in "cost reduction and improved quality and service. " Savings will result in 
"increased operational gearing" allowing the handling Of additional volumes 
through "increased manufacturing effectiveness. " 
Employing 6500 people Division B generated 1996 revenues of L560m from three 
country based businesses in the UK, Germany and North America. The businesses 
design, manufacture and market building products under a range of brands. They sell 
to consumers through retail outlets and to industrial users through both direct sales 
and wholesale distributors. Operating in mature but fragmented industries where the 
"backyarder A is a force, the businesses need to be cost competitive but at the same 
time differentiate themselves on the basis of service to industrial users and brand to 
consumers. Regional markets tend to be highly idiosyncratic. The division is in 
"recovery mode " following significant losses in its North American business in 
1995. 
6.4.1 Membership Benefits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
DMD inputs on rationalising None 
business facilities, turnaround 
processes, crisis management and the 
longer term view. 
Team: Group: 
None A move towards amalgamating 
the buying power of the UK 
and German businesses. 
4 i. e. the small owner/manager business with few staff and limited overheads operating in a limited, 
local market. 
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The primary value for the businesses of belonging to the division resides in the 
guidance given by the DMD particularly in the rationalisation of separate facilities 
and with his assistance in dealing with the profit problems that are besetting the UK 
and US businesses. Much of what the DMD identifies as value-adding in his role (see 
below) seems classically 'administrative' or loss preventative in nature. 
6.4.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy q The division is a collection of stand-alone' 
nationally based businesses that operate 
autonomously from each other. 
0 Divisional value stems from the individual 
businesses and the value-added by the divisional 
level is the control and guidance of the DMD. 
Divisional Functions 0 An Operations Director is in place at divisional 
level but his input is more control related than 
developmental. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 No structured interactions exist between the 
businesses. Telecommunication links are 
administrative informational channels only. i. e. 
they are not reflective of integrated 
learning/knowledge sharing. 
0 While no inter-business processes are in existence 
the history of the division is one of amalgamation 
of businesses as a basis for cost savings. 
Measurement 0 Divisional control is based on the financial outputs 
of the individual businesses which also comprise 
the divisional performance measures at the 
corporate level. 
0 No group based measures are in place. 
Performance incentives * The performance bonuses of the BMs are entirely 
I based on the profits of their particular business unitj 
This is a classical M-form division in terms self-contained, semi-autonomous, non- 
interacting businesses. This classic structure, however, is corrupted by the presence 
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of an aggressively interventionist DMD. There is no process or functional support at 
the divisional level although the corporate level (see below) has direct functional 
inputs to the businesses. 
6.4.3 Description 
The DMD was interviewed in his office at the company's headquarters in Surrey. 
Described as "controlfteaks " by the DMD, the corporate level provides a significant 
degree of operational Summary and service to the businesses. Human Resources, 
Systems, Training, Operations and Marketing as well as Corporate Finance functions 
have ongoing direct influence within a "matrix-style " orientation. Via sophisticated 
IT systems, the corporate centre directly measures and controls the financial, 
operating and marketing aspects of the businesses, bypassing the divisional level. 
This has been the management style of the company over a long period. i. e. 'finance 
and strategy" are controlled at the corporate centre. 
The DMD has been in his role for three years having formerly been in charge of the 
corporate training function where he managed a "core skills" training programme 
(e. g. manufacturing innovation, human resources) for all employees. As well as the 
three Business Managers (BMs) his divisional staff comprises an Operations Director 
which is a "control position " overviewing purchasing, IT and manufacturing 
performance. The DMD relies on corporate input for finance/a6counting support. The 
businesses are organisationally stand-alone in all necessary business functions. 
6-17 
The divisional level 'formulates and executes strategy and measures and controls 
the progress ofthe businesses against targets. " In one sense the divisional level 
exists to "deploy corporate strategy" in managing the business units in a way that is 
consistent with corporate requirements. This often puts the DMD in the position of 
the "meat in the sandwich " between the corporate level and the businesses who 
argue for even more autonomy. The divisional level also works with the individual 
business to develop a "vision ... a guiding principle or overvieW'within which future 
performance targets and benchmarks can be established and current performance 
evaluated and controlled. A final way that the divisional level aims to add value is in 
attempting to "develop andfoster synergy between the businesses. " 
Two forms of synergy are recognised; "hard" synergy which is equated with 
measurable activities such as plant relocation or the centralisation of purchasing, and 
"soft " synergy which is "the synergy that is talked about but can't be budgetedfor. " 
'Hard' synergy is linked to "economies ofscale and size" and is manifest in 
measurable financial benefits such as cost savings and productivity improvements 
while "soft" synergy was "difficult to measure and define. " 
Seeking 'hard' synergy had become synonymous with reorganisation and 
restructuring separate businesses into single units. The current UK business had 
originally been two separate businesses. These had been amalgamated under a new 
BM. One of the original BMs fought this development and was transferred within the 
company. With a new BM in his position and an amenable one in the other, the new 
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head of the one amalgamated business has since centralised purchasing, quality, 
marketing and product development and achieved 'hard' synergy through the 
resultant reduction in staff. The former BMs now have onlY sales and the factories 
under their direct control and this is likely to change and the benefits from the 
centralisation and rationalisation of manufacturing is being evaluated. The creation of 
one large functionally organised business in the place of two has been deemed a 
success in the UK with significant cost savings being realised. This amalgamation 
has been a reflection of the corporate vAde policy of achieving cost reductions 
through rationalisation. 
Attempting to gain the same savings in the North American businesses has proven to 
be a "disaster " and a precursor to large losses. By creating a Vice President 
(operations) and a Vice President (Sales) and centralising functions from two 
formerly separate businesses the Division made immediate gains in terms of 
"econonfies ofscale " as they had in the UK. The market however, is different in 
America and losses emanated from several unexpected consequences. "Speed of 
execution Op ,a critical requirement of 
industrial customers in the US, was lost in the 
more broadly oriented sales team. To gain 'trade' orders, sales representatives must 
visit sites and call in product specifications over the telephone to quickly get a quote 
in place. This means that sales staff must be dedicated to this sector but 
6amalgamation' removed this necessary commitment. Brand focus has also lost as 
account managers are now responsible for two differently positioned brands at 
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opposite ends of the price and image spectrum and are sold through different 
distribution systems. Each account manager is tending to treat their new 
product/brand in the same way as they had dealt with their old one. More subtly "a 
loss ofentrepreneurial spirit" seems to have resulted from the amalgamation of the 
two sales forces. The operational integration also presented problems as senior 
people, now further removed from the manufacturing "coalface ", are losing sight of 
problems in individual factories which have now developed into major issues 
whereas formerly they would have been "cut offal source. " 
These problems with the American businesses have not dampened the divisional 
orientation towards business amalgamation. Currently the DMD is putting the case to 
his UK and German operations for the centralisation of the purchasing of common 
inputs. Typical of most manufactured products the bulk of the cost is made up by 
purchased parts and there is significant commonality of raw material use between the 
two businesses. The German BM is strongly resisting this move. Also being 
contemplated, although not planned at this stage, is the creation of a BM (Europe) to 
sit over both the UK and German businesses with the thought of having one 
functionally organised European business in the longer term. 
The current strategic imperatives for the division are centred around profit 
improvements in the businesses with the major mechanism being organisational 
restructuring. At this point the DMD believes the divisional level adds value because 
he is helping the relatively new BMs to effect the necessary turnarounds and deal 
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with operating crises when they arise. He sees the size of the division per se as 
having some benefits in enabling it to attract and retain good people. After the 
turnarounds and reorganisations are completed, however, he is not sure about the 
extent of benefits from divisional membership nor of the degree of added value of 
the divisional level. 
The businesses, although inter-connected by email and video conferencing facilities, 
have no other organisational linkages. They do not share any conunon activities or 
processes other than being exposed to the same training themes from the corporate 
training initiatives. There is no transfer of people between them and, no regular 
exchanges between senior functional managers. Reflecting this stand-alone 
perspective, the performance incentives of the BMs are based entirely on the 
financial results of their own business. The divisional results, as explained to 
corporate each month by the DMD, are presented as a set of separate financial 
statements for each business. 
6.4.4 Summary 
More than any other division in the study the strategy of Division B seems a 
manifestation of a corporate strategic agenda for cost reduction particularly through 
the rationalisation of existing businesses into a smaller number of units. The 
businesses within the division are non-cooperative and managed autonomously from 
each other in contradiction of the cooperative style suggested to optimise the value of 
related businesses (Hill, 1994). While the philosophical and structural imperatives of 
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the M-form are the basis for divisional management here (rather than economies of 
scope from shared learning/knowledge/capital) there is another force that seemingly 
transcends both. This force is the financial drive for cost savings through economies 
of scale and capacity utilisation emanating from a beleaguered corporate level. 
The amalgamations seem based on accounting assumptions rather than pan- 
divisional competences or capabilities. The stand-alone businesses seem to be victinis 
of corporate/divisional strategy rather than mutually reinforcing partners in it. This is 
reflected in the expressed antagonism of the DMD to the controls and direction of a 
corporate centre of which he had so recently been a part. 
It seems quite possible that this is an example where the businesses would have been 
better off as stand-alone units. i. e. Mdi, is negative. 
6.4.5 Postcript 
The disillusioned DMD left in early 1997 (headhunted). In 19.97 Division B's profit 
performance was again poor with substantial losses in its UK and US businesses. 
These were announced to be for sale while the group attempted to build a strong pan- 
European presence in other divisions. The German business of Division C remained 
profitable and was not for sale "although attempts to transfer its success to other 
territories havefailed " ("The Times" March 1998). This is hardly surprising as 
nothing that was revealed about the structures, systems, process or value 
philosophies of Division B was conducive to such "transfer. " 
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6.5 Division C- Provision of Water Supply-Based Services 
"I was comingftom the angle that in new service development there 
was something we could define that might link some ofthe business 
units together or even all ofthem ... that is there's a 20% piece we 
must not take our eyes off. " 
The parent company is a UK based privatised utility with I 1000 employees and a 
turnover of f 13 00m from 6 divisions. International expansion is ongoing with 
increased contracts and joint ventures in SE Asia, South America and Europe. After a 
period of diversification the company has undertaken a programme of rationalisation 
to a more focused portfolio. The company was the subject of criticism for its 
diversification prograrnine which was branded "a disaster" (Financial Times, March 
1996). At this time the advent of a new CEO and a sale of the recent acquisitions 
(with the associated charges and write-downs) was seen to have resulted in "a 
cleaner group " which needed to focus on "squeezing costs " out of its core 
businesses whilst "making no more mistakes on the non-core side. " 
Division C is one of the four operating divisions of the company with 3000 
employees and 1996 revenues of fII Om. It is made up of 6 businesses which arose as 
a result of acquisitions and spin-offs from other divisions in 1991/1992. The 
businesses market services to local authorities and industrial suppliers including their 
sister divisions. As well as the 6 Business Managers (BMs) and the FD, a Human 
Resources Director (HRD) reports to the Divisional Managing Director (DMD). The 
FD and the DMD are both recent internal appointments joining the division at the 
same time in mid 1996 and have formed a close partnership in attempting to drive the 
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division in their preferred direction. The position of HR Director deals with the 
constant issues of pay, conditions, health and safety etc. that are manifest in the 
highly labour intensive businesses. 
6.5.1 Membership Benefits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
Operational interventions of the * Training of BMs. 
DMD (FD) to improve business o HR expertise. 
performance above that manifest in 
the past. 
Team: Group: 
No team interactions in place based Cross orjoint selling of 
on common processes/capabilities. services to common customers 
There is a lot of talk at divisional level (see below) of the value of sharing and 
cooperation particularly at the level of customer collaboration. It is difficult to make 
a case for this being a uniquely divisional value and at this stage it has yet to be 
demonstrated within the Division. The guidance from the DMD extends to 
operational issues of culture, customer relations, people management but is driven 
from the administrative focus on below par performance. At this stage the value 
added by divisional membership is not clear although it at least seems unlikely that 
any of the businesses is being handicapped by being part of the division 
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6.5.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy 0 The division is a set of stand-alone businesses 
which, while operationally autonomous, will 
mutually benefit from collaborating in offering a 
package of services to their common customers. 
0 Divisional value will arise from market cooperation 
as no common processes or capabilities underpin 
business competitive strategy. 
Divisional Functions * An HiTdirector oversees the divisional wide 
implementation of corporate HR policies with 
respect to pay, employment, dismissal etc. 
0 No divisional function is in place to oversee or 
facilitate strategic business processes. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 Inter-business interaction is limited to the 
interactions of the BMs at the divisionally 
organised training events. 
Measurement 0 Structured control based on the financial outputs of 
the businesses. 
0 There are less structured demands for particular 
behaviours from the BMs. (e. g. attending training 
courses) 
Performance incentives * Performance bonuses of the BMs are based entirely 
I on profit performance of their business unit. 
Whatever the espoused value the divisional level places on cooperation and sharing 
the structural characteristics of the division are more M-form in nature with the 
resultant dynamics of single business focus rather than pan-divisional integration or 
inter-business cooperation. It is unlikely that cooperation by policy will occur 
without cooperation by (enforced) practice. 
6.5.3 Description 
The Divisional Finance Director (FD) was interviewed in her office at Divisional 
Headquarters. A major re-orientation in the strategic style of the company has been 
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ongoing since early 1996 when the newly appointed Corporate Strategy Director and 
the newly promoted CEO had reviewed the mix of businesses within the company. 
They found a diverse collection of units being corporately managed in a 'financial 
control ,5 style. Many of these businesses had been added as the result of an 
aggressive acquisition strategy. Enthused by the concept of "parenting advantage" 
the corporate management team has been overseeing a programme of divestment of 
those businesses which they believe gain no benefit from being in the company. 
Linked with these divestments is a purposive attempt to switch to a "Strategic 
control" corporate style and an orientation towards a more "integrated" company: 
"The way the company operated before was pretty personality bound. You 
were very much in your boxes. There was no idea at all that that group of 
people would help that group ofpeople and vice versa, that they would 
get involved in each other's strategies. All that was being said before was 
that 'Division C might supply us ... if they're good enough'. Like a lot of 
companies being sister divisions doesn't give you any advantages ... in 
fact the opposite. " 
The move towards company "integration " is currently more a strategic intent than an 
operational process. While cross-divisional teams working on integrated strategies 
dealing with "network inftastructure developments" are the goal, the reality is 
currently limited to monthly meetings of the corporate management team and a 
recent 5 day workshop for that same group in Switzerland. 
The issue of integration offers a challenge to the division. The divisional team 
believes that the best growth opportunities will come from working closely with 
5 The company had worked with a consultant who brought the Goold et al (1994) concepts and 
terminology into common usage. 
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other divisions to develop an understanding of the integrated services that will be 
needed by them and industry customers in five years time. Because of that "there is 
no value in each of the companies (in Division Q trying to do its own thing" as they 
have in the past and would still prefer. The need for a "package ofservices " 
delivered through long term contracts and mutually enhancing relationships with 
customers is seen to be the key value adding strategy underpinning the future of the 
division, "so the strength should be in the division as a group. " (emphasis added). 
However, the division comprises a set of business units that are viewed by other 
divisions as "cowboy ouylts" that should be "sold off. " The BMs of Division C have 
similarly scant respect for their "slow moving, hierarchy bound, rules based' internal 
customers. This mutual antipathy causes obvious strategic problems, as does the 
traditionally independent functioning of the geographically dispersed businesses 
which "have been together, pulled apart, put back together et cetera, so you've got 
some pretty disenchanted BMs. " 
The general lack of profitability of the businesses adds to the tenuousness of their 
position and the defensive aggressiveness of the BMs. The company CEO has given 
the divisional team a mandate to improve the profitability of the division through 
growth as well as operational improvements. He has lent his authority to promote 
more constructive internal trading relationships. There is some irony in this as, in a 
former divisional role, the CEO was one of Division C's more acerbic critics. 
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The relatedness of the businesses is seen to be primarily at the product market level. 
as they all provide services to customers in the same industry. Whilst these services 
are all labour intensive their basic nature is different. Managers in the businesses had 
generally grown through the ranks. 
"The traditional structure in the business was a BM and a bunch of 
people called 'director'who were not really ofdirector calibre. One of 
thein, generally the BM, was the drivingforce. " 
Each of the businesses is strategically, if not financially, capable of stand-alone 
existence and faces focused, stand-alone competitors. The low profitability of the 
businesses is a major problem for the divisional team. Despite poor profit 
performance most of the BMs are resistant to divisional 'help' with the best profit 
performer being the most resistant. Ym doingfine, leave me alone. " One BM and 
his Financial Controller had been replaced as a result of continued poor results and, 
more specifically, continued resistance to suggested change. 
"No matter how hard we worked with the guy we could not get him 
to bring issues to us ... The solutionfor 
him was culture change, relationship 
management, sales skills, project skills and a much stronger management 
team andyet he was not coming up with any of those things. So we shed 
a BM and Finance Controller and some other managers. " 
Divisional involvement with loss-making or marginally performing businesses takes 
time and precedence over those that are making a positive return even if this return is 
inadequate by industry standards. The BM of the business making the most profits 
wants to be lcft alone "and to be honest we have had so many issues with the rest 
that we only go and see him once a quarter. " (emphasis added). Yet, while this 
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business is the most profitable in the division, with return on sales of 12 % against a 
divisional total of 2.5%, other external companies in the same product market are 
achieving return on sales ratios of over 20% "but at the same time I'm so stretched 
by the others I have to let him get on with it. " The time spent on improving unit 
profitability has another drawback in that it is contrary to the espoused "strategic " 
orientation of the divisional team. A focus on financial statements is tending to 
reinforce the 'financial control" perception of the BMs. 
"Every month we would go and see them and we would talk about their 
profits and their costs and we couldn't seem to change the basis of 
the relationship. " 
The emphasis on monthlY financial outputs has ended up with "everyonefocused on 
the dayjob and nobody really thinking about thefuture. " The divisional team faces 
a strategic dilemmas in getting the businesses to develop the capabilities and 
positioning for future success in the face of resistance from the BMs. 
The relationship between the business units and their internal customers has been 
characterised by antipathy. This has been a major problem for the performance of the 
businesses. "We make the mistake offocusing on the technical aspects ofthejob but 
where we lose the money is on all the politics. " At a training workshop designed to 
tackle this adversarial stance towards internal customers, the option of becoming 
"customer oriented" received far less support than the option for the DMD to "pull 
rank" and force internal trading on favourable terms. The importance of this 
relationship lies in the need for the business units to be able to develop and maintain 
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mutually beneficial "partnerships" with customers whereas "the businesses wanted 
to stay in their own little world. " In such mutually beneficial partnerships, service 
and service development would become the strategic focus rather than price. "We 
knew that we would always struggle on price so we had to add extra service to win. 
We also had to have a new service development process. " At a subsequent workshop 
with invited representatives of their internal customers the divisional staff were 
surprised at "how ignorant the BMs were of their customers and the real animosity 
between them, " This workshop at least resulted in a "treaty" as a basis for mutual 
reconsideration of more positive relationships. 
Historically there had been no inter-connection between the business units to the 
extent that the BMs had little awareness of what the other businesses actually did. 
"They'd known each otherfor 5 to 6 years and it took three workshops before they 
said 'what exactly do you do then? "' This sense of separateness was not just within 
the division. The businesses saw themselves as owned by, but not belonging within, 
the company. One BM for example claimed to never see a senior company manager 
except when asked to produce "a great tome ofa plan " for the annual budget review. 
This would form a basis for a ritual negotiation i. e. "'up your profit number .... 
'can't'.. 'up your profit number'... 'OK "' followed by failure to achieve the 
increased profit budget in the following year. "What a waste oftime! " 
The divisional team believe 'partnering' should exist between businesses. "We are 
trying to bring them together, trying to get them to share. " To facilitate this it 
6-30 
seemed important for the businesses to have a "similar value set" and "common 
standards ofprofessionalism " and operate "in a reasonably consistent way " in terms 
of such processes as "project management ", contract management skills " and "team 
development " "Then you begin to discover that we all have different meaningsfor 
those things. " 
A series of professionally facilitated workshops was run with the BMs and divisional 
staff at country venues. Although based on various topics such as '5th discipline 
thinking', 'marketing' and 'innovation' the events were aimed at facilitating a more 
pan-divisional perspective through the promotion of commonality of business 
processes and objectives. An over-riding aim was to develop an awareness of the 
tangible value of inter-business sharing. 
The relationship between the division and the businesses remains characterised by 
ambivalence. At the early stages the businesses were not viewing the divisional level 
as "a value adding opportunity.. as able to open doors. " It was seen as just 
"another layer" of assessment and monitoring and this was reinforced by the degree 
of performance variance analysis at monthly meetings. Even after a period of 
seemingly successful workshops, a planned divisional conference has met with 
"mixed reactions " although the BMs "didn't wince " as they had in the past when 
fin-ther training workshops were announced. 
Against business opposition the division has introduced such processes as 3600 
feedback, internal business communication programmes and formal appraisals and is 
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planning pan-divisional supervisors' programmes. At the same time it continues to 
aggressively monitor operating performance and actively intervene when 
perfonnance is below plan. Despite this push towards a pan-divisional orientation 
the BMs have no shared accountabilities and each of their incentive plans are linked 
only to the performance of their business. At the same time the control focus of the 
division is on the traditional elements of profit, cash and directly associated 
measures. Divisional monthly reporting to the corporate level remains based on the 
financial accounts of the individual units. 
6.5.4 Summary 
Within a company wide theme of integration the divisional team are attempting to 
promote sharing and cooperation between businesses which, in the past, have BMs 
who have barely spoken with each other. The division has been a classically M-form 
organisation with businesses virtually left to run themselves with an annual strategic 
and budgetary framework. In practice, little has changed despite the avowed intent 
of the divisional staff to promote more linkages and a greater pan-divisional 
perspective. This remains a non-cooperative division with a top team espousing 
entrepreneurial, cooperation whilst immersed in administrative monitoring to the 
extent that they do not have the necessary time to influence mediocre performers as 
they are too busy dealing with the poor performers. 
At best Division C might be seen to be in transition to a more cooperative form but 
the entrenched resistance of the BMs, who are guarding their stand-alone "Patch" 
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with vigour, may doom the attempt to failure. This is even more likely given that the 
relatedness of the businesses is viewed in terms of common markets and customers 
rather than common processes or capabilities. The input of the divisional team via 
exhortation and training events is aimed at achieving mutual, cross-selling of a 
package of services by collaborating BMs who, even now, have little idea of the 
services of their sister businesses and remain under performance pressure in their 
own business. 
It is unlikely that substantial change in behaviour will occur without organisational. 
structural and process changes being put in place to support and drive the new 
ideology. If there is material divisional value to be gained by the packaged, one-stop 
sale and delivery of a set of services (as proposed by the divisional team) it may be 
necessary that this selling/logistic activity becomes a divisional function (activity 
benefit) while the businesses focus on furthering their competitive (cost) capability in 
the service to be provided. 
The dilemma between espoused value and M-form practice is acute in this division. 
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6.6 Division D1 - Manufacturing Capital Equipment for Retail Stores 
"In reality ofcourse you know that in any business you're stamping 
fires out. In a group ofany size at any one time the chances ofthem 
all being up and everything's cosy andyou can go home on a Friday 
and sleep and think about strategic things is wishful thinking. " 
Division DI is la sister division of D2 described in the previous chapter. It employs 
I 100 people and generated 1996 revenues of L80m from six business units in the 
UK. The businesses manufacture and sell a range of capital equipment and fittings to 
large retail stores. Customers are part of a concentrated industry where "a handful 
ofmajor accounts" constitute the focus of competitive activity. While cost (price) is 
a competitive imperative, customising product to the specific "bells and whistles " 
requirements of the major customers offers the major value-adding opportunity. A 
foreseen strategic threat is that major customers begin to prefer the cost savings 
inherent in standardised products and move to a tendering process and hence increase 
"thefair amount ofdownwardpressure " that is currently being exerted on prices and 
margins. The combination of products from the businesses make the division a large 
player in a fragmented industry with a unique breadth of offering. 
"In our business it is the range ofproducts that we have to offer 
by comparison to our competitors .. we're able to do a turnkey 
operationfor a major customer. In the UK there is no competitor 
that has that breadth of offer .. that's the clear differentiation we have in the marketplace. " 
Despite this breadth of divisional offering the businesses still need to be individually 
competitive on service, quality and price as some customers have shown a tendency 
to "cherrypick" particular components of the offer whilst taking cheaper alternative 
6-34 
parts from other suppliers. Each of the businesses occupies the leading or number 
two position (by market share) in its particular product/market. 
6.6.1 Membership Benefits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
is Varied inputs from the DMD to the Divisional brand 
individual BMs including taking the 
long term view. 
Team: Group: 
None Potential for cross-selling with 
common customers 
The primary value for the businesses of belonging to the division resides in the 
guidance given by the DMD. The entrepreneurial scope of this seem limited, 
however as his own description (below) of his fire-fighting (administrative) activities 
leave him no time for developmental strategy. There is no capability or resource 
sharing between the businesses (team) and the divisional level carries out no 
activities on their behalf (facilities) other than maintaining a divisional brand. Even 
the group value of the integrated offering/cross-selling seems over-stated given the 
tendency of customers to unbundle such offers. 
It is difficult to make a case here for a positive Mdj, although it may not be 
necessarily negative. 
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6.6.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy 0 The division is a collection of stand-alone 
businesses that operate autonomously from each 
other. 
0 Cross selling and market collaboration is 
encouraged between the BMs. 
0 Divisional value stems from the integration of the 
offering of the individual businesses into a 'one- 
stop' package. 
Divisional Functions * No strategic functional or process support staff or 
facilities are in place at divisional level. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 Structured linkages are limited to a monthly 
meeting of BMs. 
Measurement Formal divisional control is based on the financial 
outputs of the individual businesses. The divisional 
results are also the individual business accounts. 
Performance incentives The performance bonuses of the BMs are entirely 
based on the profit results of their own business. 
This is a non-cooperative organisation in structure, process and philosophy. Other 
than the hands-on DMD these are separate businesses selling non-competing 
products to the same customers. There seems to be little that the divisional umbrella 
provides that could not be gained from stand-alone units in a trade association or a 
more informal network. 
6.6.3 Description 
The DMD was interviewed in an office on one of the business sites on a Binningham 
industrial estate. During the 1990s there has been changes in corporate orientation 
with respect to the position and role of DMI)s in the company. Prior to 1993 the four 
DMDs were "sitting in the businesses they had grown out of' and becoming 
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increasingly autonomous. In 1993 they were " ut into headquarters" and set up to P 
operate as an executive team. In mid 1996 this move was reversed and the DMI)s 
were "devolved" out of headquarters to their divisions in a move back towards 
strategic and budgetary independence. This move was based on the view that "we, 
being DMDs would be more useful if we were out in the operations. " 
Changes have also been taking place in the structure of the division. 1996 was the 
first year that its six, functionally autonomous businesses has operated under an 
integrated marketing policy and, in particular, under one brand. The six businesses 
have been further integrated into two major groupings based on product similarities 
with some manufacturing sites being amalgamated. The businesses are seen to be 
highly related at the product/market level, we're branded the same ... we're 
interfacing with the same customer operating in the same markets ... the same 
culture ", but have little process capability in common. For example even though the 
businesses manufacture at four UK sites, manufacturing is not regarded as a strategic 
process. 
. 
".. we don't have to be stuck about manufacturing .. we can badge 
we can do what the hell we like as long as we've got control of 
theface to market. " (emphasis added) 
Other than the Business Managers (BMs) only a part-time Financial Controller 
reports to the DMD. The role of the finance man is to "collect the information that 
comes to the (corporate) centre and push that back in aformat that's usefulfor 
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divisional board meetings. " This part-time role is filled by the Finance Director of 
one of the businesses. 
The DMD has occupied various operating roles in his twenty years with the company 
and finds difficulties in his current role in "letting the operators operate. " This is 
particularly the case when problems arise in the operating units that appear beyond 
the capabilities of the BM to resolve quickly. While the "ideal situation" is to have 
91 competent BMs running the unitsfully devolved to the point 
that they understand what their targets are ... with a clear 
strategic view through me to corporate ", 
the reality is that at least one of the businesses is likely to be in crisis at any given 
time and the DMD "ends up going back to be an operator in the real world. " While 
strategically distracting and undesirable it is an essential part of the DMD's role that, 
unfortunately, reflects badly on the BM of the business in question, "so it comes 
down in the end to the selection ofpeople beneath you. " 
When free from such operational involvement an important input of the DMD's role 
lies in developing visions for the businesses in the medium and long term. The BMs' 
lack of experience and their focus on day-to-day issues leave them with no time to 
develop a future orientation. 
I really think the added value that I give is to take my experience' 
point out if necessary, ifI'm asked, where that might be ofsome 
benefit but really to look at the opportunities and the bigger issues. 
Organisational restructuring is another ongoing feature of divisional intervention. 
This restructuring has taken two forms. The first has been to promote the "short term 
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strategy" of the division in getting the businesses individually in "good order. " This 
has meant pursuing cost-savings through amalgamation and rationalising 
manufacturing facilities. The second form has been to further the "longer terin 
strategy" of becoming "the single most important supplier in the UK" through 
offering "turnkey solutions " to customer problems by developing the concept of 
escross-selling. " "The real issue is: How do you cross-sell? " 
This capability of offering a total package of products from the six businesses is seen 
to be the key attribute underpinning the value of the group over the sum of the stand- 
alone businesses. 
"They are absolutely worth more as a grouping. Ifyou broke them 
up and sold them, and that's the acid test isn't W, they would have 
nothing to offer individually amongst a multitude ofsimilar competitors. 
By common branding, integrated marketing and sales efforts and active cross-selling 
by BMs the value of the division is seen to be enhanced as a potential "one-stop 
shop. " Even though any under-performing business or "star" might be seen as a 
profitable divestment opportunity, "ifyou took it out of the whole it lessens the value 
of what's left" and the divested business itself would be worth less if deprived of 
divisional membership on the basis that it would take a product out of the portfolio 
on offer. 6 
The linkages between the businesses are limited to unstructured "cross dialogue " 
between the BMs and a monthly meeting of them all with the DMD. The 
6 These are the views of the DMD. As noted earlier I found it difficult to justify this view. 
6-39 
performance incentives of the BMs do not include any pan-divisional elements being 
related only to the financial performance of their own business. 
"There is noformal reward (for sharing), on the other hand the 
guys are trying to operate within a system that gives reward 
even if it's only by acknowledgement of the contribution they 
make at a divisional Board meeting level. " 
There is a competitive element between the businesses that operates against 
cooperation,. ".. they've got their own P and Ls and they will deliver that and 
don't care about anybody else to that extent. " However, they are dealing with the 
same, small set of customers, and withholding information makes it seem that the 
BM "hasn't got his ear to the ground, and ifyou say 7 don't know'which means 7 
ain't going to fell you', well basically you look stupid. " 
Each year a dozen or so of "the stars ifyou like " from across the company are taken 
as a group through a management training course at a prestigious training centre. 
Mffle coordinated at a corporate level the identification of the high potential 
individuals is via the BMs and then supported at divisional level. The DMI)s take 
part in the training process by acting as "consultants" and take turns in leading this 
party on overseas inspection tours. This annual event is the only structured contact 
between managers below the BM level and is the only systematic divisional (or 
corporate) training. 
The divisional results are reported directly to the corporate finance office from the 
business units with (financial statements only) being reported with the DMD 
commenting on individual businesses and not the division as a whole. 
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6.6.4 Summary 
Despite being part of a company that espouses integration and core competences this 
is a non-cooperative division which operates as a set of stand-alone businesses with 
no integrating structures, systems or processes between them. It is the product market 
activities of the individual businesses that define their relatedness and not a sense of 
common capabilities, competences or processes. While the DMD has a strongly 
espoused orientation towards 'sharing', this is predominantly reflected in the 
exchange of market/customer information between BMs both informally and at the 
monthly divisional meeting. The DMD concedes that his own fire-fighting duties 
prevent him from acting more proactively to develop his ideas of 'turnkey' solutions 
and the lack of any divisional support staff (even the FD is part-time) indicates the 
lack of commitment to pan-divisional functioning. 
6.6.5 Postscript 
Announcing its own large losses in mid- 1997 the parent company revealed the sale of 
Division DI to a German engineering group. The division had experienced a drop in 
profits due to the deferment of refurbishment by major customers and a series of 
operational difficulties. The sale was in order that the company could concentrate on 
its core divisions and "leverage their synergies. "( Annual Report for 1997). This 
plan did not seem to increase the perceived attractiveness of the company's shares: 
. ".. investors should 
be under no illusion that a quick turnaround is 
on the way .. there are 
better bargains elsewhere in the sector. " 
(Financial Times, July 1997. ) 
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6.7 Division E- Vehicle Sales and Service 
"We actively want the head office to be very much smaller, very much 
less involved in what happens at the local business level bilt we want 
to coordinate that activity to the extent that we can maximise 
the opportunity it presents. " (emphasis added) 
With a turnover of; E1500m and employing 9000 people in four business groupings 
in the UK and France the parent company is a UK leader in its sector. After a history 
of broad diversification in the 1970s and 1980s (e. g. hotels, electronics, computing) 
the company has reshaped its industrial and geographical portfolio to become a 
"broadly based" services group in the vehicle industry. With stated goals of being 
"the leader in each area in which we operate " and a long term aim is to make the 
company name stand for "trust" and "valuefor money" the company is seeking to 
build market share as a means of increasing returns to shareholders. The corporate 
focus is on "investing in the areas ofgreatest opportunity and maximising the 
returns in each individual business. " To relate this focus to shareholder value each 
business is measured on "its profit after a chargefor the cost of capital, reflecting its 
gearing and risk characteristics. " This measure is a key feature of management 
bonus schemes. 
Division E generated 1996 revenues of E800m from 3500 employee throughout the 
UK. The primary businesses units are sixty five autonomous dealerships which are in 
one of four franchise groups under the control of a Franchise Director. As well as the 
four Franchise Directors, a Finance Director and an Operations Director, "who looks 
after certain key activities, personnel, information technology and so on across the 
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patch ", report to the Divisional Managing Director (DMD). The division has had 
several different organisational structures in its attempts to maximise value from its 
collection of dealerships. 
Operating in mature markets the dealerships sell and service new and used vehicles. 
The new vehicle industry is becoming increasingly concentrated as the manufacturers 
are actively reducing the number of distributors. The suppliers have a strong 
ownership orientation to their franchised brand outlets 
. ".. just get it right guys 
(they say). We own the right to distribute this 
product. You're theftanchisee and we're theftanchiser and we'll tell 
you how we want to see it. " 
The franchisers are increasing the geographical area of responsibility of their 
franchisees to minimise intra-franchise competition and encourage a more mutually 
beneficial "partnership " between themselves and their retailers. 7 In contrast the used 
car market is highly fragmented. New and used cars are sold and serviced locally and 
local marketing and reputation are seen to be the key facet of competitive strategy 
"there are very different characteristics within local market territories. " 
"It is quite difficult today to drive clear competitive advantage. Our 
belief is that the real competitive advantage will be demonstrated 
through the way we deal with our customers ... the only real point of 
differentiation has to be in the effectiveness ofyour processes and 
the quality ofyourpeople -" 
7 Potential changes in European law has also acted as a spur to the manufacturers. 
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6.7.1 MembershiP Benerits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
Administrative Summary by the * Divisional name (? ) 
DMD/Franchise Directors * Administrative (e. g. IT) help. 
e Divisional training schemes in 
quality, people skills etc. 
Teani: Group: 
No material internal linkages. Increasing territorial 
exclusivity driven by the 
manufacturers i. e. the 
manufacturers want fewer, 
larger, outlets. 
There is limited divisional value from the guidance of the divisional level as the 
prime value-adding characteristic of the dealerships are rooted in local issues. The 
dealerships are not linked with each other in terrns of process or capability although 
they do have email linkages (which they do not use). The value of the divisional 
brand is admitted to be limited and whether generic, divisional wide training is value 
enhancing is a moot point. The prime potential for divisional value seems to lie in the 
potential for enhanced prices/margins as competition is reduced between same brand 
dealerships due to the increasing territories being allowed to the one company. 
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6.7.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy 0 The division is a collection of stand-alone 
businesses that operate autonomously from each 
other. 
0 Value is derived from the local, market-specific 
activities of the dealerships. 
0 Limited value is gained from inter-business 
processes. 
Divisional Functions 0 No strategic functional or process support staff or 
facilities are in place at divisional level although 
administrative help and overview is given by the 
Operations Director 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 The divisional staff, including the Franchise 
Director meet monthly but no such structured 
meetings occur for the dealerships. 
Measurement 9 Formal divisional control is based on the financial 
outputs of the individual businesses. 
0A move towards other non-financial outputs is 
underway (e. g. customer service). 
Performance incentives e The performance bonuses of the BMs are entirely 
based on the profit results of their own dealerships. 
Divisional strategic management is based on separate, autonomous businesses 
generating value from their specific markets. The divisional processes, systems and 
philosophies are consistent with stand-alone M-form organisation. There is a move 
towards non-financial measures but the shareholder value measure remains the key 
indicator of business success. 
6.7.3 Description 
One of the Franchise Directors was interviewed in his office at the divisional 
headquarters in Buckinghamshire. He has been in the division for 4 years and with 
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the company for 25 in various roles in the UK and overseas. The division has been 
in a state of organisational flux for some time. "We've gone through a number of 
different phases ofthe organisation over the pastfew years. " Four years ago, after 
the division had expanded by acquisition there had been a more significant level of 
functional support to the dealerships in their particular franchise groups. "For every 
ftanchise director, you had afinance guy, personnel support and other support 
teams, So it wasfive times quite a lot ofpeople. " Moreover, because the Franchise 
Directors had different company origins, they "were organising and running their 
oi4, n ship " in different ways to each other. "It was very much an organisalion of 
separation where they were separate organisations... very different. " 
In response to these "different cultures " it was decided to structure and implement a 
divisional "way ofdoing things. "A standard computer system was imposed, as were 
ways of selling, service "all sorts ofthings. " "Big teams ofpeople ", based at 
divisional head office focused on implementing such programmes across the 
organisation "as rapidly as possible. " On the back of buoyant trading the costs 
associated with this organisational culture change were painlessly absorbed. A 
market downtum, however, caused a close look at the "one hundred and eighty 
people that were engaged in these projects andprogrammes and support processes 
and management etc. " and it proved "difficult to see where th e added value was. " 
(emphasis added). As a consequence it was decided to reorganise the division on a 
regional basis. While the number of Franchise Directors stayed the same they lost 
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their support staff and had General Managers who, with their team, were responsible 
for a number of dealerships on a geographical rather than franchise basis. This was 
combined with a reassessment of the dealerships and the decision to dispense with 
some of the long term non-performers 8. 
"... ifyou have a problem you spend a helluva lot of time putting all your 
energy into that problem. You never spend the time putting your energy 
into the opportunities. " 
Although "predominantly cost driven "9 reorganisation into a regional structure was 
also 
"driven towards getting economies ofscale out of the regions. It was 
more efficiency driven ... to maximise our marketing potential in the region. 
We could have adjacent businesses in the same territory, or at least in 
contiguous territories where they could be actively behaving in two 
different directions with no synergies at all and effectively competing. 
"Synergies " were gained through various cost reduction and efficiency based 
initiatives such as rationalising common systems and services in local regions. (e. g. 
spare parts were rationalised to one warehouse. ) "Pre the structural changes we 
didn't have synergies. " 
After 18 months the changes were reviewed "andftankly we agreed that it had 
linfited success. " It was concluded that previously there had been "one level of 
complexity " at the top of the division that "really rested in the head of the DMD .. he 
was the only guy that really needed to bring together a picture. " It now seemed that 
8 This has been an ongoing process and, linked with the consolidation of dealerships in response to 
franchiser pressures, has seen a reduction in the total number of dealerships from 105 at the beginning 
of 1992 to 62 at the end of 1996. 
The restructuring allowed a 56% reduction in head office numbers. (i. e. 180 to 80) 
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this level of "strategic thinking or structural thinking" had been moved "down two 
levels into the heads of the regional GMs ". and the regional GMs proved incapable 
of handling the multiple issues. 
"They were suddenly in a region with maybefour orfivefranchises 
and having to understand the complexities ofthe manufacturer's 
requirements in eachftanchise. Having to see what could be done, 
what couldn't be done and how they could achieve resultsfrom that. 
Where regionalisation was seen to have been successful it "was where we had a 
singleftanchise. " Another force at work during this period was that the major 
manufacturers, who previously had been insistent on small franchise regions, had 
begun the shift of orientation to a preference for fewer franchisees covering larger 
tcrritorics. 
At the beginning of 1997 the division moved back to a franchise based structure but 
with some major differences from the earlier franchise based organisation. Whereas 
the former Franchise Directors had full support staff the current roles "have no 
support at aIL " They act more as a "direct link " to the dealership 10. Also some of 
the (one-franchise) regional groupings were left in place. Throughout all of this 
restructuring the dealerships have been autonomous with respect to the functions 
needed for day to day operations. When explaining his monthly results the Franchise 
Director reports on each of the businesses separately. When the divisional results are 
reported the figures are reported by franchise but individual dealership figures are 
still made available. 
10 At this stage the divisional office head count was down to 30. 
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Most of the time of the Franchise Director is spent on operational matters in his set of 
dealerships. 
"Eightypercent ofmy time is spent in business reviews, one-to-one 
reviews site visits, operational reviews ... twenty percent of my time is 
spent on development strategic activity around the portfolio and around 
performance ofthe portfolio. We spend time as a (divisional) board 
developing those things. " 
Although most of the Franchise Director's performance incentive is based on the 
results of his business group there is a an "element" of it that is linked to the overall 
divisional result. The incentives of the dealership heads are based only on the 
performance of their own business, "they are veryfocused in that regard " 
Performance for the purpose of bonus is measured in terms of "shareholder value, 
which is based on a the concept ofa return on capital" but also incorporates the 
results from a "customer service index " and an annual "employee opinion survey. " 
While shareholder value remains the first and most important hurdle the last three 
years in particular have seen increased emphasis place on a more "balanced 
scorecard" incorporating employee and customer satisfaction. 
During the past few years the divisional level realised that there "were lots ofother 
areas we were less than comfortable with. " The division has been through "lots of 
programmes like 'Investors in People'and IS09000 and all those sorts ofgood 
things " but believed that "processes andpeople were not getting the attention they 
deserved. " Currently a consultant facilitated, self development programme is being 
enacted throughout the division. The progranune, "a cascading process which starts 
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at the top and works its way down ", is designed to help all employees reflect on their 
role and position in the organisation. "How youfit in, what you like doing and what 
you don't like doing, what you can do more, and a skills and talent assessment as 
you go along. " 
The value of the process is seen to be in "getting us (management) closer to the 
people " and in "energising " the organisation because "in our industry there'sforty 
years ofapathy been built up in the way we do business. " At the end of the 
programme each employee receives a badge to signify successful completion and a 
small, laminated card "as a take-away and reminder " of the divisional vision and 
the goals for customers, employees, managers, manufacturers and performance 
parameters. 
Other than exposure to such pan-divisional training programmes there are no 
structured links or shared processes or activities between the dealerships nor between 
the franchise groupings. Although all units within the division are email linked, this 
has not been a precursor for more horizontal connectedness. Even at the level of 
common stocks of parts and second hand product the dealerships have been reluctant 
to cooperate and share. 
"T've got emailfacilities to all the dealerships. .. Now getting them to 
use it is a different matter. The parochial thinking's like 'I bought this 
item and it's going to show me a profit so don't take it awayfrom me. ' 
The technology makes it (sharing) possible but it's the old horse to water 
issue. There's plenty of water in the trough, now we'vejust got to get the 
horse to believe that it's the right thingfor it to do. We're getting there 
but we're not at thatpoint. " 
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The issue of the value of being part of the division and the value added by the 
divisional level is a vexed one. "It's a good question because I think it's one of the 
biggest challenges we arejacing .. it questions the value that division adds to the 
picture locally. " (emphasis added). Rationalising common activities (e. g. parts 
supply) within regions and "operating a more effective distribution strategy within 
that geography" are opportunities for cost savings for individual dealerships and yet 
"to befrank with you it's yet to be proven absolutely to me that is the right 
route. I think there are equally opposite views that show you that 
individually a business with the rightfocus can produce higher returns 
as well. " (emphasis added) 
Although all the business within the division operate under the divisional name this 
is not seen to be a brand as such. The advertising and brand of the suppliers is seen as 
the marketing image that draws customers. 
"At the end of the day the customer decides he 71 buy that product and he 71 
lookfor a local dealerfor thatproduct. He's not thinking Tm going to buy 
soinethingftom (Division E). " 
Repeat purchase through customer loyalty are key local goals "so if the divisional 
name adds loyalty, great! but if it doesn't add loyalty, why do it? " 
Despite the identical processes, products, technology etc. across dealerships and 
businesses it is difficult to draw lessons from one to the other. 
"You've got to be carefulyou don't make too many assumptions. There 
can be effective ways in a particular geography ofgaining benefits that 
relate to scale more than anything else and economy in terms ofcost to 
manage the operation. But I don't thinkyou could necessarily go away 
and replicate that elsewhere. " 
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6.7.4 Summary 
This is another non-cooperative division but one that over the years has actively 
organised and reorganised in search of value from (regional and franchise) linkages. 
However, during all this time the fundamental source of value has been viewed as the 
local product market activities of the business and the necessary autonomy of the BM 
to manage those local nuances. This marketing mind-set is perhaps not surprising as 
the common career path in the division starts at the salesman level in a dealership. 
No concerted attempt has been made to operate the division on the basis of common 
capabilities or processes. This part of the value-adding equation seems to have been 
left to the manufacturer/franchiser. The ambivalence of the Franchise Director about 
the value-adding potential of pan-divisional processes is clear. His description also 
indicates that the BMs are actively resistant to any erosion of their autonomy. 
Although there may seem to be little positive Mdj, at the capaýility/resource level in 
the division there is potential for value from the market power that a smaller number 
of dealerships will hold within one franchise. These territories can be such (e. g. 
entire counties or regions) that the opportunity for the typical private consumer to 
benefit from competitive bidding between dealerships in the same franchise will 
effectively be non-existent. In this case relatedness will be of value due to market 
power with the divisional input being to maintain the necessary discipline between its 
autonomous units. 
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6.8 Division F1 - Manufacturing Child-Care Durables 
"We are a series of national businesses and it is our objective to try, 
asfar as we can, to keep it that way. That allows us to get different 
margins in different countries and allows the division in total to be 
more profitable than it would if we were to turn it into a global business 
harmonising our products across all markets would bring the margins 
down to the lowest. " 
"The role (of the divisional level) is to make sure each of the companies 
in isolation is doing the right thing to henefit itsetrandyet doing nothing 
to offend the total of what the division is trying to do .... it's also a 
coordinating pointfor the various subsidiaries. " (emphasis added) 
The parent company is a multinational %Nrith 5000 employees generating revenues of 
E950m and operating profits of L41m from four product divisions across Europe, 
Asia, Oceania and US. In 1993 a new CEO was appointed from within the company 
(a Board member since 1973) and a new chairman joined in 1994. Internal 
programmes to "increase efficiency and improve business processes " have been in 
place since 1995 with longer term aims stated for "design innovation" - through IT 
systems, "transferring expertise "- eventually through a "global personnel policy " 
and "communication" - through newsletters, video conference etc. The company is 
pursuing a corporate strategy of "acquisitive growth " and joint ventures towards its 
goal of becoming synonymous with "commercial dominance of its international 
markets ." 
Division FI had 1996 revenues of fI 00m and employs I 100 people in eight 
businesses in Western Europe, Australasia and the US. As well as the BMs an 
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Engineering Director (with no staff) reports directly to the DMD. Vv%ile a Financial 
Controller also works with the DMD, his direct reporting line is to the corporate 
finance department. The DMD has been with the company for three years in a 
continuance of his career in consumer goods companies. 
Traditionally the strength of the division has been in the UK, Gennany and Australia. 
Expansion to other parts of Europe has taken place through the establishment of self 
contained, national marketing companies either through acquisition or start-up. The 
strategic imperative for the division for the future is international expansion and 
"America is the keyfor that. " While current profitability is sound, future organic 
growth is limited to a rate "a little ahead of inflation " unless the division makes 
inroads into the USA which is the biggest single product market in the industry. 
Following an initial, greenfield' start-up at the beginning of 1996 the medium term 
growth strategy is based on the acquisition of a major American competitor. 
Selling through retailers, the businesses, which are self-contained in all functions, 
market nursery products to first time mothers. While the four largest businesses 
manufacture their products the businesses are "product design and engineering 
companies and marketing businessesfirst .. manufacturing is not essential to us. " 
Markets are mature and concentrated in the countries in which the businesses have a 
presence. The maturity of the markets for the major products are a function of 
legislation which makes the use of the product compulsory for designated sections of 
11 A BM of one of the European businesses was seconded to the US for two years to oversee thestart- 
up. 
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the population. Despite the identical function of the products, legislation and 
consumer taste varies between regions to the extent that national markets differ 
I considerably 
"Basically the division is a series of national businesses with commonalties between 
them. " (emphasis added). Legislative requirements, reflected in mandatory use and 
product standards, are important market-entry barriers. The businesses work closely 
with regulatory bodies to raise the technical hurdles to entry. 
"Part of the strategy is to keep the products increasingly technically 
advanced and make those advances statutor)ý which means it reduces the 
number of simple entrants and has the moral rationale that it makes the 
product safer. It also happens to be commercially attractive. " 
The competitive strategies of the businesses are based on "con7bination of three of 
fourfactors that separate usfton2 the crowd. " Specific to particular countries the 
division has "some very good brand names " so that in Germany, for example, the 
business brand name has the "same recognitionfactor as Coca-Cola. " The 
businesses have "technical leadership over most of the competition " to the extent 
that in total they employ "more design engineers than the rest of the industryput 
together' ." Linked with this technical expertise, two 
BMs are "top people " in the 
industry as well as the divisional Engineering Director and as a consequence the 
12 While one set of regulatory standard requirements now prevails throughout the EEC these 
standards are different, and the differences are substantive, to those in the USA which in turn are 
different to those in Australasia. 
13 This is not a just reflection of relative size as, on a global basis, Consumer Products Division is one 
of three (equal revenue) co-leaders the industry. 
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division is "disproportionately heard in terms ofall the standards and committees. " 
Finally the businesses are "very good at managing retail distribution at local level. " 
6.8.1 Membership Benefits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
General (DMD) management inputs None 
to the individual BMs including the 
provision of longer term direction. 
Team: Group: 
Some cross sharing of technical 0 Increasing technical and 
knowledge. legislative barriers to entry. 
" Price management between 
territories. 
" Reputation of the company and 
representation on industry 
wide bodies. 
The three major businesses (in terms of profits) in the division are dominant in their 
national markets with market shares of over 65%. On a prima facie basis the ability 
to maintain local (national) pricing by owning the virtual cartel of likely competitors 
in Europe is a potential source of group based divisional value and hence "synergy. " 
i. e. the whole is worth more than the sum of the parts because the parts would be 
competing away margin if they were stand-alone. Teani based benefits seem trivial at 
best and given the comments of the DMD (below) probably more apparent than real. 
The guidance inputs from the DMD appear 'administrative' in nature and hence not 
likely to be truly value-adding despite his more optimistic views. 
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6.8.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy The division is a collection of stand-alone, 
nationally based businesses that operate 
autonomously from each other. Despite similarities 
of product and process the market differences of the 
businesses are paramount. 
Divisional value is a function mainly of the general 
guidance of the DMD and the group benefits of the 
elimination of European, cross border price 
competition between businesses that, were they 
stand-alone, would be natural competitors. 
Divisional Functions No strategic functional or process support staff or 
facilities are in place at divisional level. 
A divisional Engineering Director represents 
divisional interests on standards and legislative 
committees. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 Structured linkages exist in the bi-annual meeting 
of BMs and an annual meeting of Technical 
Directors. 
0 The divisional Engineering Director acts, to a 
limited extent, to share technical knowledge 
between businesses. 
Measurement * Formal divisional control is based on the financial 
outputs of the individual businesses which also 
comprise the divisional performance measures at 
the corporate level. 
0 The DMD operates as a non-structured guidance 
and feedback system based on more behavioural 
input parameters with a particular focus on new 
product development. 
Performance incentives * The performance bonuses of the BMs are linked 
only to the profits of their own business. 
_ 
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The prominent feature of this division are the M-form characteristics of autonomous, 
stand-alone businesses judged on their individual financial results with no functional 
nor process inter-dependence. The actual, structural interactions between the 
businesses are limited to bi-annual meetings of the BMs and annual meetings of their 
Technical Directors. The divisional Engineering Director has no input into 
engineering or product design despite his background in this function. 
6.8.3 Description 
The Divisional Managing Director (DMD) was interviewed in his office at the 
company headquarters. Although there is no process, function nor system support the 
divisional level is seen to add value to the businesses in several ways. Regular visits 
to the companies ensure that "they are steering the ship generally in the right way " 
as local operating managers can "get so caught up in the detail that they lose the 
direction of where they ought to be going. " 
In particular the visits aim to keep the business focused on new products and new 
product development which can get deferred to more urgent operational 
contingencies. In the smaller marketing companies "by their very nature " the skills 
of the local managers "are not totally rounded" and support is given by the DMD. 
The divisional level provides "the impetus to enter new markets " as the local focus 
of the national companies hinders more expansionist initiatives, "the Germans worry 
about Germany, the English worry about the UK", 
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Although the DMD visits the businesses frequently there is no formal schedule of 
meetings. The businesses are measured on their achievement of budgeted financial 
targets although the DMD maintains an overview of 'ýproduct development 
progran7n7es " in the larger businesses. The performance incentives of the BMs are 
based entirely on the profit performance of their business. Twice a year, once in the 
UK to coincide with the annual result announcement in the company and once in the 
US at an annual trade fair, the BMs meet formally as a group with the DMD and the 
Technical Director to discuss any issues deemed important to the division or other 
parts of it. 
There are no functions, activities or processes that are shared between the businesses 
other than the relationship of supplier-customer that exists between the larger 
businesses and the smaller marketing/sales companies. Despite having the same 
manufacturing process and selling "essentially the same product" there is no 
interchange of product nor the cross sharing of manufacturing facilities. 14 The 
potential gains from improved manufacturing efficiency from focusing each facility 
on a narrower range of products are deemed "trivial compared to the potential gains 
ftom launching a newproduct. " Even at the level of common components the 
German and UK businesses are designing and manufacturing their own different 
14 Two occurrences showed the relative ease with which this could take place. In the first case the 
American operation started up by assembling products from parts that were shipped from the German 
and UK plants. This was despite the fact that "we had to make amendments to all the products to meet 
American standards. " In the second case a gap in the product portfolio of both the German and UK 
businesses was filled by the same product, with cosmetic changes, supplied by one overseas supplier. 
(Eventually both companies tooled up to make the product themselves. ) 
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versions which "does add a little bit of competition " which is seen to be "quite a 
good thing. " Overall "ifyou look at the synergies between the businesses they're 
very lintited. " (emphasis added). 
Despite this 
"there's a lot ofcross-fertilisation, particularly on the engineeringftont, 
between the companies, so that if we get a good idea in one place we 
transfer that knowledge to others who may use it in a differentform. " 
Knowledge exchange happens at an annual meeting of Technical Directors of the 
businesses and on a more informal basis between BMs "which we rather 
encourage. " Part of the role of the Divisional Engineering Director is to remain in 
contact with his business counterparts and ensure that he acts as "a catalyst to the 
transfer ofknowledge. " The major part of his role, however, is as divisional 
representative on various standards and regulatory bodies. 
' 5 
Other than some technical matters, local market differences dominate the views of 
the businesses and division. The appearance of the product differs according to 
national taste. "Ifyou look a the products in Germany, on appearance alone less 
than 10% could be sold in the UK and vice versa. " Different brands are used in 
different countries "so the management of brand varies. " The "structure ofretail 
distribution" varies widely with 55% of retail trade being through small, 
independent outlets in Germany while the "multiples" account for 90% of similar 
trade in the US and France. The structure of the "multiples " also varies with "true 
15 The incumbent, who has been with the company for many years and has received an MBE for his 
services to the industry, is currently in ill-health. Should he retire there is no intention to replace him 
i. e. it seems that it is the individual rather than the role that is of value. 
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superniarkets " dominant in France and more specialised outlets more powerful in the 
UK and US. "It's very difficult andperhaps not even a wise thing to manage retail 
distribution except on a local basis, " The exception to this may come in the form of 
globalising customers and in particular with customers adopting a pan-European 
orientation. "In the long run the business will become global. " 
Despite an espoused lack of synergy between the businesses, a potential acquisition 
in the US is predicated on potential synergies as well as a drive for growth. The 
opportunity for a "clear two brand strategy" using European product/brand through 
the US distribution system is matched by the reciprocal opportunity to bring the 
lower cost, American product to countries in Europe. Also taking "some cost out of 
the system by amalgamating manufacturing areas in the States " is less problematic 
in the new market. 
"It is actually the differences that give the opportunityfor synergy.. 
most of1he synergies will be on the salesftont which is leveraging 
the distribution channels ... we haven't got the management capability 
to do that in isolation.. that is without an acquisition. " 
The value of the division over the sum of its businesses is also augmented by its 
ability to constrain competition between its two largest businesses. Both have in 
excess of 60% market share in their national markets but "the UK tends to be a lower 
margin countryfor us than the continent. " Having "a similar but different product" 
in various countries enables the businesses to "price position differently. " If the two 
businesses were stand-alone then the UK business, with lower costs than it's Gennan 
counterpart, would compete in Germany at lower prices. If the German business was 
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thereby forced to lower its prices the effect on its margins and profits would be 
significant even if its market share was unchanged. "We actually take advantage of 
thefact that it is a series ofnational markets rather than a European market. " 
The move to a common European currency is a potential threat as "our ability to 
confuse the issue though different currencies will become more difficult and cross 
European pricing will become a little more transparent. " Customers with pan- 
European ambitions are already causing problems by selling product purchased in the 
UK in other European outlets. Changes in the marketplace may force changes in the 
strategic orientation of the division with a consequent change in the nature of the 
people in the businesses. 
"I do accept that in time it will move towards a more global structure 
and maybe the types ofMDs we require will need to change to be more 
system type people rather than entrepreneurial. " 
6.8.4 Summary 
Division FI is not a cooperative organisation despite the fact that, typical of other 
manifestly non-cooperative divisions, the DMD talks about knowledge sharing and 
cross-fertilisation in a way that bespeaks a cooperative orientation. The businesses 
are, in fact, stand-alone, nationally based entities that in reality have little to do with 
each other in any but the most cursory of ways. Even the low degree of sharing 
suggested by the DMD is probably overstated as he also describes how the UK and 
German businesses are separately (and secretively) designing and developing the 
same, critical component. No structural mechanisms are in place to force sharing or 
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integration and, other than the Divisional Engineering Director who seems to be 
more an industry representative for the division, no functional/process staff are in 
place to add expertise. This DMD is comfortable with running the division as a set of 
autonomous units because his perception of the most important source of value lies 
in the local product-market activities of the businesses which, in his view, are 
defined more by their differences than their similarities. Hence his seemingly 
contradictory statement about "differences" giving rise to "synergy. " By this he 
means that by adding low market end products (different) to their current high end 
(and high cost) portfolios the businesses will make more profit (i. e. synergy). 
An important issue for Division FI is the value of maintained pricing, in particular, 
6 in Gennany' . At this level of group 
benefits it is logically feasible that restriction of 
(price) competition, which is under divisional control, is a material divisional value. 
In such a case the M-form management of the division is an appropriate one as it is 
important to maintain and enhance territorial and hence business boundaries to 
ensure territorial discipline. 
The value of this division may indeed be greater than the sum of the parts i. e. 
synergy may be in existence, but based in economics of monopoly control rather than 
economies of scope. 
There is more than one way to make added profits from relatedness. 
16 There was more than a hint of local resale price maintenance being a feature of the market 
dynamics of the (dominant) German operation. 
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6.9 Inside a Non-Cooperative Division: 
In this case a "deeper" investigation of a non-cooperative division was undertaken 
through interactions with other divisional level managers and business managers 
after the discussions with the DMD. Although the major issues brought out by the 
DMD are evident in these additional interviews a richer sense of the dilemmas and 
tensions of divisional memberships comes through. 
Division F2 17 _ Vehicle Sales, Servicing and Leasing 
"As long as the man who's running the business is a good all-round 
'chap'. good all-roundperformer I don't see that you can add value 
to that. Ifeel ourjob at the centre is merely to put in place the correct 
person to run that business and don't get involved anymore andjust 
make sure we monitor hisfinancial activity. " 
(DMD - emphasis added) 
Company 
CEO 
DMD 
Finance Deputy BM BM Business Development 
DMD (Rental) (Parts) and Strategy 
BMs (Dealerships) 
Bold = part of the division 
........ = direct influence 
Fiaure 6.1 Oraanisational Chart - Division F2 
17 As a quid pro quo for access to this division I was asked to make a presentation on my 
findings/thoughts particularly pertaining to the dealership businesses. The summary report of that 
session is contained in Appendix F) 
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Division F2 is one of four product divisions of Company F the parent company of 
Division FI described above (6.7). Employing 23 00 people in the UK the division 
generated 1996 revenues of E600m from three businesses operating in the vehicle 
distribution industry as a competitor to Division E (above). The three main 
businesses areas operate in different segments of this mature industry. The 
dealerships, the main focus of the division, sell and service new and second-hand 
vehicles as well as supplying parts and in some cases hiring or leasing products for 
short or extended periods. The growth of parts supply, both to consumers and to 
other dealerships, has been such that it has been consolidated into one stand-alone 
18 
business within the division . Similarly the growth of the leasing market caused 
leasing to be operated as a significant business area in its own right. The parts 
business supplies some of the requirements of the dealership but is limited to the 
parts of one (major) franchiser. The dealerships supply some of the new product 
requirements of the leasing company. While a 'preferred supplier' basis is evident 
these internal trading arrangements operate on an 'arms length/market pricing basis. 
Leasing and Parts businesses are headed by Business Managers (BMs) with a 
functional organisation below them. The other business area, headed by the deputy 
DMD, comprises 26 stand-alone dealerships each headed by its own BM and 
functional team. The deputy DMD has no support staff and shares with the DMD the 
Is In fact the growth was within one large dealership where the parts operation grew to be so large it 
was handled as a separate business within the dealership and finally put as a stand alone divisional 
business, incorporating activities from other dealerships. It is still a very small business in terms of 
turnover compared with the other two. 
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oversight of the 26 dealerships. i. e. his role is a manifestation of 'span-of-control' 
difficulties which the DMD would experience if 28 businesses reported directly to 
him. A Financial Controller and a Director of Business Development and Strategy 
also report to the DMD. The Financial Controller consolidates divisional numbers 
and is a link with his counterparts in the business. The position of Director of 
Business Development and Strategy is a newly created one and the role of the 
incumbent has not yet been fully defined. Currently he is acting as the project 
manager of a centralised computer system for use by all the dealerships. Later his 
role is mooted to be involved in assisting the dealerships with internal processes on 
the basis of his past experience as a consultant in process improvement. 
The current divisional strategic imperative is shaping the dealership portfolio to meet 
longer term macro environmental change. Foreshadowed changes in European law 
and the response of major suppliers are causing a rethink of the potential shape of the 
division. Within the dealerships the second hand market, which is an important 
source of margin, is highly fragmented and easy to enter. "apiece of larmac, a shed 
and a telephone and that's it, you're in. " The new product market, important as the 
"shopftont ", however, is becoming increasingly concentrated as the major marque 
suppliers are actively reducing the number of franchisees and increasing the territory 
of those that remain. The suppliers are also trying to break down a long term 
adversarial relationship with their franchisees, "they're generatingfriends in the 
business, people who want toform partnerships with them in the long term. " 
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Local market knowledge and responsiveness are seen to be the key issues 
underpinning competitive success in the dealerships with the BM being the key 
driver of business performance. The "main ingredient" of the competitive advantage 
of a dealership is 
it customer care ... how we treat the customer to get the repeat 
business. " 
6.9.1 Membership Benefits 
Guidance: Facilities: 
" Administrative overview by the * Divisional name. 
DMD/Deputy DMD who act as * Centralised IT. 
guide, counsellor and cross 
pollinators of problem solutions. 
" (Planned) kaizen inputs from newly 
appointed divisional manager. (? ) 
" Designated divisional experts in 
Sales, Welfare, Service. (? ) 
Team: Group: 
" Meetings of sales and service heads Increasing territorial 
of the dealerships exclusivity for the dealership 
" Divisional sales incentive scheme businesses driven by the 
run by one of the dealership BMs. manufacturers i. e. the 
manufacturers want fewer, 
larger, outlets. 
Captive custom for leasing and 
parts. (? ) 
Purchasing discounts. (? ) 
Cheaper finance. 
The (? ) indicates potential value of membership that is suggested by some members 
but questioned by others (notably the BMs) as a divisionally specific benefit. The 
major potential value of membership seems to lies with group based benefits of the 
increasing territorial exclusivity that is being made available to the dealerships. The 
administrative inputs of the divisional level seem unlikely to sufficient to make Mdiv 
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significant even in the eyes of the DMD/deputy DMD (see Description below). It is 
difficult to make a case for a divisional value greater than the sum of stand-alone 
performance unless increasing market consolidation does end up having a positive 
effect of prices/margins through monopoly effects in regional markets. 
6.9.2 Perspective and Pattern 
Divisional Philosophy 9 The division is a collection of stand-alone 
businesses that operate autonomously from each 
other. 
" Value is derived from the market-specific activities 
of the businesses. 
" It is important for the BMs to have the 
responsibility and authority to run their businesses 
as their own with limited interference from the 
divisional centre unless the business fails to deliver 
its budgeted performance 
Divisional Functions A new role of Business Development Manager has 
been added which duties have yet to be fully 
defined. Other than this there are no process or 
functional support staff at divisional level. 
Pan-divisional 
dynamics 
Integration 0 No structured integration of the businesses (within 
the three main areas or the dealerships) is in 
evidence. 
0 Informal contacts of functional heads of the 
dealerships are maintained. 
Measurement 9 Formal divisional control is based on the financial 
outputs of the individual businesses. 
*A move towards other non-financial outputs is 
underway (e. g. customer service). 
Performance incentives The performance bonuses of the BMs are entirely 
based on the profit results of their own business 
with no part contingent on divisional performance 
or shared goals with other businesses. 
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This is a determinedly non-cooperative organisation wherein, throughout the 
division, the possible economic benefits of scope through shared learning and 
development of capabilities and competences are subjugated to the psychological, 
organisational and marketing benefits of separation and autonomy. 
6.9.3 Description - The Divisional Managing Director 
The Divisional Managing Director (DMD) was interviewed in his office at divisional 
headquarters in Worcestershire. The divisional managerial philosophy it strongly 
oriented towards autonomous business units. The DMD has been in the role for 5 
years although with the company and in the industry for over 30. When he took up 
the role he changed the structure of the division. "We used to be totally centralised, 
we (the centre) used to do all the advertising, we used to do all the buying. " 
This was not the way he felt was the best way of motivating people in the businesses. 
"I knew how Ifelt as a business manager. They don't want some wanker 
comingfrom head office saying "this is how I think", a great theoretician 
coming along telling them how to run the business. " 
Thus all the BMs are given the functional autonomy to run "their" business on a 
stand-alone basis. They must however do this within the framework of achieving 
agreed targets. 
"I say 'ifyou know how to run the business that'sfine, can Ijust tell 
you what the rules are? Do you agree that we need to get X? Ifyou Ire 
quite happy to do that I won't even come here again. As long as you 
send me the money Im quite happy to do that ý" (emphasis added) 
The businesses are measured on their financial results against budget. Although a 
return on capital employed (ROCE) target is the main measure the (individual) . 
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monthly meetings go into details by cost centre. The performance for each cost 
centre is graded as 'excellent', "that's humming", 'average' or 'poor', "requires a 
high level offocus and attention. " The dealerships are also measured on their 
performance against an externally generated customer service measure with an 
objective to be at number one or number two if number one is another divisional 
business. On these measures "you don't have to be there tomorrow but the next time 
thefigures come out you have to not go down. We'll let you stand still a bit but you 
have to keep movingforward " 
As well as the ongoing customer measure the divisional level has undertaken a 
consultant supplied "mystery shop programme" to audit various aspects of customer 
service. 
Other than the external customer survey the benchmarking of performance is internal. 
Dealerships that consistently under-perfonn in an area are encouraged to visit and 
learn from those that are doing well, 
(4 where we've got a relatively poor performer we can attempt to bring 
in the skillsfrom a goodperformer and insist that the guy who's running 
the business goes and gets apiece ofthat action " 
or the DMD and his deputy "cross-pollinate " solutions to problems. 
"Where we help is to say 'Joe Bloggs had this problem two weeks ago and 
this is how he satisfied it. Try it. Ifyou're not happy with it do something 
else but we still want our ROCK " 
This problem solving orientation is acknowledged to do nothing to drive the better 
performers. "I think we tend to take the best perforinerfor granted and wrestle with 
the ones below im. " 
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The bonus incentives of all managers in the division are based on the financial 
performance of their business and includes no shared or pan-divisional components. 
There is no link of the incentive scheme with any non-financial measure. For 
corporate reporting purposes (and explanation at Board meetings) divisional 
performance is reported as a set of separate figures for each of the business units. 
Although all the businesses and dealerships share the divisional name ('brand') there 
are no formal linkages of processes, systems or functions between them. While no 
facilities are currently shared by the dealerships, a centrally located and maintained 
computer network is in the process of being installed under the project management 
of the Director of Business Development and Strategy. All of the BMs used to meet 
twice a year at corporate conferences based around Ul and half year result 
announcements. These meetings have become less frequent since the appointment of 
a new company CEO and restricted to fewer numbers. The value of such meetings 
was questioned in any case, "whether it's we don't do them right or what .. I mean we 
get a bit out of it, but the amount of money it costs! " 
The BMs of dealerships with the same franchise meet under the auspices of the 
deputy DMD once a month in a "very informal meeting which isn't agendaed by the 
centre " based on a "what's going on? How is it with you? sort of thing " which 
benefits the people attending who "contribute, listen, get aflavour. " 
The benefits of divisional membership, outside of the intervention and guidance of 
the senior managers, did not come easily to mind, 
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. ".. some economies ofscale ... we can buy ourfinance at half a percent less and on the volumes that we deal with it adds up to hundreds of 
thousands ofpounds... a bit on consumables and afew bits andpieces 
elsewhere ... there 
has to be something in the branding .. hopefully we 
attract quality people that stay with us. " 
A particular dilemma centres on training and the divisional neglect of business level 
inputs and processes, "I don't know how to train our people.. " Similarly the 
selection of key business and unit level staff is handled at the centre by a large 
competitor but is rejected as central interference in Division F2. 
"I try to put it all back to the man who runs the business and if there is 
something that is not working in that business then it's down to him. And if 
he requires training or ifhe's got crap salesmen then that's down to him. " 
This approach is not without its concerns. 
"When you see the rest of the industry doing the complete opposite of what 
you're doing, it worries you a bit. " 
6.9.4 Description - The Divisional Level 
The executives reporting to the DMD (Fig 6.1) comprise two divisional staff 
positions, the Finance Director and the Business Development and Strategy Director, 
the Business Managers (BMs) in charge of two separate businesses of Parts and 
Rental and the deputy DMD in charge of 26 stand-alone businesses (dealerships) 
The perspective of the divisional level as a stand-alone, autonomous group of 
businesses is clearly a shared one by the managers at the divisional level. 
PP rom the centre. we don't actually run itfi 
(Deputy DMD) 
SP -operationally we are autonomous. 
'p 
(BM- Parts) 
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'firom the time he (DMD) appointed me he left me to do my own 
thing. He never once attended a board meeting. 
(BM - Rental) 
"Fundamentally the responsibility sits with the BMs which is right, 
it's a decentralised organisation. " 
(Director Business Development and Strategy) 
As well as having external customers, the Rental and the Parts business trade 
internally with the Dealer business. Parts are sold to the dealerships which enjoy 
lower costs and stock holdings as a result. The dealerships sell vehicles to the 
Leasing business with consequent volume benefits for the dealerships as well as the 
opportunity to obtain first preference for service contracts. In this sense "synergy 
between the dealerships and the rental company isfairly obvious. " (BM - Rental) 
The 'synergy' is one-sided as the Rental business can buy from anywhere and 
sometimes pays a higher price to the divisional dealers for the sake of maintaining 
the internal trade. Apart from internal transactions there are no ongoing linkages 
between the three business areas. Each exists independently and shares no facilities, 
meetings, processes etc. with any of the others. In fact all of the dealerships have 
their own local parts businesses with 15-20 people employed and some of the larger 
ones run their own rental operations. For their own businesses the Rental and Parts 
BMs had difficulties thinking of advantages to being part of the division. 
".. I do struggle with the idea ofadvantage'. Operationally we are 
autonomous softom that point of view there is no direct advantage. 
(BM - Parts) 
6-73 
The recently created divisional level position of Director, Business Development and 
Strategy seemed contrary to the strongly prevailing culture. The appointee came from 
outside the division (and the company) and is known within the division as the 
"Kaizen Manager. " His background in the automobile industry and consulting had 
built his expertise in waste reduction and cost improvement based on focusing on 
organisational activities and processes. 
"Myfocus is very much on the process and that's trying to break 
awayftomjust thinking about results. Get the process right and the 
results should come. " 
In this he agreed that his perspective was contrary to the prevailing ethos of the 
division, "it will take quite a lot oftime to break awayftom a numbers driven 
approach. " In another significant way his orientation towards inter-business sharing 
was contrary to divisional practice. 
"There are elements of bestpractice across the group, what we 
don't have currently is a way ofsharing that. What happens is we 
reinvent the wheel. ... We try andfacilitate sharing though the various 
league tables, 'you guys that are bottom talk to the guys at the top', 
I don I think the sharingpart occurs enough ... It's about getting 
away thefear that talking to somebody else is a sign offailure. 
(emphasis added) 
Despite these strongly held views on the value of sharing he does not advocate the 
imposition of sharing mechanisms. In the context of a "decentralised organisation " 
there had to be "local ownership " with his input coming from "working along side 
the BMs more. " So far he has been focused on managing the centralised computer 
project and has had little input of a "kaizen nature'into the businesses. His 
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optimistic assessment that the principle of kaizen being appropriate across the 
dealerships "isfairly well embedded into most ofthe BMs'minds now " is not 
reflected in the comments of the BMs. Similarly, his commitment to training as a 
facilitating mechanism, particularly in the light of his views that the division is 
"unprofessional in our trainingftom the BM down to thefirst line manager". is in 
marked contrast to the DMD's expressed lack of faith in management education and 
training. 
This role seems out of place as neither pan-divisional processes nor ongoing process 
intervention at business unit level has been a characteristic of divisional strategy and 
operating culture in the past and is not consistent with the current views of the 
majority of others in the division. 
6.9.5 Description - The Dealerships 
"We are left almost completely alone to be master ofour own destiny. 
(BM - Birrningham) 
"The best thing about our group is that we are allowed to get on and 
run the business. " (BM - Stafford) 
The dealerships form the core of the division and, organisationally, constitute a mini- 
division of autonomous businesses under the stewardship of the Deputy DMD. There 
is a move, initiated by the major manufacturer/franchisers, towards consolidating 
dealerships by geography such that a hub dealership has control of other satellite 
sites. This change is aimed at reducing the number of franchisees and enabling those 
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that are left to better control prices and margins in larger sales territories. "I'd call it 
a cartelpersonally. " (Deputy DMD) 
Although some of the dealerships differ by franchise (two marques predominate) 
they operate under the same divisional name, sell the same products and offer the 
same services to the same type of customers. The customer segments, while the 
same for each dealership by type, exist in differing proportions in different territories. 
. ".. you are in your own marketplace, the 
demographics are your 
demographics and nobody else's. Therefore ifyou're in a large city 
centre and have a huge welfare component .. you have to be an expert in 
that. Ifyou're operating in a smaller seaside town in the south of 
England .. it's probably pure retail therefore you need all the strategies 
that gofor an agedpopulation that's well moneyed and so on. 
(BM-Bin-ningham) 
Their product strategy is seen to be dominated by the actions and requirement of their 
franchiser "we are dependent on the manufacturerfor our markelingplans. " (BM - 
Cheltenham). Despite this restriction, the dealership BM's unanimously assert that 
"giving the sort ofservice that makes people want to deal with us " (BM- 
Manchester) and "building relationships with your local community, local police... " 
(BM - Banbury) to be the critical underpinnings of their long term competitive and 
financial success. To fully develop local focus it is argued that autonomy of 
operation is logically essential. 
"The essence of thisjob is to run it like it's my own business. It is 
important that we have that delegation down because you need 
relationships with the local community, you need to understand how 
the local community operates. " 
(BM - Banbury) 
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Consistent with an "own business" culture there are no processes, structures or 
systems that link the dealerships in their daily operations. It is also apparent that not 
only do the BMs view stand-alone functioning as necessary, it is also an orientation 
they like and prefer. They want to be in charge of their "own" business with as little 
input from division as possible. "One ofthe great benefits ofthis group is the 
autonomous nature 
in which we are allowed to manage " (BM - Manchester). The Deputy DMD, 
however, is conscious of some problems with being consistent with a culture of 
behavioural autonomy and output controls, 
. 
".. there are too many examples at the moment where, ifyou 71 
forgive the conceit, we know that what the BM is doing is wrong, 
but because we operate on the principle "you run your business 
we're here to advise or consult" we can only comment, we can't 
insist he changes. " (emphasis added) 
He offered as a current example the instance of a BM who had persisted with a 
functional manager for eighteen months despite the Deputy DMD's oft given advice 
to the contrary. Finally the functional manager was dismissed after being 
acknowledged by his BM to be specifically responsible for a significant monthly 
loss. The Deputy DMD remains angry that he did not command the dismissal of the 
manager at an earlier date and questions his own persuasive abilities' "perhaps my 
arguments were not strong enough " while at the same time contemplating the 
dismissal of the BM because "it's obvious his thinking is not quite sound " Despite 
this, and other examples of the costs of autonomous functioning, the Deputy DMD 
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remains committed to the principle because "if everyone thought I knew all the 
answers then we'd have a majorproblem. " 
In most instances where there is disagreement the BMs tend to take the proffered 
advice of the Deputy DMD or the DMD. If not for the obvious political reasons then 
this is for the pragmatic ones that the two senior men are experienced industry 
managers who also have daily contact with other divisional businesses and "Ihey can 
see some obvious things that won't work and then it's good to get a view that it's 
failed everywhere else. "(BM - Bournemouth). The generally accepted input from the 
divisional level is in the form of problem solving suggestions related to specific 
under-performance. Occasionally a pan-divisional suggestion in terms of broader 
process issues is offered but these are less likely to be taken up by the majority. An 
example of this was given by the BM - Sherwood (one of two female BMs). Six 
years previously the division had exposed all the BMs to a sales training company. 
Whilst most BMs attended the initial presentation and tried the programme for a 
short time, the BM - Sherwood was the only one that had persisted with the training. 
The problem being for the others, as she saw it, was the fact that the process involved 
ongoing monitoring of salespeople and particularly their telephone techniques and 
"the guys didn't like being constantly monitored " 
Although no formal inter-business links exist there are two semi-structured sharing 
mechanisms. The first exists in the form of acknowledged expertise among the BMs. 
Three of the BMs are considered to have gained, either through background 
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experience or through current operating circumstance, particular skills and 
knowledge in a particular function or process. (Repairs, Service, and Welfare Sales) 
and are nominated as the divisional experts. These BMs are used by others, either 
through self initiation or through the 'advice' of somebody senior, as the prime 
source of knowledge in their particular areas. For example other BMs may visit the 
&service expert' or send their Service Head to spend time at his dealership. 
The second mechanism lies in monthly meetings of the dealership Service Heads 
under the chairmanship of the 'service expert' and twice yearly meetings of the Sales 
Directors. This latter meeting is run by one of the BMs who also runs a cross- 
divisional sales incentive scheme. Whilst these meetings are focused on sharing 
information, discussions on 'best practice' do take place. The BMs fulfilling these 
quasi-divisional functions are not rewarded on the basis of them and do not have any 
aspect of these roles included in their annual objectives. They could renounce these 
extra-business roles if they so wished. 
The value of these sharing mechanisms and whether or not they are contingent on 
divisional membership was questioned, however. 
"Nice to have but not essential. Theftanchisers do similar things.. 
That networking is very important but it would happen anyway, within 
the industry. I wracked my brains to see what there is in terms ofsynergy 
and, yes, you get those things, butyou get those things anyway. 
(BM - Banbury - emphasis added) 
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In general the BMs were hard pressed to specify tangible advantages of belonging to 
the division 19 . "When you start to talk about divisional benefits they do get watered 
down a little bit because you are expected to run the business. " (BM - Leeds - 
emphasis added). 
The Deputy DMD was similarly hard pressed to see the added-value of grouping the 
businesses other than some "economies ofscale " from central purchasing and 
finance, and some selective value from the "advice and counsel " from the top 
because "ifyou've got the right people they would not need any governance at all. " 
However the value of even these factors were seen to be low by some of the BMs. 
"Buyingpower is overstated, centralpurchasing is not much better 
than I can do .. Js (DMD) 
been here twice this year. It's nice to chat 
and chew over ideas but, he's the owner/banker, he's no Ynore than that. 
(BM - Banbury - emphasis added) 
The divisional name is seen to be less important than the franchiser's brand and both 
are less important than local reputation. Being part of a large, reputable group was 
helpful in reassuring customers and in attracting high calibre staff. In the main little 
tangible advantage was seen to accrue from being part of the division. The BMs 
believe they should get together as a group more often to get to know each other, 
"There are BMs who probably don't talk to each otherftom one six 
months to the next. I think we miss something in not seeing each other, 
(BM - Stafford) 
19 Intriguingly (at least to this researcher) some of the BMs (unwitting &V . 1y) suggested that the businesses 
were worth less as part of the division. e. g. '7fit were my own business I could take a view that I 
could more effectively build it up hyploughing back all the profits and accepting that I won't make a 
short term profit because I know what I am doing will generate a much more stable, long term 
business .. whereas with a p1c they want their money back as soon as possible. " (BM - Cheltenham) 
and "afamily owned business would take a more long term view ofthings than a p1c with 
shareholders to keep happy. " (BM - Manchester) 
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Yve never met thefellowfrom Birminghamfor example 
(BM - Sherwood) 
This, however, was suggested as a mechanism for developing a sense of group 
cohesion rather than in pursuit of business advantage. Some of the BMs, "the 
clique " (BM - Shirley), had planned an annual social gathering under their own 
auspices if the divisional people did not arrange such an event 20 . Despite these 
expressions of a need for some form of togetherness an encapsulation of the overall 
culture came in one BM's response to the question: "Do the other BMs spend much 
time with each other? " "I don't know, I really don't care what others do. " (BM - 
Manchester) 
Although the value, necessity and desirability of autonomous functioning was 
expressed by the majority there was one BM who had a notably different view. This 
man was the 'service expert' in the division who, having risen through the ranks of 
technician to service manager was now in charge of a dealership. This was unusual as 
the typical BM rose through the sales ranks. He was adamant that "as much as J and 
P (DAfD and Deputy DAID) believe in autonomy, and that's great, th ere are 
efficiencies you can gainfrom getting together " (BM - Shirley - emphasis added). 
He saw potential for doing many things "across the businesses " but believed this 
needed to be handled at a divisional level because no manager lower in the 
organisation would have the time. He was "allfor cross-fertilisation, and swopping 
20 This was motivated by the good time a dozen of so of them had enjoyed on a franchiser sponsored 
'fireehie" in Amsterdam. 
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and changing" people, ideas and learning across the division and would have "no 
problem adhering to set parameters" from a central source. The division was 
singularly lacking in ongoing cross-leaming for which he was an enthusiastic 
supporter. 
"Ifyou are a department manager andyou walk out ofhere to 
another dealership we should all be doing the same because we've 
all learned the best procedures andpractices and whatever. Because 
we should have cascaded down all these best practices. I'm allfor that, 
I'd love to do that tomorrow. 
Ifsomeone said to me 'go out and spread the word'I know I could go 
into every dealership and talk to the service manager and say, 'this is 
the way, unless you've got something different, something better, this 
is the way or this is your starterfor ten. It's IS09000, ifyou're going 
to change it I need to know. So try itfirst, write the procedure out, and 
put it in, and we can change the entire system. 'That's what I think 
we should do. " 
(BM - Shirley) 
The key to cross-divisional learning in his view lay in standardisation of functions, 
processes and systems. He believed that "despite afew wrinkles " between different 
franchisers, "a lot ofthe things we do are the same " but were being done in different 
ways despite the fact that one of those ways must be the most efficient. He foresaw 
little problems with the other BMs as, in his experience as the 'service expert' he had 
found that, despite their defence of stand-alone individualism, " it's amazing how 
they will do the same things ifthey can see the profit in it. " This degree of espoused 
support for pan-divisional linkage and standardisation was unusual among the 
business BMs and the divisional level executives. 
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6.9.6 Summary 
In this more deeply based examination of a non-cooperative division the lower level 
discussions revealed more team oriented behaviour than noted by the DMD. Despite 
some ambiguities, however, the overall divisional perspective and practice remains 
consistent mith the views of the DMD. Throughout the division the classical M-form 
organisation of vertical and horizontal split of responsibilities is manifest. Linked 
with a clear demarcation of business boundaries is a pervasive philosophy of 
individual accountability linked with commensurate responsibility. The systems of 
the division are consistent with this perspective and the enthusiasm of the BMs 
reflects their personal commitment to running their 'oAm business. ' 
Consistency is also evident in the two interacting drivers of perspective and practice. 
The first driver is the orientation of the DMD and his divisional colleagues who are 
committed to managers being given as much autonomy as possible. The second is a 
shared perspective on competitive advantage that emphasises the primacy of the 
position of the business in its local product-market. Divisional knowledge sharing 
and learning is embodied primarily in the DMD and his deputy by virtue of their 
industry and company experience and their active 'cross-pollination' of business 
solutions to specific performance problems. 
Tensions and dilemmas are also evident however. The prevailing primacy of 
autonomy and local market dynamics is seen to sub-optimise the valuable control 
influence of senior managers and impedes the development of best practice across 
6-83 
the businesses. Perceived operating inadequacies can arise due to the reliance of the 
divisional managers on persuasion rather than direct command. Similarly in areas 
with ostensibly common processes (e. g. the service departments), unrealised 
opportunities inherent in a pan-divisional approach to 'best practice' are recognised 
by at least one BM. 
There are more inter-business connections and knowledge sharing than indicated by 
the DMD. These take the form of 'unofficial' but regular meetings of service and 
sales department managers, 'clique' based networking and the acknowledged process 
'experts'. Whilst the divisionally-specific value of such linkages are doubted by 
some they remain an informal source of pan-divisional knowledge transfer. In terms 
of social cohesion there is a strong sense of 'benefit' in regular group gatherings to 
the extent that BM-initiated action was mooted should the absence of divisional 
commitment prevail. 
The tension between autonomy and control and stand-alone and linked businesses 
are embodied in the recent 'Kaizen Manager' divisional role. His perception of the 
role and his influence on the businesses is at odds with the prevailing culture of the 
division. In another setting his appointment would be initial evidence of a shift of 
orientation to a focus on common business processes but the lack of active support 
from the divisional level contradicts this interpretation. 
This remained a mystery until later. (See postcript) 
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6.9.7 Postscript 
In a management buyout in early 1997 the Parts and Dealership 21 businesses were 
acquired by a partnership of the DMD, his Dealer Director and a new Finance 
Director. It was put to me that the position of 'Kaizen Manager' had been created as 
a consequence of the concerns of the venture capitalist partners who had wanted 
post-acquisition improvements identified. Cost savings, based on commonality of 
process, had been proposed and the 'Kaizen Manager' created to effect these savings. 
This makes sense of the lack of 'cultural' fit of the position which, even after the 
buy-out, remains out of kilter with the strategic and organisational perspectives of the 
joint CEOs. Informal follow-up (dinner with the DMD-nowjoint CEO) revealed that 
the 'Kaizen Manager' remains immersed in the centralised computer project which 
has been beset by start-up problems. He has yet to begin his planned development of 
pan-divisional processes and will be unable to do so for the considerable time 
involved in the computer project. 
The stand-alone philosophy still predominates this now automous M-form business. 
21 The retention by the parent company of the Leasing business suggests that the benefits of divisional 
membership were not perceived to be overly high. 
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6.10 Overview of the Non-Cooperative Division 
'Non-cooperativeness' is a syndrome i. e. "a characteristic combination of opinions, 
emotions, behaviour, etc. " (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 199 1) made up of a pattern 
of "signs" (what the "outsider" can see) and "symptoms" (what the people involved 
report as their experience and views). The non-cooperative divisions studied share a 
number of characteristics consistent with a view of divisional value being derived 
predominantly from the product/market activities of the individual units. Major 
organisational processes, systems and philosophies reflect the emphasis placed on 
optimising the performance of individual, semi-autonomous businesses and, if 
divisional staff positions exist at all, they tend to be in control-based functions 
(Finance) monitoring systems focused on the outcomes of the individual units. 
Benefits of divisional membership exist primarily in the form of general management 
guidance from an experienced and interventionist DMD and (sometimes) group 
gains from the overall size of the business grouping and the consequent purchasing 
market power effects. Divisional performance is viewed as the sum of the 
performances of the individual businesses with sustained under-performance of any 
unit always being unacceptable to divisional management and generally resulting in 
an increased level of intervention. These patterns and behaviours exist despite the 
relatedness of the business units and despite the espoused value of sharing of most of 
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the DMDs. i. e. they talk about cooperation but have no processes, systems or 
structures in place to enable it, other than exhortation. 
6.10.1 Tensions and Trade-Offs 
There is not the sense of prevailing division-business tension in these divisions that 
was expressed in their cooperative counterparts. The BMs here, as in the cooperative 
groupings, value and support the autonomy of the businesses and the idea of the 
"pure" M-form structure and philosophy as a normal "default" mode is reinforced. 
The non-cooperative mode seems to be the inertial status quo from which any move 
towards cooperative mechanism requires energetic input. 
Clearly some trade-offs are consciously made but there is not the feeling of an 
ongoing struggle about this 
cc e. g. ... we 
know that what the BM is doing is wrong but because we 
operate on the principle "you run your own business we're here 
to advise or consult " we can only comment, we can't insist he 
changes ... 
but if everyone thought I knew all the answers then we'd 
have a major problem. " (Deputy DMD - Division F2) 
Tensions and dilemmas over the loss of potential gains from business cooperation are 
submerged beneath a tide of concerted support for the stand-alone perspective. 
6.10.2 Whither Synergy? 
Synergy in the form of inter-business economies of scope is not actively managed in 
some of these divisions because it is notperceived to exist. 22 i. e. the existing 
dominant logic excludes such synergy as a major divisional value driver. 
22 Whether it does exist or not is arguable but what is not arguable is that senior managers think that it 
does not. 
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e. g. "... I think there are equally opposite views that show you that 
individually a business with the rightfocus can product higher 
returns as well. " (Franchise Director - Division E) 
"... ifyou look at the synergies bemeen the businesses they're 
very limited " (DMD - Division F) 
However some of the divisions do suggest that synergy is inherent in the business 
grouping, 
"" When people ask me what I've been doing, I've been running a 
mini-conglomerate. That is a division comprising a number of 
discrete businesses but with a good deal ofsynergy between them. 
(DMD - Division A, emphasis added) 
".. the synergy that is talked about but can't be budgetedfor... 
(DMD - Division B) 
but have no systems, process or structures in place to exploit it. 
It seems possible that a value opportunity is being missed in non-cooperative 
divisions. Organisationally they are reflective of the traditional concept of the "pure" 
M-form in the way that they are manifestations of splitting and division at the 
expense of sharing and integration. Hence they do not appear to be functioning in a 
way that can optimise the horizontal scope-based economies theorised to be a 
significant basis of the synergy inherent in the relatedness of the business units. 
Discussion of the reasons for this and the existence of cooperative divisions that do 
appear to be attempting to create value from such scope economies is taken up in the 
next two chapters. 
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Chapter 7 
DIVISIONAL VALUE, COOPERATION AND RELATEDNESS. 
" IMat does the Divisional Office bring to the game? 
Well I think thejury's still out on that... " 
(Human Resource Director - Division G) 
In theory, divisional value (Mdi, ) derives from benefits that are contingent on 
divisional membership and which are realised through appropriate structures, 
systems and processes managed by divisional executives. The previous two chapters 
have described and analysed twelve divisions of related businesses. Based on 
differences in the membership benefits they are interpreted as offering their 
businesses, and their organisational philosophies, structures and processes the 
divisions have been labelled as being 'cooperative' or 'non-cooperative'. The nature 
of the study precludes any rigorous classification or comparison of "degree of 
cooperativeness" and relying on the stated values of the DMI)s would put all but two 
of the divisions into the cooperative category. However a "feel" for the relative 
positions of the divisions on a 'cooperativeness continuum' can be gained from two 
of the more "objective"' divisional characteristics; 1) the number of divisional level 
staff and 2) the extent to which business manager's remuneration incentives are 
linked to divisional performance. 
1. Divisional Staff 
Launenstein (198 5) made the observation that 
1 In the sense a fact readily verifiable by others and not contingent on subjective interpretation. 
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41 ... management's real opinion ofthe value ofsynergy is revealed by how it organizes. Related operations are brought together under a 
group executive. It is at this level that the strategic advantage of 
synergism must be realised, But there is almost never any strategic 
staff at the group level. (p. 50, emphasis in original). 
If "cooperation" is substituted for "synergy" then a feel for management's 
commitment to cooperativeness (i. e. their "real opinion") can be inferred from the 
number of "strategic staff' at divisional level. "Strategic" staff are those reporting 
directly to the DMD (including "dotted line" reports) who are not in charge of a 
business unit and excluding the DMD's secretary/personal assistant. 
2) Business Managers'Incentives 
This is a simple indicator based on the well worn truism that in management, as with 
most jobs, people will do those things for which they are rewarded in preference to 
those things for which they are not and hence cooperation must be rewarded if it is to 
occur (Lorsch and Allen, 1973; Gupta and Govindarahan, 1986). In his "classic" 
paper Kerr (1975) pointed out the importance of rewarding the behaviour that is 
wanted rather than "hoping" for it. A specific example he gave is the contrast 
between "hoping" for team effort (i. e. cooperation) and rewarding individual effort 
(i. e. non-cooperation). The extent to which a business manager is rewarded for the 
attainment of divisional goals is one measure of the commitment of the division to 
cooperation as a working ethos rather than an espoused ideal. 
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Table 7.1 below ranks the twelve divisions on the basis of divisional staff and 
indicates the percentage of the business manager's performance incentive that is 
related to divisional results. 
Division 
Divisional 
Staff 
Divisional Component of BM's 
Performance Incentive 
"Cooperath, e" 
G (Vehicle manufacture) 9 301 
11 (Drink-ý .1 6 50+ 
D2 (Auto components) 5 30 
1 (Pharmaceuticals) 5 0 
J (Auto components) 4 40 
"Non-Cooperative" 
A (Agriculture) 2 20 
C (Water Services) 2 0 
E (Vehicle sales) 2 0 
F2 (Vehicle sales) 2 0 
F1 (Child care products) 2" 0 
B (Building products) 1 0 
DI (Retail equipment) 0 
Instituted after the case write-up 
2 One part-time 
3 Part-time 
Table 7.1 ]2ivisional Rankine by-Divisional Staff and DiviSional Incentives 
This table is admittedly at the level of "rule-of-thumb". e. g. To some extent the 
number of "strategic" divisional staff is overstated as, for all of the divisions except 
D2 and B, one of the divisional staff is a finance director (the part-time position for 
F I) which, notwithstanding the strategic input of many FDs, remains a 
predominantly control-focused position. On the other hand in some divisions (e. g. 
Division J) specific business managers have a broad divisional role as well as 
responsibility for their unit. i. e. the level of divisional "staff ' is understated. Despite 
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this, mapping the divisions in such a fashion clearly indicates a split in practice that 
differentiates two sets of divisions. 
There is a clear "break point" at the level of number of divisional staff with 2 being 
the maximum in the non-cooperative group and 4 the minimum for cooperative 
divisions.. The qualitative detail from the cases emphasises the significance of this 
break point as in the non-cooperative divisions the (fewer) roles tended to be 
characterised as "control" or "advisory" positions whereas in the cooperative 
divisions they were described as more strategically and operationally interventionist. 
There is also a clear link between those divisions (cooperative) with more staff and 
the tendency to tie BMs' incentives to divisional results. In only one division with 
four or more divisional staff is there no tie and this is in the "mini" example of the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing division. In contrast there is only one division with 
two or less divisional staff where there is such a link- and this, at 20%, is the lowest 
percentage of all the divisions who tie BMs' remuneration to divisional results. 
The data in the table above suggests that those divisions which are attempting to 
realise the value from the relatedness of their businesses are doing do through 
cooperative mechanisms which they have accepted means additional cost in the form 
of staff positions. They are also intent on emphasising to their BMs the place of the 
division as the central focus (through the incentive system). 
But this raises the question again as to why there are cooperative and non- 
cooperative divisions when (by definition and prior selection) all of them are made 
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up of related businesses and they all should (economically speaking) be cooperatives. 
A logical starting point in examining this (partial) contradiction of theory and 
practice is to analyse the type of value that the divisional management layer add (or 
think they add) and how this pertains to relatedness. 
7.1 Divisional Management and Adding Value 
Divisional managers, while not familiar with the concept of divisional membership 
benefits, are familiar with the concept of value added to the businesses by 
management 2. All of them act to add such value either through their own direct 
influence, categorised as (general management) guidance, or through managing 
other divisional managers and dynamics. In practice, however, none of the divisions 
which took part in the study nzeasure or attempt to measure actual or potential 
divisional value-added 3. Hence, DMI)s are uncertain about the value added by 
themselves or from membership of the division even in those divisions where 
concerted commitments of time and effort are made in pursuit of such value. 
"I couldn't attribute whether I've hadfiftypercent or ten percent 
orfive percent influence. " 
(DMD - Division A) 
In the non-cooperative divisions direct guidance is the major, and often the only, 
material discernible benefit of membership. In these organisations, as was often 
2 The question "What value do you add? " is a familiar one for managers and has been extended by 
corporate strategy authors (e. g. Goold et al., 1994) to "What value do they add? " in reference to the 
corporate (in this study divisional) layer. 
3 This is one of those "obvious" findings that is surprising. Measurement is conventionally argued to 
be the sine qua non of effective management and yet, in the corporate and (here) divisional value- 
added debate so popular over the past ten years (e. g. Goold et al., 1994), the measurement of the 
value added C'parenting advantage") by senior management levels is notable by its absence. CP 
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implied in the case analyses, it is particularly disputable that there is a positive Mdiv 
i. e. that the value of the division is greater than the sum of the stand-alone 
businesses and some BMs do indeed dispute this value. However, even in the 
manifestly cooperative divisions where additional teani and process guidance 
benefits have been suggested, this value is still, at best, an inference by both the 
divisional team and the researcher who both lack measurement tools and criteria. 
In the absence of direct measurement, an attempt is made below to examine the likely 
potential for membership benefits of cooperative and non-cooperative divisions by 
associating proposed divisional value-adding activities from the cases with more 
traditional value categories and examining the degree to which these value-adding 
activities can be logically supported as positive membership benefits for the business 
units. 
7.2 Categories of Value 
Chandler (1994) has suggested that the value roles of strategic management can be 
divided into overlapping administrative or "loss preventative" and entrepreneurial or 
69 value creating" categories. Divisional managers describe 'performance 
maintenance' and 'crisis intervention' activities that can usefully be classified as 
'administrative' functions where "loss" is extended to incorporate below-budget 
performance. 'Performance maintenance' represents the ongoing monitoring and 
guidance activities ensuring that business units continue at expected (budgeted) 
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levels while 'crisis intervention' denotes more urgent and focused assistance when 
businesses are experiencing acute or chronic operational problems. 
Another set of value-adding divisional activities deal with factors that are believed to 
be beyond the scope or capability of the stand-alone business unit. In this sense they 
can usefully be categorised as divisionally 'entrepreneurial' or value creating. 
Included in this category are activities termed 'future orientation' i. e. forcing a longer 
term time horizon on each business; 'best practice' - driving improvement in the 
processes and functions of individual businesses and 'pan-divisionalism' - intra- 
divisional processes based on the division as an entity rather than a collection of 
stand-alone businesses. 
Figure 7.1 represents these categories. 
Divisional 
Z 
Administrative 
< 
Value 
Entrepreneurial 
Performance Maintenance 
Crisis Intervention 
Future Orientation 
Best Practice 
Pan-Divisionalism 
In the following sections Administrative and Entrepreneurial value are examined in 
three ways. Firstly the sub-categories of these two classifications of value as 
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discussed by the DMDs arc bricfly described and discussed. Note that at this stage 
the fact that it is the divisional informant who has specified the activity to be of 
value. These categories are then linked with business relatedness. i. e. it is indicated 
how the specific value-category might logically be leveraged by being applied to 
related businesses. Finally the sub-categories are examined to see whether a case can 
be made for them to be a source of divisional value, i. e. whether they can be a 
component Of Mdiv. The argument is made that only "best practice" and "pan- 
divisional" activities are logically likely to be value-adding at divisional level, 
"future orientation" and all "administrative" inputs are more likely to be more akin to 
superstitious behaviour i. e. the belief in causality when objective evidence suggests 
otherwise. (Gimpl and Dakin, 1984). 
7.3 Administrative Value 
The active maintenance of budgeted business performance and crisis intervention 
underpins much of what is perceived as value-adding activities in all the divisions 
and, whatever the staffing at divisional level, absorbs a significant amount of the 
time of the DMD. 
7.3.1 Performance Maintenance 
Monitoring, communicating, supporting, advising and otherwise interacting with the 
business units about to their on-going operations consumes much of the day-to-day 
activities of many divisional level managers4. These activities capture more than 
4 For example the deputy DMD of Division F2 claims to motor 3000 business car-miles a month in 
this role throughout England. i. e. at an optimistic average of 50mph he thus spends 1.5 (40 hour) 
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governance influence in attenuating opportunism and sub goal pursuit and the 
amelioration of general agency problems (Williamson, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
They incorporate the active maintenance of business unit performance to acceptable 
standards. Maintaining business performance is such a 'taken-for-granted' part of the 
divisional role that it was often bypassed by informants when describing the value of 
their role. 
e. g. "... apariftom all the obvious clichis. -forget the profits and 
everything .. my role is... " (DMD - Division D I) 
The maintenance activities of divisional level stafe are primarily focused on the 
perfonnance of the individual business unit. Although convinced of the value to be 
gained from the energetic, stand-alone, activities of competent BMs and their teams, 
most divisional managers are, at the same time, wary of the losses that could be 
incurred through inappropriate decisions. While not wishing to dampen the initiative 
of the gifted they do want to contain the actions of the less able. There is, however, 
an awareness of the dilemma of divisional curtailment versus freedom to act and the 
necessity to be specific about this 
e. g. "... we give people maximumfreedom ofactivity within a clearly 
defined and mutually discussed and mutually acceptedftamework 
(DMD - Division A) 
working weeks per month in his car visiting businesses. While the car mileage is unusual the 
dedication is not. 
5 The use of the general term does not mean all divisional staff but refers to a finding from this study 
and the people in it. 
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By 'leaving alone' within established policy guidelines it is felt possible to gain the 
benefits of a stand-alone business in terms of the energy and commitment of the 
people running it, but at the same time to protect the division from the consequences 
of any one business becoming a major problem.. 
7.3.2 Crisis Intervention 
While the managers in the business unit are constantly involved in dealing with 
operational threats that have the potential to harm the financial performance of the 
business, some of these issues become large enough to also threaten the total 
divisional performance and hence attract the direct intervention of divisional staff 
and particularly the DMD. Variously termed 'fire fighting', 'problem solving' and 
&crisis management' this aspect of divisional functioning is seen as an ever-present 
distraction from a more desired 'strategic' role. 
"In reality ofcourse you know that in business you're stampingfires 
out .. In reality attention gets 
diverted to those problems. 
(DMD - Division D I) 
Value-adding at this level overlaps with 'maintenance' but has a greater sense of time 
urgency and a need for immediate damage limitation. There are two broad types of 
crisis that attract the sustained intervention of divisional staff. The first comprise 
specific events leading to problems or losses. Examples included sales losses due to 
functional incompetence (Division F2) and 'dumping' of product by international 
competitors (Division A). The second type of crisis is sustained under-performance 
of a business unit. Here the drive of the divisional role to get the business back on 
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planned track will often involve the replacement of the BM and some of his/her team. 
(Division Q. It was not uncommon for the DMD, or one of his divisional staff, to 
have taken over the management of an under-performing business as interim 
management until a new BM had been appointed. (Divisions J and 132) 6. 
7.4 Administrative Value and Relatedness. 
The relatedness of the business units in divisions makes early detection of 
performance problems more likely and management intervention more timely and 
potentially more efficient than if they were unrelated and so suggests a sensible 
'administrative' rationale for managing related businesses together. Key performance 
indicators in related units are common and form a limited set of criteria by which 
divisional managers can judge and control a number of businesses. In particular the 
format and meanings of terms on the financial statements tend to be identical with 
ratios such as margin percentage; overhead costs to sales, stock turns, debtors days 
etc. being directly comparable. Capital requirements, hurdle rates for projects, 
staffing levels, stock holdings, productivity measures, etc. are all capable of 
management control within a limited set of generic guidelines. Comparison between 
the business units enable these guidelines to be a dynamic manifestation of current 
trends as well as a rcflections of history. Under-performance of an individual unit is 
made more apparent by comparison with its peer businesses and divisional 
6 The eventual non-participation of one of the divisions that initially agreed to take part in the study 
was due to the DMD sacking one of his BMs and temporarily taking over the running business 
himself. As well as 'commuting' from the South of England to the Midlands on a weekly basis he 
required his PA to do the same so that he could continue with divisional duties at the same time. 
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management is able to gauge the performance as a business-specific or 
market/industry wide problem and can 'leverage' business similarities in search of 
efficient handling of specific problems. 
It is a rare set of operating problems or crises that will not have been encountered and 
dealt with by one of the businesses or the (experienced) DMD in the past. The 
necessary knowledge, techniques and actions can hence be transmitted either directly 
or via the divisional level. i. e. relatedness allows a divisional 'cookbook' of 
operational 'recipes' as responses to business problems. Division F2 is an example of 
this wherein the DMD, on the basis of 30 years in the industry, is able to offer 
advice, or direct the BM to one of the other businesses which has already solved that 
day's particular problem. Organisational, learning is manifest in an articulated or 
articulable form as a mix-and-match set of problem solutions either in the head of the 
DMD or via another business. If the DMD deems the problem to be beyond the 
capability of the incumbent BM he can step in himself or put other divisional 
resources into the business to help the management team. 
7.5 Administrative Value as Divisional Value 
The fact that it is easier to manage a group of related businesses and that 
administrative activities comprise a relatively narrow range of tasks across a group of 
such units does not necessarily mean that the businesses thereby benefit from 
divisional membership. Administrative management absorbs time, energy, resources 
and commitment at divisional level and yet it still remains to be understood why such 
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oversight and intervention logically adds value to the divisional units to make them 
more valuable as part of the division. The problem for positing the administrative 
value function as a significant source of divisional value-added was concisely put by 
the Deputy DMD of Division F2. 
"In terms ofthe governance of what they (Business Managers) do, 
I suppose one could assume that ifyou've got the right people they 
would not need any governance at all, that left to their own devices 
they would be OK.. " (emphasis added) 
While most administrative value-activity is routine based and system driven, crisis 
intervention demands disproportionate attention and distracts divisional and BMs 
from more entrepreneurial activity. Whatever the overall divisional strategy, an 
under-performing business receives focus as a individual unit until the problem is 
resolved. Even where divisional staff exist, the DMD is the key managerial input. 
Thp management pattern is one of super-management7 i. e. overseeing the same 
managerial processes as the BM. As Nvith other bases of divisional value, the value of 
super-management, and of administrative value in general, rests on the implicit 
assumption that the business would not and/or could not achieve the same value 
(performance) on its own 8. 
It is difficult to sustain a viable argument that typical, capable, self-interested 
managers would allow their stand-alone businesses to consistently under-perform the 
industry or their own historical performance levels without making efforts to correct 
7 This term is used in the same sense as "supervision". It was disparagingly referred to a "micro- 
managemenf' by the Manufacturing Director of Division 1. 0 Zý Again in these discussions I am staying with the typical and avoiding extremes of ability, luck, 
motivation etc. 
7-13 
this. Even in the event that the managers themselves were not motivated to engage in 
corrective action, the pressure of external stakeholders would concentrate their minds 
in that direction. In the same way, managers of stand-alone businesses are motivated 
to respond to crises. i. e. they will not ignore profit threatening contingencies any 
more than divisional management will and no logic says they are less able to cope. 
The logic that membership of a division enables the business to better deal with 
under-performance or crisis rests essentially on the value of super-management of the 
DMD and his staff. Each of the DMDs appears to assume the superiority of their 
knowledge and experience over that of their BMs. An example of this came from the 
DMD of Division A, 
"Maybe one BM 's a numbers man, not good with HR but good 
commercially so maybe I make a contribution there. In some business 
where I've worked overseas and travelled the world I've probably got a 
perspective that an engineering division ofa salmonjariner in Scotland 
couldn't possibly have in that business. That is helpful if they're talking 
about developing their export strategy. " 
There are, however, at least three logical impediments to sustained divisional value 
being derived from such inputs: 
1. It is unlikely to be true for most divisions that the DMD does in fact possess 
superior knowledge and insight about the running of particular businesses unless 
the BM is new or the division has a policy of employing BMs who are less 
competent than the DMD. To have superior ongoing knowledge the division must 
overcome the "10 percent versus 100 percent paradox" highlighted by Goold, 
Campbell and Alexander (1994). i. e. 
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" The very idea that part-time managers at one remove (or more) will 
be able to enhance the performance of the business's own dedicated 
management is, in some sense, paradoxical. " (p. 79) 
If, for a period of time, the DMD did have superior knowledge then it must soon 
be imparted to the BlAs or, over time, become less relevant. 
2. If it is true that a DMD is a particularly gifted person in keeping businesses on 
track and resolving crises then it is not membership of the division and exposure 
to the DMD position that is the source of value. Value is vested in the 
management capabilities of that individuaL The delayed retirement of the DMD of 
Division A suggests that an "irreplaceable" individual perspective does exist in 
some divisions9. If this is a true perspective then there are potential consequences 
for divisional value when the "irreplaceable" individual finally retires. 
3. Problem solving and crisis resolution skills do not comprise divisionally-specific 
knowledge. They are freely available to stand-alone BMs as are the articulated, 
industry recipes that are often the basis of the experienced DMI)s knowledge. 
Logically, stand-alone BMs will aggressively deal with crises and under-performance 
and can do so at least as well as when their business is part of a division of related 
businesses. In fact it is argued by some that administrative intervention by senior 
management is often unwarranted and costly interference in a business wherein a set 
of below-budget monthly figures is merely a manifestation of natural variation 
9 An interesting issue with respect to gifted individuals versus divisional or company value lies in the 
problems of bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the individual/division. The huge C, 
remuneration packages currently commanded by some individuals in charge of large companies and 0 
the compliance of institutional shareholders with this, suggests that such quasi rent bargaining can 
operate in a non-trivial way at the corporate level at least. 
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(Demming, 1986). Where this "interference" is ongoing "advice" as suggested by 
the DMD of Division A above then the question arises as to whether the BM asks for 
it or gets it whether he/she needs it or not. 
In the light of these points, and the overall weakness of the argument that divisional 
value is greater than stand-alone value because the division steins loss better, it is 
difficult to sustain the view that that 'administrative' value functions lie at the heart 
of divisional value creation. This is not to deny the benefits of input from other 
divisional businesses and/or the guidance of the DMD and his staff in problem 
resolution. However, where they are a benefit, these are more likely to be occasional 
and supplementary and not a primary, on-going source of value. 
As expressed in Division D 
" There is no reason for Divisional Office to be here unless we are pan- 
European. In my view administering and controlling are not enough. 
(emphasis added) 
7.6 Divisional Administrative Value - Implications 
A paradox appears to exist that significant time and effort is committed at the 
divisional level to activities associated with problem solving and crisis resolution in 
the businesses but that the added value from this is logically minimal. If the total 
costs of these activities (e. g. resource (the DMD), the internal transactions with the 
businesses) are combined with possible diminished business value from loss of 
market incentives then it is difficult to understand how administrative activities on 
their own add net value to the group compared to the sum of the stand-alone units. 
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i. e. In terms of divisional value a significant component of general management 
guidance is probably =a material membership benefit. If this is the sole source of 
"value" offered to the business units then a lean "delayered" divisional staff (lowest 
possible hierarchical costs) operating in a hands-off manner' 0 (minimising 
interference and wasteful transactions with value adding BMs) controlling through 
systems (e. g. IT) and a well defined and specific set of incentives and contracts at 
least minimises the hierarchical and interactional costs for the value-adding 
businesses. i. e. a pure M-form philosophy, is the least cost option for divisions if 
entrepreneurial value is not added. As was highlighted at the beginning of this 
chapter those divisions classified as non-cooperative exhibited evidence of such a 
stance with few divisional staff and incentives for stand-alone perforrnance only. 
7.7 Entrepreneurial Value 
The sense of the entrepreneurial value functions of divisions is evoked when 
divisional management discuss "opportunities" or the "strategic" part of their role. 
i. e. what they and the division do to create extra value. Without exception this 
function is contrasted with administrative management and is often subjugated to it. 
e. g. "... ifyou have a problem you spend a helluvalot of time putting all 
your energy into that problem. You never spend the tinte putting 
your energy into the opportunities. " 
(Franchise Director - Division E, emphasis added) 
10 Not noted with any DMD. Even in the most avowedly non-cooperative division (F2) the deputy 
DMD spends man-weeks each month in his car visiting the businesses. This division has sophisticated 
IT systems, phones and faxes. Other than the psychic satisfaction and reassurance of the Deputy DMD 
there is logically limited Mdj, emanating from his travels. rP 7-17 
With differing levels of emphasis, 'future orientation', 'best practice' and 'pan- 
divisionalism' are three identifiable sets of entrepreneurial divisional activities which 
are claimed to be oftalue by the DAfDs. 
7.7.1 Future Orientation 
Managers intuitively believe in the value of enviromnental scanning for signs of 
trend changes and the emergence of strategic issues of threat or opportunity and a 
significant literature supports this believe. (e. g. Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan, 1983; 
Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Dutton, 1988). In line with this thinking, all of the 
divisional managers see such a function as a significant part of their role and, more 
pertinently, believe themselves to be in a position to view and interpret the future and 
set broad business direction better than the BMs because of the focus of the BMs on 
the day-to-day business operations II. 
"(B. Ils) get so caught tip in the detail that they lose the direction 
of where they ought to be going. " 
(DMD - Division F I) 
While future orientation is stressed as an important divisional input, discussions 
revealed no dedicated mechanisms to carry out the necessary environmental 
scanning. Nor did interviews give the impression that much time was being spent on 
this by the divisional people. In reality divisional views of the future seemed to stem 
primarily from casual inputs from the businesses more than from independent 
11 The view that the divisional level is better equipped to predict the most likely futures and hence the 
most appropriate business response is not necessarily shared by the business managers, 
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thoughts or structured investigations from divisional management. As close industry 
interactions are a business dynamic this is hardly surprising. 12 
7.7.2 Best Practice 
Under this category is incorporated divisional attempts to lift the current operating 
capabilities of the businesses to higher levels. These are behaviours and systems 
designed to "enhance", "develop", "groNV' etc. the businesses beyond current 
averages or norms. Although interconnected, best practice is distinguishable from 
best performance. The latter is characteriscd by benchmarking 'what' is achieved 
(i. e. outcomes) while best practice is characterised by 'how' it is achieved (i. e. 
behaviours or inputs). Both practice and performance standards are viewed from two 
perspectives in the divisions. One view is to adopt as a benchmark the best in the 
division. The other is an attempt to lift all the businesses to a "world class", "best in 
class" or "industry best" level in designated areas. 
" 
Division J is an example that combines an internal perspective with an external one 
with "the best ten companies in Japan ". and particularly Toyota, serving as models 
for process and capability goals. While driven by performance benchmarks, Division 
J is explicitly focused on skill and knowledge sharing to all the businesses rather than 
just to "problem" businesses. 
.6... one operation is by thefar the best at invento? y management.. 
what we do is get into that particular business, understand how they 
do material control and we then standardise that across all the other 
businesses. " 
(DMD, emphasis added) 
12 This mutual influencing of the strategic orientation of different hierarchical layers has been 
explained and explored by Burgelman (1983,1994). 
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7.7.3 Pan-Divisionalism 
This category expresses the importance of inter-link-ed dimensions across the 
businesses and the attempts to exploit value from them. More critically perhaps it is 
the mindset of the divisional level that focuses on their value-adding role achieving 
value from the division as an integrated whole which is made up of (business) 
components as compared with achieving value from optimisation of a set of separate 
components. Of all the identified characteristics and categories of value it is the 
commitment to pan-divisionalism and the associated organisational structures and 
processes and staff that empirically differentiates the cooperative and non- 
cooperative divisions. 
Almost inevitably associated with this perspective is the active pursuit of 
standardisalion of processes and procedures in thq businesses that pertain to the 
strategic variable under focus. 
" We are now moving towards a higher degree of consistency and 
standardisation across the business units " 
(Division J- emphasis added). 
It is perhaps this drive for a degree of trans-business standardisation that meets with 
the most resistance from autonomy-minded BMs who are sensitive to local nuance 
and their own loss of specific control to divisional forces. 
"... it must be human nature or something, to want control. I'M not 
sure there is always a good business rationalefor all this tweaking 
and wanting things different. Sometimes it'sjust because they (BMs) 
feel better, more comfortable with something they own or they 
suggested " (Division J) 
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7.8 Entrepreneurial Value and Relatedness 
Across all three of the categories of entrepreneurial value, relatedness appears to 
offer the potential for value creation and leverage. 
As market, industry or broader macro-envirorimental change will have an impact on 
all related businesses, a prescient, future-oriented divisional level affords the 
opportunity for anticipatory action across all the business units. Even if the divisional 
level does not anticipate change itself, it can swiftly spread the word from the 
businesses that have noticed new contingencies to those that are not as well 
informed. Not only does business relatedness enable the need for change to be 
efficiently transmitted it also enables communication of the most appropriate 
mechanisms. This overlaps with the category of 'best practice'. 
At the level of the cross sharing of 'best practice' and, to a lesser extent, 'best 
performance relatedness between business units appears to have powerful value- 
catalysing potential as a specific manifestation of the knowledge based economies of 
scope. (Teece, 1982). Even where 'best performance' is used as the comparative 
spur, it is the practices and methods underpinning that performance that often 
become the focus for change although this is not inevitable' 3. The relatedness of the 
businesses enables such practices to be transferred between businesses effectively 
13 it Mic, 
ght, for example, merely 
become a spur for renewed effort with existing methods or, in more 
political environments, for tinkering with measurement systems. I suspect the 'measurement' response 
is not a trivial matter. In one company in my experience a high premium was placed on safety 
performance to the extent that any bonuses to senior managers were contingent on not exceeding C, 41 
maximum levels of Lost Time Injuries (LTIs) defined as injuries that caused work absence of at least 
one day. To meet the performance benchmarks of peer businesses one enterprising(? ) manager made 
room in the medical centre for injured workers to be at work and not at home. His business levels of 
LTIs were commendably low but safety practices remained lamentably poor. 
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and cfficiently with the minimum disruption to ongoing operations. i. e. there is 
already a degree of organisational 'fit'. This is particularly so where, as in most 
cases, 'best practice' is an incremental derivative of 'common practice' which is a 
feature of pan-divisionalism. 
Tan-divisionalism', whilst a seemingly significant psychological change in 
divisional mental maps, is a logical development of the sharing of individual best 
practice but in this case the division specifies the best practices and processes and 
aclively manages these as standardised inputs across the division rather than 
facilitating the cross-business sharing of business-based developments. Pan- 
divisionalism can only exist as a value-adding construct as a manifestation of 
exploitable divisional relatedness. As with the sharing of best practice, it is based on 
the relatedness of underlying processes, methods and behaviours and is not 
necessarily contingent on the relatedness of outputs.. Pan-divisionalism, reflected as 
the logic of common process inputs underpinning disparate product outputs, is 
congruent with the modem concept of "core competence" ( Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Rumelt, 1994). 
7.9 Entrepreneurial Value as Divisional Value 
As with 'administrative' value, the potential for relatedness-based entrepreneurial 
value is only a potential divisional value if stand-alone businesses cannot or will not 
avail themselves of similar benefits. It had already been suggested that relatedness- 
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linked, administrative value has difficulties passing this 'test' despite the significant 
investment of divisional resource. 
There are two problems in positing the future orientation of the divisional level as a 
source ofMdi,,. The first problem is demonstrating that the activity is valuable in 
itselfand the second lies in explaining, if it is valuable, why businesses don't/won't 
do it themselves. In the first case the increasing pace and inevitability of 
envirorunental change (Toffler, 1971,1990; Naisbitt, 1994) and the value to be 
gained from timely and appropriate organisational response (Kantor, 1989; Pettigrew 
and Whipp, 1991) might be received Aisdorn from some quarters but Bamey (1986) 
questions whether this is the case, 
"... analyzing afirm's competitive environment cannot, on average, be 
expected to generated expeclational advantages that can lead to expected 
above normal returns, " (p. 1238). 
Added to the potential lack of advantage from systematic environmental advantage 
(over, say, following the others) is the fact that forecasting of complex environmental 
change is almost invariably %vrong although techniques of professional forecasters 
continually increase in complexity if not sophistication. (Gimpl and Dakin, 1984). 
Notwithstanding this more gloomy view of its objective value 'future orientation', 
'the long term view' or 'the strategic perspective' has strong intuitive appeal as a 
value-adding input from divisional managers. Yet as an activity and a skill it seems 
logically unlikely to be necessarily divisionally contingent. Divisional managers 
claim that BMs have no time to fulfil this function but it seems, from their own 
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descriptions, that divisional managers are similarly constrained. Notwithstanding the 
lack of necessary organisational slack, it is difficult to sustain an argument that the 
BMs would systematically pay less attention to future strategic developments than 
their current divisional superiors if sensitivity to future change is important for 
business success. 
If not a question of motivation then divisional value from future orientation can be 
based on divisionally superior capability. However this again introduces the "10 
percent vs 100% paradox" (Goold et aL, 1994) and there is little logical support that 
the divisions in this study are likely be more adept at forecasting and handling 
relevant long term change than their business units despite the contrary beliefs of the 
DMDs. IBM's now legendary failure to notice the emergence of the PC is an 
example of corporate short-sightedness which, along with others 14 , may even suggest 
that large, organisations are prone to not see threafening change but are more likely 
to forecast continuing benign circumstances. (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Miller, 
1992). Overall it seems unlikely that significant ongoing divisional value can be 
justified on the grounds of superior future orientation and no examples arose in this 
study to counter this view. 
The activities of divisional management in developing and sharing of 'best practice' 
and associated knowledge does seem to be a potential value-adding role. Barney 
(1986) points out that that it is by turning inwards in its analysis that might expect to 
14 e. g. even the redoubtable Bill Gates "missed" the significance of the Internet. 
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enjoy "significant expectational advantages" (p. 1239). The view that hierarchy (in 
this case divisions) is superior to markets (stand-alone businesses) as a mechanism 
for adding and retaining knowledge-based value is a well established one. 
(Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1980.1982; Hill, 1994). The first problem for stand-alone 
businesses is that other businesses that are related are often current or potential 
competitors. For logical reasons competitors are unwilling to share knowledge and 
learning that is important to competitive success and, in fact, attempt to do exactly 
the opposite and maintain secrecy. Division J is facing this problem with new Joint 
Ventures where the different partners are opposed to sharing with other partners who 
are their competitors in other markets. For the same reasons businesses might be 
unwilling to share proprietary knowledge with non-competitive businesses for fear of 
losing control of its distribution. Even if businesses are not competitors, it seems 
unlikely that shared learning is a spontaneous pra6tice outside. of a formalised 
structure (e. g. alliances, divisions). From this study it is apparent that even between 
sister businesses in the same divisions, sharing and cross-learning needs to be driven 
by external authority if it is to become an ongoing dynamic. The necessity to 
continuously drive and manage inter-business processes in the face of the 
determinedly autonomy-seeking behaviour of BMs was emphasised by all the 
divisional managers. 
Even if willing to share best practice and knowledge it is difficult for stand-alone 
businesses to do so. Firstly knowing what to share is problematic. Unless businesses 
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are constantly monitoring each other's capabilities and performances (as can happen 
through external processes in divisions) they will tend to focus on their own 
processes and problems and only occasionally seek information when large 
differences in performance are manifest in the market-place. Secondly the imitating 
of best practice is fraught with problems of knowledge transfer and codification 
particularly of tacit, team-embedded skills. Ongoing contact and interaction arc 
essential minimum requirement even if trans-location of staff is not possible. Even 
where 'best practice' is seemingly well understood and articulated e. g. the efficiency 
and quality systems of the Japanese motor industry, attempted transfer at the level of 
codified knowledge has proven difficult, costly and problematic in achieving 
operating parity (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990). 
Inherent in sharing best practice is a level of standardisation enabling successful 
transfer. Tan-divisionalism' takes this to the extrime and divisional managers 
aggressively develop cross business standardisation as infrastructure support for 
optimal intra-divisional sharing. While 'best-practice' can be a process of inter- 
business transfer, 'pan-divisionalism' is an intra-divisional characteristic. The 
practical problems of stand-alone businesses sharing isolated 'best practice' are 
significant, the difficulties of adopting a pan-business approach to processes and 
capabilities are insurmountable in the real world. 
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7.10 Implications 
Entrepreneurial value through 'best practice' or 'pan-divisionalism' is a potential 
source of significant divisional value. It is only realised through active divisional 
ineta-management i. e. the management of processes that are not managed or 
manageable by the BMs 15. Specific meta-processes include inter-business 
cooperation and the sharing of knowledge and learning. Evidence from all the 
divisions indicates that ifthese processes are not aggressively managedftom outside 
ofthe businesses they do not occur. Entropy rather than cohesion seems to be the 
Gfinatural" or, at least, business-preferred state. Such meta-management is a major 
problem for stand-alone (inside or outside of a division) businesses attempting to 
cooperate in that someone has to enforce cooperation and enforcement is not a peer- 
based dynamic. It is here that divisional management appears to have its greatest 
opportunity for creating value over the sum of the stand-alone parts as it can act to 
enforce value-enhancing cooperation despite the resistance of the businesses. 
The specific mechanisms, activities and processes will be contingent on the broad 
category of benefit that divisional management is aiming to offer. All of the 
cooperative divisions in the study were different in these ways. What was constant 
was that there significant activities and areas of responsibility that remained devolved 
to the businesses. i. e. the fundamental framework of the division was still an M-form 
structure but with an evolved set of more holistic, more complex, more horizontally 
15 "Meta" is used here in the sense of "higher or second 6rder" (Concise Oxford Dictionary) 
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manifest but still vertically managed interactions, i. e. network dynamics (N-form) 
within an M-form skeleton. 
7.11 Divisional Management and Membership Benefits 
In Williamson's (1975) terms all of the divisions in this study are "corrupted 
multidivisionals" wherein "the general management has become extensively 
involved in operating affairs" (p. 153). The operationally interventionist DMD is the 
common feature of all the divisions but, consistent with the administrative and 
entrepreneurial value discussion above, such intervention is viewed as'a value input 
rather than the contamination of an ideal. As Hill remarks 
"the deeper one goes into a multidivisionalfirm, the more likely it 
is that deviationsfrom the M-form ideal come to light. 
(1988: 75-76) 
Another commonality among the divisions is the preference for stand-alone 
functioning by BMs and their aggressive pursuit i; f autonomy. While this fits well 
with the splitting ethos of the M-form and the Western cultural value of 
individualism and manager-as-hero (Hoskinsson, Hill and Kim, 1993), it is a 
significant obstacle for divisional teams attempting to inculcate inter-business 
cooperation. Major differences in the strategic management of the divisions are 
linked to the prime, divisional membership benefits and the allied 16 management 
orientation and structure of the division. 
The use of this word purposely begs the question as to whether structure follows strategy, strategy 
follows structure or the connection is merely "sense making 
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7.11.1 Non-Cooperative Divisions. 
In non-cooperative divisions the prime focus of divisional management and 
organisational processes appears to be on 'administrative' activities. These have been 
argued above to be unlikely to forrn a basis for sustained 17 divisional value. General 
management guidance is the prime perceived business benefit but such guidance is 
super-management of the individual business which raises the question of the 
competence of the BMs and their teams rather than the value of the DMD. Team 
benefits based on systematic interactions and linkages between business units are 
subjugated to the value of business autonomy. 
The term 'non-cooperative' is coined because, whilst demonstrating many of the 
stand-alone, unit-optimising characteristics associated with traditional M-form 
organisation, these divisions are more than "collecting points" and are not 
-competitive" organisations in the sense of being ffianaged at "arms length", on the 
basis of "rate of return" by non-involved management, (Hill, 1994). The DMI)s are 
operationally active. They are not shareholder proxies they are managers who are 
constantly influencing inputs and behaviours by push, plea and persuasion from their 
position of authority and (assumed) superior knowledge but the question still remains 
as to the real business benefit of such influence. 
The guidance benefits from these DMDs can be argued to be underpinned by 
econonues of scope of general management as classically suggested by Penrose 
17 Whereas a once-of "injection" of management help might help a business initially, as in 
"restructuring" a business that is often in need of such help suggests other remedies are more value- 
adding in the long term than repeated divisional involvement. 
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(195 9) however, for this to be a divisional value the knowledge of the DMD must be 
systematically greater or more valuable than that of the BMs. This is logically 
unlikely as an ongoing position and is accepted as such by at least one very busy 
manager. 
"... if everyone thought I knew all the answers then we'd have 
a major problem. " (Deputy DMD - Division F2) 
While the DMI)s espouse the value of shared knowledge among the businesses they 
are the sole pollinator, catalyst or agent of that knowledge and, from their own 
descriptions of the time they spend in monitoring, controlling, reporting and fire- 
fighting, it not credible that such a role is a reality in these divisions - they simply do 
not have the time. While the DMI)s acknowledge business capabilities and processes 
as important components of competitive success they give primacy over these to the 
unique product-market interactions of the individual business. If cross-business 
learning or knowledge-sharing does take place it occurs in the context of crisis 
management and fits a problem solving (administrative) rather than a developmental 
(entrepreneurial) model of value and learning. 
The non-cooperative divisions seek maximisation of divisional value through 
optimising the performance of the individual units. Business differences are seen as 
the prime source of divisional value with collaboration encouraged but not mandated 
by decree or structure. Stand-alone optimisation is the primary divisional philosophy 
with no commitment to pan-divisional control of strategically critical processes or 
systems. 
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e. g. "Our goal is to develop our businesses to achieve market leadership 
in their markets. " 
(DMD - Division B, emphasis added) 
"The role ofthe divisional level is to make sure each of the companies 
is doing the right thing to benefit itseffandyet doing nothing to offend 
the total of what the division is trying to do. " 
(DMD - Division F I, emphasis added) 
"I say 'ifyou know how to run the business that'sfine, Can Ijust 
tellyou what the rules are? Do you agree that we need to get X? If 
you're quite happy to do that I won't even come here again. 
(DMD - Division F2, emphasis added) 
In 'non-cooperative' divisions DMI)s may intervene to restructure separate business 
units under one BM to realise cost savings through facility and staff rationalisation. 
However, following such reorganisation, they maintain a unit optimisation approach 
to the (fewer) remaining businesses and operate in the "financial control" mode of 
Goold and Campbell (1987) rather than a "strategic planning" mode. To this end, 
amongst other characteristics, divisional staff numbers are kept to a minimum (costs 
are minimised) and incentives for business managers are focused on the business 
perfonnance. 
It is difficult to maintain a logical argument that non-cooperative divisions have a 
value greater than the sum of the stand-alone businesses unless there are significant 
market power (monopoly) group benefits. This lack of additional value of 
membership is in spite of the relatedness of the business units. 
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7.11.2 Cooperative Divisions. 
These divisions aim to exploit team benefits and/or guidance from divisional process 
or functional experts as well the gains from somefacility and group value. A 
significant component of competitive success is seen to lie in the processes, 
technologies and capabilities that are common across the business units. A pan- 
divisional orientation towards the exploitation of this "resource"-based relatedness 
through shared learning results in structures, processes, systems and staffpromoting 
and driving inter-business linkages and sharing. An identifying characteristic of these 
divisions (compared with non-cooperative divisions above) is the presence of 
divisional staff responsible for strategically important processes or functions 
although there are different positions and hence different intensities of involvement 
in different processes. 
While the differences in local market applications-and customer needs are 
acknowledged and managed, these differences are not allowed to gain primacy over 
the synergistic benefits of pan-divisional processes. The businesses have stand-alone 
responsibility for local issues but are required to demonstrate active commitment to 
divisional goals. Both in terms of economic rationales of exploiting non-tradable, 
knowledge based economies of scope (Teece, 1982) or core competences (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990) and corporate strategy rationales of sharing activities and 
transferring skills (Porter, 1987) these divisions are actively engaged in the search for 
extra-business synergy. Divisional managers install mechanisms of standardisation of 
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systems, procedures and activities to achieve sameness across the businesses and 
drive inter-business learning and sharing. i. e. they meta-manage processes that the 
businesses would typically ignore or resist. They accept that, unattended, the ideal of 
self-initiated inter-business sharing will only occur under exceptional circumstances 
and so use their divisional staffs to proactively and aggressively drive cross-boundary 
interactions. They seek optimisation of divisional value through integration. 
e. g. "Each location generally has aformal structure ofa monthly meeting 
for all the people... We also require a weekly meeting ofthe local business 
manager and his managers. " 
(Human Resource Director - Division G, emphasis added) 
"the bedrock is manufacturing excellence ... (I'm) still in the process 
ofdoing is build(ing) manufacturing excellence across the division. 
(DMD - Division J, emphasis added) 
"I don'tjust mean countries when I say 'cross-borderý I'M talking 
offunctions, I'm talking of businesses... " 
(DMD - Division G, emphasis added) 
7.12 Dilemmas of Divisional Value 
In practice none of the divisions studied measured divisional value-added and, 
consistent with this, all divisional managers expressed uncertainty about the value 
they and/or the division added in quantitative terms. Some were even unsure of the 
value they added in a more subjective sense. Value benefits might be most easily 
measurable infacilities and group categories particularly in (business) cost savings 
through the centralisation of common activities (facilities) or discounts on volume 
purchases (group). Ongoing developments, however, tend to reduce these as a source 
of value contingent on divisional membership. The outsourcing of activities e. g.. 
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distribution, computer services, payroll, etc. and the use of specialised professionals 
for occasional services, e. g. tax, legal, training etc. has become a standard ploy for 
stand-alone businesses. This enables them to reap the savings from the economies of 
scale of one expert servicing many businesses and also to benefit from that expert's 
focused ability in a narrow range of activities. Provided the market price of these 
facilities is not materially greater than the internal divisional costs then divisional 
members have no value benefits over stand-alone outsiders. Some group benefits are 
also less contingent on divisional membership. e. g. changes in competitive law in 
some countries have markedly reduced the availability and the materiality of volume- 
based discounts and, where they do still exist, stand-alone businesses are free to form 
buying groups to gain these advantages. 18 Even without these developments some 
businesses are sceptical about the actual savings the division can manage for them 
compared with their own efforts. 
e. g. "... Buying power is overstated, central purchasing is not much 
better than I can do. " 
(Business Manager - Division F2) 
The theoretical perspective detailed at the beginning of this study posited the view 
that ongoing divisional benefits are primarily grounded in economies of scope 
manifest in shared learning and knowledge and that these are best exploited through 
6cooperative9 processes and mechanisms. This perspective is strongly linked to the 
observed divisional entrepreneurial value management functions of "best practice" 
18 'Retravision' in Australia and 'Ardek' in Germany are two examples of groups of otherwise 
independent retailers who have linked to consolidate buying power over large suppliers. 
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and "pan-divisionalism" and the membership benefit categories of guidance from 
functional or process experts and team based interactions between the businesses. 
Yet only five divisions (labelled the 'cooperative' cluster) showed strong evidence of 
putting in guidance functions other than the DMI? or adopting a proactively pan- 
divisional approach to achieving team value. In the seven other divisions a non- 
cooperative a unit optimising approach prevails and guidance is typically confined 
to administrative value activities of the DMD. These activities have been argued 
above to be unlikely to form the basis of material divisional value. 
7.13 Summary 
The foregoing research and discussion suggest following bald conclusions or 
propositions for further research. 
1. Non-cooperative divisions are (relatively) easy to manage but, absent significant 
market power effects (i. e. price/margin control), provide no more sustained 
membership benefits (Mdiv) than a group of stand-alone businesses or a divisional 
conglomerate of unrelated businesses. 
i. e. at best Vdiv = a, + b., + c., 
where Vdiv ý divisional value and a, etc. are the values of the sum of the stand- 
alone businesses. Mdiv = divisional membership benefits = 0. 
2. Cooperative divisions are (relatively) difficult to manage but, as well as market 
power effects, provide benefits by leveraging common processes, resources and 
competences across the division. They add value through benefits of business 
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integration (team) and/or focused divisional level process or functional inputs 
(guidance). 
i. e. Vdiv>a, +b. +c, 
The value of the division exceeds the sum of the values of the stand-alone 
businesses (by NLi,. ) 
3. The fundamental structure of cooperative divisions and non-cooperative divisions 
remains M-fonn in character with both categories giving significant operating 
autonomy to the businesses in many areas. Compared to the non-cooperative 
divisions however the cooperative divisions (and the businesses) are learning to 
manage integration, holism and "horizontalisnf' without sacrificing all of the 
benefits of division of labour, individual focus and vertical authority. i. e. 
cooperative divisions are not "either-or" they are "botlf'. 
If there are benefits in the horizontal management of relatedness which result in 
added value (synergy or NLi, ) why do non-cooperative divisions exist given that they 
too have relatedness as their raison d'Etre? 
The next chapter attempts to answer this question and to reconcile the contradictions 
of the two categories. 
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Chapter 8 
RECONCILING THEORY AND OBSERVATION 
"Every man is in certain respects like all other men, like some other 
men and like no other men. " 
(Kluckhohn and Murray, 1953) 
The study of divisions is as bedevilled as any study in social science. Divisions are 
organisational systems wherein recursiveness typically confuses dependent and 
independent variables (Forrester, 1969, Senge, 1990 ) and apparent stability is often a 
dynamic equilibrium of path-dependent, organisationally-specific interactions 
exhibiting non-linearity and "sensitive dependence on initial conditions" (Glieck, 
1987: 23). Despite such complications, social science theorising is concerned with 
explanations based on generalities. To say that all divisions are different is 
indisputably true at one level, but this chapter attempts to reconcile such differences. 
8.1 Divisional Strategy 
Divisional strategy is argued to be theoretically grounded in the creation of additional 
value ("synergy") from the process or capability relatedness of the component 
businesses. Whilst there may be other relatedness-connected benefits specific to 
particular divisions, general divisional value is realised over the long tenn through 
pan-divisional management of common capabilities, processes and functions. i. e. 
fluough the creation, development and management of exploitable relatedness. 
Divisional strategy is diagramatically represented in Figure 8.1. 
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I Corporate Strategy I 
.. ". Ex ploitable Relatedness Divisional Strategy Synergy 
Cooperation 
...................... 
I Business Strategy I 
Figure 8. Divisional Strategy 
InFigure8.1 exploitable relatedness is the perceived, strategically valuable aspect 
of business relatedness and cooperation is manifest in pan-divisional perspectives 
and practices and includes various strategic functional/process inputs from the 
divisional level which may augment or replace business functions/processes. 
Synergy is the resultant value added above the sum of the stand-alone businesses. 
The multiplicative relationship between the two dynamics suggests that if either 
exploitable relatedness or the appropriate style of strategic management is absent 
then synergy is unlikely to occur. i. e. synergy is a manifestation of creative, active 
management. 
8.2 The Dilemma of Practice versus Theory 
The cooperative division is reflective of a the synergistic perspective above. 
However, the non-cooperative divisions are not passive administrative units 
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managing the units at arms length. Like their counterparts in the cooperative 
divisions the divisional managers of non-cooperative divisions are aggressively 
operational, espouse the value of inter-business sharing and have mind-sets oriented 
towards divisional value by adding to business value. What they do not have is a 
strong pap-divisional mindset, divisional staff managing functional inputs or process 
integration nor incentive systems that explicitly reward inter-business cooperation. 
On the other hand the cooperative divisions continually fight the stand-alone 
proclivities of their business managers and have typically evolved from a non- 
cooperative structure in the past. 
So while some divisions are attempting to add value through the pan-divisional 
management of perceived exploitable relatedness others are not. If, as suggested, the 
economic rationale of divisions is exploitable relatedness why are they not all 
reflecting the same approach and how does the behaviour of non-cooperative 
divisions "fit" with the theory as suggested? I An internal contingency explanation is 
suggested i. e. organisational. "realities" impede strategic (economic) rationales. 
8.3 Forces Against Managing Divisional Process Relatedness 
While categorisation is inevitably an attempt to separate the inseparable, the forces 
sustaining a unit optimisation perspective are an interaction of corporate, business 
1 It should be noted that this is the general style of question faced by all social science theories which, 
typically, are not universally manifest in their expressed form in real life. Whilst the theory proposed 
certainly has theoretically 'ideal' connotations it has been induced from other research findings and 
theoretical viewpoints and observed in real divisions. (See Chapters 2 and 3). 
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and divisional processes. The pressures are such that stand-alone, unit oPtimisation 
becomes the default mode of strategic management practice in divisions. 
8.3.1 Corporate "Style" - Pressure for Unit Optimisation. 
Goold and Campbell (1987) describe three major corporate styles as 'strategic 
planning', 'strategic control' and 'financial control' with "style" being a holistic 
interaction between the continua of 'planning influence' (structure, review of plans, 
allocation of resources etc. ) and 'control influence' (objectives, monitoring results 
and incentives). They report on the influence of corporate style on the behaviour of 
the divisions and business units in the corporation. One of the significant aspects of 
corporate style with respect to divisional strategy is the way the corporate level views 
and treats its divisions. i. e. as a collection of business units or as an integrated whole. 
As it is "harder to have a longer time horizon than your boss" (Goold et al. op. cit. p. 
256) it is harder for a division to focus on horizontal integration if the corporate 
reporting, review and strategic planning requirements force a focus on the financial 
perfonnance of business units rather than the strategic functioning of the divisional 
whole. While the perception of the corporate level as "controlfreaks" by the DMD of 
Division B is an extreme view, even in the cooperative divisions the divisional- 
corporate reporting requirements are predominantly focused on the financial 
parameters of individual business units. 
Corporate predispositions towards unit optimising systems are exacerbated if there is 
a corporate drive for observable cost savings through rationalisation, "downsizing", 
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"re-engineering" etc. which has been communicated to the City. Division B is a good 
example, although not the only one, where an over-riding corporate agenda has left 
no room for additional staff, resources or time to build inter-business systems. 
8.3.2 Business Autonomy - Pressures for Stand-Alone Functioning 
In all the divisions the business managers actively promote their stand-alone 
preferences. Differences are accentuated and similarities undervalued. The more 
different the business are perceived to be, i. e. the more regionally idiosyncratic, the 
more dissimilar in product, process, market and industry characteristics the more 
likely that exploitable relatedness is masked and optimising individual businesses 
will be viewed as the only viable divisional strategy. Even in the manifestly 
cooperative divisions, divisional staff struggle with the non-cooperative preferences 
of business managers. 
The proffered explanations of the BMs for their stand-alone preferences are based on 
their belie? that it is in fact better for the business and the division for their business 
unit to be autonomous. They stress the nuances of their customers, competitors, 
suppliers, operational processes and labour force ("it's different here in the South 
than in Coventry") and the need for them to be able to respond flexibly to local 
contingencies without the "bureaucracy" of the division slowing them down. 
Congruent with this view, every impediment and cost of divisional membership is 
2 The long history of research into attitudes, beliefs, cognitive dissonance etc. would support the view 
that most of the BMs do actually believe this even though more cynical observers might see conscious 
self-interest as the basis for their autonomy-seeking behaviour. The way that most BMs "own" their 
businesses as part of themselves rather than as an instrument for future gain has perhaps to be 
experienced to be truly accepted. 
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highlighted (wasteful meetings, unsuitable IT systems, inappropriate training 
courses, unwarranted interference etc. ) as is every instance of value from business 
3 
self-sufficiency 
In a much broader context the M-form, with its emphasis on stand-alone 
performance, is infused with values that are consistent with the admiration for 
successful individualism and manager-as-heroic-lone-leader that is intrinsic to the 
cultures of the US and UK wherein it rapidly grew. In fighting for autonomy then, 
the BMs are merely reflecting societal values. Whittington (1993) points out that 
f csystemic" theories of strategy are based on such "social embeddedness" 
(Granovetter, 1985) of decision makers. 
Another reason for BMs being determinedly autonomous is that it is rationalfor 
them to be so. Whatever the level of cooperation espoused by the organisation, 
performance appraisal systems focus on the individual and his/her contribution 
relative to others. Internal promotions, with the attendant rewards of power, prestige 
and remuneration, go to those who are seen to excel as individuals and who are 
associated with individually attributable performance which is relatively better than 
others who also might be in running 
4. i. e. promotion is inherently a competitive 
' One of the business managers of Division J-a cooperative "learning organisation" - delighted in 
telling me how he and his accountant worked their way around the capital approval limits when they 
felt the business needs outweighed their commitment to the divisional ethos. 
4 This is not to deny the significant impact of politics in organisations as "impression management" 
remains contingent on individually attributable outcomes. Adroit business managers negotiate budgets 
and manage reporting in ways that enhance their perceived performance. 
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process. Running your own, autonomous business offers better opportunities to 
demonstrate comparative excellence than does being part of a cooperative team. 
A final, and perhaps more salient point, is that BMs "raised" in an M-form 
environment almost certainly lack the necessary knowledge and skills to establish 
and maintain organisational cooperation even if they thought it potentially valuable. . 
8.3.3. Divisional Inertia - Past and Present 
The organisational history of the division and the mental maps of its managers 
influence divisional strategy. The major problem for divisional management 
contemplating change, however, is the commitment of measured resource in pursuit 
of uncertain value. 
8.3.3.1 Divisional History 
Divisions are born out of separation. They are off-spring of the M-form and most of 
them have a long history of managing separate businesses. Many researchers (e. g. 
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991) argue that the true understanding of organisations can 
only be gained through longitudinal analysis. The present is a path dependent 
outcome of the past. Organisational inertia causes adherence to established processes 
particularly if financial performance has been good (Miller, 1994). 
The divisional strategy of today, then, is likely to be a function of the divisional 
strategy of yesterday and will remain so without aggressive and proactive change by 
divisional managers. The organisational structure and the systems of planning, 
reward, capital appropriation etc. reflect and influence how the division is 
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strategically managed. A small staff at divisional level, combined with stand-alone 
incentives, individual review and an 'administrative'-value focus, favours individual 
optimisation and vertical management processes. This common scenario, as shown in 
this study, militates against the development of more amorphous linkages across and 
between business units. 
8.3.3.2 Divisional Mental Maps 
Cognitive working models, whether they be seen as the 'mental maps' (e. g. Lorsch 
and Allen, 1973), 'sensemaking' (Huff and Schwenk, 1990), 'dominant logic' 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) or 'frames' (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) of divisional 
managers are an important rationale and driving force for maintaining or changing 
divisional strategy. These maps shape how and what managers perceive, attend to, 
remember and learn about competitive advantage, the nature and value of the 
relatedness of the businesses, the role of business management, divisional 
management etc. 
The divisional managers in this study generally arrived in their role with mental 
maps built on experience in the industry and often the company and division they are 
currently in. Their belief in their own autonomy as the basis for their success as 
stand-alone managers (e. g. the DMD of Division F2) combined with a business 
experience restricted to organisational cultures of unit optimisaiion and the 'guru' 
style of divisional management leaves them bereft of alternative views of divisional 
value. Even if DMI)s entertain a pan-divisional view of value creation they often 
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have little, if any, experience or knowledge on how to go about releasing such value. 
As the DMD of Division J pointed out there is little of specific help for divisional 
management in the management literature 5. 
Another problem for divisional managers is that a move to a more cooperative 
structure is a move towards increased ambiguity. This is not a situation that typical 
Western managers enjoy, 
i. e. "Western managers have a low tolerancefor ambiguous situations 
and have a tendency to perceive them as a threat. Ambiguous situations 
are those that cannot be categorized because oflack offamiliarity 
(newness); complexity (interaction of events too difficult to analyze 
completely); or contradictory situations where different elements 
suggest different structures. " 
(Gimpl and Dakin, 1984: 132, emphasis in original) 
Non-cooperation is a far less ambiguous orientation. 
8.3.3.3 Measured Focus vs Intangihle Scope 
Divisional strategy can be viewed as the interaction between vertical organisational 
processes and horizontal relatedness of the division. Although such concepts are 
interactional continua, models couched in static extremes facilitate focused 
discussion and explanation. If exploitable (i. e. valuable) horizontal relatedness is 
taken as 'high' or 'low' and divisional strategic management orientation as non- 
cooperative (i. e. optimising individual businesses) or cooperative (i. e. optimising the 
integrated whole) then the interaction between them and the divisional value 
dilemmas can be represented as in Figure 8.2. 
5 By this he meant nothing with a title such as "Divisional Strategy". 
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Strategic Man agement Slyk 
Non-cooperative Cooperative 
1. Maximise 3. Organisationai 
Exploitable 
Low Efficiency Cost 
Relatedness 
High 2. Opportunity 4. Maximise Cost Scope 
rigureo. z. inevivisionai vaimemuemma 
The dilemma is grounded in the dimension of exploitable relatedness. The value to 
be gained from relatedness is contingent on the perception, imagination, thought i. e. 
the mental maps of management, but the realisation of value only arises from 
appropriate management. Thus the paradox arises that managers cannot know that 
relatedness value exists until they successfully exploit it, but they are unwilling to 
attempt to exploit it until they are sure it has value. i. e. Digging for gold is contingent 
on knowing it is there but knowing it is there is contingent on digging. 
This leads to a game-theoretic dilemma for divisional management. By managing the 
division in a non-cooperative, unit optimisation style, divisional management 
achieves benefits from focus efficiencies and does not incur the costs associated with 
inter-business management. Whether these "costs" are the well-known organisational 
imposts of measurement, accountability, intra-boundary conflict, divisional-business 
1. Maximise 3. Organisationai 
Efficiency Cost 
2. Opportunity 4. Maximise 
Cost Scope 
8-10 
conflict 6 etc., or the financial costs of extra staff and resources; their key 
characteristic is that they are tangible and, in the case of resources, measured in the 
day to day financial monitoring of the division. By managing in a cooperative, 
integrated optimisation style these costs are incurred but the value gained from 
exploiting horizontal relatedness is, in the majority of cases 7, not measurable in a 
way that is separate from the stand-alone performance of the businesses. 8 
So in table 8.2, quadrants I and 4 are the (conceptually) value-maximising options 
while net losses of different types are represented in quadrants 2 and 3. 
Organisational costs (Quadrant 3), particularly financial under-performance against 
budgeted outcomes, are immediately obvious and bring unwelcome attention to those 
who are accountable. On the other hand, opportunities missed (Quadrant 2) are rarely 
noticed and even more rarely are the precursor to censure. In the traditional M-form 
organisation a risk averse, divisional office, where 'risk' is used in the subjective 
sense of "chance of loss" (Collins and Ruefli, 1992), will tend to manage through 
unit optimisation. With such a style the opportunity costs of not exploiting horizontal 
relatedness are unmeasured and (probably) unmeasurable. This is less risky than 
incurring the measurable costs of integrating the group particularly if perceived 
6 Divisional (or corporate) service/function provision and the allocated charges are the traditional 
battleground on which autonomy-control battles are most energetically fought. The "cold war" often 
becomes "hot" at budget time when a business, under pressure for cost containment, is allocated 
divisional (corporate) charges which have increased by more than the "allowable" factor. Inevitably 
the businesses can "do it cheaper and better" than the division. 
7 Centralising and rationalising functions are measurable in a financial way and hence tend to be the 
more frequent manifestations of divisional strategy. 
8 This problem of non-measurability is compounded by the tendency for the measurement of di visions 
to be the sum of the component businesses. 
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relatedness value proves to be illusory. In the language of game theory (Poundstone, 
1992) the "rational" option for divisional management, even if they perceive 
potential value from pan-divisional relatedness, is to "defect" to a non-cooperative 
orientation. Such "defection" is, however, a passive maintenance of the status quo. 
8.4 Divisional Strategy - an Evolving and Dynamic Compromise with "Reality" 
Divisional strategy then is an ongoing compromise between economic potential and 
organisational reality. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) are wrong when they characterise 
the "SBU" as the "tyrant" barring the way to the exploitation of core competences. 
The SBU is merely a symptoni of the complex mix of psychological, organisational 
and environmental dynamics underpinning the relationship between organisational 
forces and economic value. Figure 8.3 represents some of these forces. 
I Corporate Strategy I 
Style 
Ex ploitable Relatedness 
Fivisional Strategy Synergy 
History 
Mental Maps Cooperation 
Measurement 
........................ 
I Business Strategy 
" Pressure for Autonomy 
" Degree of Variety 
" Market Forces 
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i. e. Divisional strategy is the achievement of added value (synergy) from the 
exploitable relatedness of the processes and capabilities of the component businesses. 
The achievement of value from exploitable relatedness is via a cooperative set of 
managerial and organisational perceptions, systems and processes. The extent and 
nature of exploitable relatedness and cooperative patterns and perspectives is 
contingent on a variety of interacting forces at corporate, divisional and business 
levels. 
8.4.1 Forces for Change 
Changing to a cooperative structure can be initiated at any of the levels which act as 
barriers. A new DMD might bring a different view of divisional functioning. 
Division D2 is becoming an increasingly integrated group as the result of the beliefs 
and actions of the new manager as has Division J. The requirements of the market 
place and changes in business industry can also force a more pan-divisional 
perspective. Globalising customers are a significant force for Division G and an 
ongoing pressure for an integrating orientation. The non-cooperative Division FI is 
also under pressure to rethink its stand-alone perspective as customers become 
increasingly pan-European. Corporate pressure, perhaps driven by a drive for cost 
reduction as in Division B, or by comparative performance benchmarking against 
other corporations can also lead to increasing functional integration of business units 
and a sharpened focus on the potential synergies currently dormant in the divisions. 
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8.4.2 Developmental History 
The cooperative divisions have developed from non-cooperative origins and still 
have to manage non-cooperative forces. Even the most structurally non-cooperative 
divisions are attempting to gain from sharing between the businesses if only at the 
level of "cross-pollination" by the DMD. i. e. whilst non-cooperative they are not 
avowedly 'competitive' in outlook or behaviour. These signs are consistent with M- 
form history and development. From its creation as a response to growth- induced 
complexity through its period as a facilitating structure for acquisition-driven growth 
the M-form has harvested the benefits of separation. Structural and operational 
autonomy is thus the starting point of M-form divisions and, despite the relatedness 
of the business units, still confers benefits of simplicity and focus. However, like all 
evolving "organisms", increased levels and breadth of performance, whether 
demanded from a changing environment or fostered by internal drives, are contingent 
on metamorphosis to higher order and more integrated (vs separated) forms of 
organisation. i. e. complex (non-decomposable) processes needs must be managed by 
organisational forms demonstrating "requisite complexity". The development of 
divisions from competitive through non-cooperative to cooperative structures mirrors 
the increasing complexity and interactivity of the management processes necessary to 
harvest all sources of potential value. 
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8.5 Some Implications for Practice 
Informing practice is at the heart of strategic management research 
"If the discipline ofstrategy aspires to be more than a specialized 
sub-branch of thefield of business history, it must be able to prescribe 
appropriate actions a priori, notjust describe outcomes e-x post. It 
must develop theories, tools and systems which guide managers and 
companies towards more productive choices, not simply record the 
strategies espoused by the eventual winners and their historians. 
True intellectual progress, therefore, consists ofdemonstrable 
improvements in prescriptive capability. " 
(Strategic Management Society9,1998 - emphasis in original) 
This research, while focused on the processes and strategic orientations of divisions, 
is grounded in the assumption of a causative link between strategy and performance. 
The specific divisional strategy-perforniance links are captured in the following 
assumptions: 
(a) cooperative divisions create more opeTationallo value than non- 
cooperative divisions in the same industry and 
(b) cooperative divisions create more operational value than the equivalent set 
of related but stand-alone businesses in the same industry. 
This two part proposition addresses the issue of pan-divisionalism versus unit 
optimisation within divisions (the major focus of this study) and also that of 
divisional membership versus stand-alone functioning (the rationale for group 
management in the first place). Little, if any, work has been carried out on either of 
these comparisons at the divisional level because the division, as defined in this work 
9 Ps 1-2 of the "Call for Panel, Paper and Poster Proposals" for the I Sth Annual International 
Conference. 
10 This adjective is used as distinct from market (stock price) value. 
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as an internal, quasi-corporation, has rarely been the unit of analysis in any research. 
The evidence that does exist comes from parallel work at the corporate level. 
Even at the corporate level little has been done to compare operating performance of 
related corporations verses the equivalent group of "related" but stand-alone 
businesses. Market valuation comparisons, i. e. acquisition and divestment frequency 
or valuation measures e. g. Porter, (1987), have been used to show the problems of 
unrelated acquisitions. Much work has also been carried out on the comparative 
performance of companies comprising related and unrelated portfolios (e. g. Rumelt, 
1974). However the acid test of corporate (and divisional) value-adding or synergy 
lies in the comparison of a group of businesses under one management and a group 
of similar businesses operating as stand-alone units. This comparison is a difficult 
one to undertake. 
Some support for the superior performance of cooperative organisations has already 
been found at the corporate level where Hoskisson, Hill and Kim (1993) have 
suggested the "by no means hard and fast" conclusion that most successful multi. 
divisional are "those that emphasise cooperation between divisions. " (p. 290). Also 
Davis, Robinson, Pearce and Park (1992) find a positive correlation between 
"relatedness" and performance in the US paper and pulp industry and their particular 
operationalisation. of 'relatedness' is more a measure of cooperative orientation" 
11 i. e. "Each manager responded to questions about the extent to which business units shared: 
customers, plant and equipment facilities, the same sales force, advertising and promotional efforts. 
research and development efforts, and interdivisional product transfers as purchases and sales. " (p. 
355) 
8-16 
than the traditional measures of market/production similarity. These corporate studies 
lend weight to the argument that cooperative divisions will out-perfon-n non- 
cooperative ones. 
If this value proposition is an accepted assumption it then makes economic and 
strategic sense for the managers at all levels in multi-divisional companies to develop 
and maintain cooperative orientations, processes and structures integrating related 
businesses in their companies. 12 However, as observed in the divisions studied, this is 
not necessarily happening in the world of practice where various dynamic barriers 
and dilemmas impede theoretically optimal strategy. 
8.6 Strategic Perspectives 
Two overlapping perspectives are pre-requisites if the divisional collection of related 
businesses is to capture economies of scope. 
1. Divisional value, 
2. The Division as the unit of management 
8.6.1 Divisional Value - Membership Benefits and the Divisional Level 
By divisional value is meant the additional value the businesses derive from being 
part of the division. Two dimensions of divisional value are important the sources or 
nature of value and its measurement. 
12 Although this research is focused on divisions as established groups or quasi-corporations of related 
businesses the same logic applies to stand-alone corporations that are made up of related businesses 
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8.6.1.1 Sources of Value 
The unique value potential of a division lies in the exploitation of some aspects of the 
relatedness of its component businesses. The nature of exploitable relatedness is 
divisionally specific and contingent on the imagination and efforts of management at 
all levels. Value must first be discovered/created before it can be exploited. One way 
of viewing such value is to examine the division in terms of the membership benefits 
that the businesses derive from being a part. Four categories of membership benefits 
have been suggested: group (e. g. size, market power), facilities (e. g. centralised 
distribution, centralised branding), guidance (e. g. divisional manufacturing group 
helping the businesses) and team (e. g. core processes and businesses helping each 
other). This is a simple, and not necessarily exhaustive classification, that 
nevertheless provides a starting point for managers who have not thought 
13 
systematically about this issue 
While all the categories offer the potential for divisional value, the more that benefits 
derive from capabilities and processes grounded in interactional learning the more 
likely it is that the value will be sustainable as a source of divisional-specific value. 
i. e. the more a 'core competence' is developed that Underpins a set of 'core products' 
or 'core processes' the more valuable the division is likely to be over the sum of the 
stand-alone businesses (Hamel, 1994). 
13 This would include all of the divisional managers in this study for example. 
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Other divisional value issues, related to the "parenting advantage" insights of Goold 
et al. (1994), concern the value added by the divisional level. Such questions 
logically follow the definition of membership benefits as the role of the divisional 
level and the value it adds is contingent on the benefits to be managed and exploited. 
Answers, or at least struggling with answering 14 will clarify appropriate roles, 
actions and systems. 
It is logically unlikely that administrative value activities alone (i. e. monitoring, 
controlling, 'fire-fighting') add value over that of a competent business manager. A 
divisional head swamped with such duties either has incompetent subordinates (and 
the solution is clear) or lacks the necessary concepts, skills and organisational 
support to operate differently. Such super-management ensures, in the main, that the 
businesses are doing what they could and would anyway. The divisional level only 
adds value through entrepreneurial behaviours concerned with improving the 
businesses beyond their operating norm and managing the value-creating linkages 
and processes between the businesses. i. e. by meta-managing those processes that, as 
a matter of course, the businesses could not or would not proactively manage 
themselves. 
8.6.1.2 Measurement ofDivisional Value 
Divisional managers are uncertain about divisional value. In the non-cooperative 
divisions the divisional managers espouse "sharing" and "cooperation" but are 
14 The fact that ready answers are not available to complex questions should not mean ignoring the 
issue. Some questions are inherently unanswerable in terms of a final hest solution but from the , 
ongoing struggle with the dilemmas better insights and management will emerge. 
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inhibited in enacting the necessary (costly) systems due, in part, to the non- 
measurable nature of any resultant gain. Even in those divisions that have manifest 
commitments to cooperative structures, staffing and systems; it is belief, ambition 
and hope that have overcome this dilemma rather than the surety of knowledge. One 
divisional manager spoke of "hard" synergy being the synergy that could be 
measured in terms of cost savings and "sofC' synergy that could not be measured but 
was valuable in some intangible sense. It was, perhaps inevitably, "hard" synergy 
that was most energetically pursued. 
If membership benefits based on relatedness are the major source of divisional value 
then, to transcend the metaphysical status of "synergy", these benefits must have 
some concrete representation. The measurement of such value remains an issue of 
intellectual experimentation as neither academic theory nor business practice offer 
guidelines. Unfortunately, in light of the business clichd that "what gets measured 
gets done", measurement must become as connected to divisional value as it is to 
business value. If divisional value is not made tangible then the measurable cost- 
savings from "downsizing" (divisional staff) will always be a temptation in tougher 
times and the "defection" to unit optimising "minimalism" will always be the 
66rational" choice. 
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8.6.2 The Division as the Unit of Management 
To facilitate the quest for divisional value, managers of cooperative divisions view 
their task as managing one, multi-component business rather than a collection of 
separate units and they are also more committed to a 'pan-divisional' perspective. 
8.6.2.1 The Division as the Business 
Conceptualising the division as one multi-site, multi-product or multi-country 
business rather than as a group of several businesses is a necessary perceptual 
integration that precedes meaningful intra-divisional linkages. Thinking in terms of 
"one business" facilitates inter-business insights and the management of breadth. 
This is often a difficult re-orientation for managers who have come up through the 
business management ranks. They have generally been immersed in a sense of 
business 'separateness' and have neither the mental models nor the necessary 
integrative skills demanded of cooperative divisional processes. Not only might the 
manager not be aware of an alternative logic but he often has a personal commitment 
to a perspective of separate businesses as it was in this structural orientation that he 
achieved the success that enabled him to achieve his current position. For similar, 
self-oriented and self-interested reasons, business managers also reinforce the ideal 
of separateness and business autonomy. 
The perspective of the division as the business fosters a view of business-based 
employees as divisional personnel with business responsibilities. In particular the 
business managers may also have other pan-divisional roles such as the divisional 
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6quality training' role fulfilled by one of the business managers in Division J. This 
multi-role perspective can be difficult for business managers who are often culturally 
conditioned to the ideal of "running their own ship" and who view themselves as 
business managers first and divisional members second. Given that these are the 
divisional/corporate managers of the future, however, it is appropriate that they 
develop a broad perspective sooner rather than have to overcome a narrow one later. 
A commitment to the "one business" view can be supported through the divisional 
measurement, reporting and reward systems. This support might also include having 
the division reporting to corporate as a divisional whole rather than as a collection of 
business units (not noted in the study). Joint accountability of business managers for 
divisional performance is another possible integrating mechanism that was not noted 
in this study. So, while 'stockturns' is an important operational parameter for 
Division J, the businesses are judged separately on this measure. A focus on the 
divisional performance might requires targeted divisional stockturn figure for which 
the business managers (via their material control managers) are jointly accountability 
as well as retaining accountability for their individual business perfonnance. 
8.6.2.2 Pan-Divisionalism 
Realising divisional value, whatever its source, is contingent on appropriate 
management. It may depend on aggressive, pan-divisional management of attributes, 
processes etc. that transcend business boundaries. Such management is characterised 
as meta-management as it entails the management of higher level or second order 
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processes than business managers manage, either because they do not have the 
power, position or capability and/or because they resist the loss of autonomy implicit 
in pan-divisionalism (i. e. will not). In the single business, managing cross-functional 
teams and horizontal processes rather than (vertical) functions is now received 
wisdom to the point of clich6. (e. g. Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990). Such trans- 
boundary management is also a feature of divisions realising economies of scope. 
Pan-divisionalism can be reflected in inter-business processes (e. g. core 
competences, key processes etc. ) entailing the management of the horizontal inter- 
relating or can be reflected in a core process capability at divisional level which 
guides each business and entails managing vertical inter-relating 
15 
. However, 
whatever the level of inter-relating, its creation and maintenance depends on 
divisional influence as a top-down dynamic. i. e. teamwork is created and maintained 
through the authority of hierarchy. It is perhaps this paradox that most needs to be 
understood by divisional managers. While implicit in the notion of 'teamwork' is a 
sense of voluntarism based on mutual awareness of common goals and the common 
good, the evidence from the divisions in this study suggest that views on the common 
good are, in fact, not common. BMs, in particular, believe that the common good is 
best served by summing their autonomous efforts. 
The implications of this is that pan-divisional processes deemed to be strategically 
important must be actively managed at all levels and such active management 
15 The various specific mechanisms such as task forces, staff trans-location, cross business teams etc. 
are well known (e. g. Alexander, 1993) and will not be covered here. The main points are that such 
mechanisms are predicated on a pan-divisional perspective and must still he managed. 
8-23 
implies the presence of proactive divisional staff In terms of trans-business 
processes "what gets managed gets done', but, perhaps more pointedly, what does 
not get managed, does not happen. The emphasis on "all necessary levels" derives 
from the reluctance of business managers to spontaneously promote ongoing trans- 
business interactions and the corresponding inertia of their functional managers to 
self-initiate ongoing peer contact. The ongoing interaction, so necessary for tacit, 
group based learning, is lost without (divisional) managerial drive and support. 
Divisional and business managers in non-cooperative divisions of cost focused 
corporations are likely to view the simple advocating of divisional staff as a 
controversial suggestion for which the potential "rewards" do not warrant the 
concrete risks or losses. "Enlightened" self-interest acts to leave synergy "in the 
ground". 
8.7 From Stand-alone to Cooperative 
Change carries risk particularly where that change is a major reorientation of 
perspective and practice against multi-faceted forces for the status quo. Often a major 
crisis can becomes an undeniable rationale for transformation 
16 
. Unfortunately, from 
the perspective of divisional strategy, a performance crisis is more likely to orient 
corporate and divisional managers towards cost savings and rationalisation rather 
than the creation of divisional staff positions and interactive processes. It might be 
then that the establishment of cooperative, pan-divisional processes is best started in 
16 Kotter (1995; 60) identifies "Not establishing a Great Enough Sense of Urgency" as the number one 
error underlying failures in transformational change. 
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"good" times. The problem then is that business managers will be even more forceful 
in their defence of the value of stand-alone functioning and their logic of "it ain't 
broke don't fix it" can seem indisputable. 
Guidelines for the introduction of such change in organisational orientation do exist. 
Collis (199 1 c) for example presents a hierarchy of five levels of "modes of 
coordination" of separate businesses within a corporate strategy framework. At the 
top level are "those modes of coordination which involve the least centralized 
intervention" (p. 8). He suggests it is "often best to introduce coordination by 
gradually moving down the hierarchy" (p. 9) and in particular to start with those 
cooperative activities that are in the self interest of the businesses to implement. As 
synergies become apparent at lower levels the businesses can be helped to the 
realisation of the long-term benefit of increased levels of divisional coordination of 
business processes. The "trappings" of stand-alone functioning might need to be left 
in place to assuage fears of a downgrading in status. e. g. as Division D2 moved to a 
more integrated structure the title of Managing Director was left with managers who 
were, technically, no longer in that role. 
Cooperation is as much a mind-set as it is a practice-set and both must be in place if 
divisional value is to be created. 
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
"Now this is not the end. Is not even the beginning ofthe end But it 
is, perhaps, the end ofthe beginning. " 
Winston Churchill) 
In Chapter I five research questions were posed about the strategic management of 
divisions which gave direction to an empirical investigation of divisions. These 
questions are now be re-visited with brief answers giving concluding summaries of 
the study. 
9.1 Question 1: What is 'divisional strategy' in theory i. e. What is the value 
creating rationale of the division? 
Divisional strategy is the creation and management of exploitable relatedness in its 
component businesses to create membership benefits such that the value of the 
division is greater than the sum of the values of the stand-alone businesses. A variety 
of membership-contingent benefits can be created ranging from the exploitation of 
market power to the linkage of competences and capabilities between businesses. 
These benefits have been categorised into: 
guidance benefits- where divisional level resources actively augment the strategic 
capabilities of the businesses; 
facilities benefits- where divisional level resources replace the strategic capabilities 
of the businesses; 
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team benefits- where the businesses actively augment each others' strategic 
capability; and 
group benefits - where the advantages of membership are inherent in the size, history 
and/or position of the division. 
The unique input of the division over its component businesses lies in the creation, 
development and management of the meta-value of membership. 
Although market based relatedness can be a source of additional value (e. g. through 
quasi monopoly effects) the prime basis for positive divisional membership benefits 
lies in the exploitation of commonality of processes, functions and competences via 
an aggressively cooperative divisional infrastructure. One of the reasons that a 
cooperative infrastructure is required is that the successful exploitation of economies 
of scope of divisional-specific knowledge and learning which underlies shared 
capabilities'relies on the transfer of the tacit components. Such transfer is dependant 
on physical interaction as tacit knowledge, by its nature, is not reducible to 
articulable coding. 
This viewpoint follows the significant stream of research on the link between 
relatedness and performance (e. g. Rumelt, 1974; Singh and Montgomerie, 1987; 
Amit and Livnatt, 1988) where several variables have been argued to intervene 0 
between relatedness and synergistic performance. i. e. relatedness is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of synergy. Amongst these variables a managerial orientation 
towards underlying capabilities or resources as the key, exploitable component of 
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relatedness (Lemelin, 1982; Markides and Williamson, 1994) and strategic 
management oriented towards "cooperative" inter-business systems and structures 
(Collis, 1991 c; Hill, 1994) have been deemed to be significant. 
9.2 Question 2: What is 'divisional strategy' in practice? 
i. e. What is the value creating perspective of division management and how do 
they purposively enact it? 
In Chapter 3 this broad question was broken down to two specific queries about the 
views of divisional managers: 
1. What are the views of DMI)s on the membership benefits for divisional business 
units, the role of the divisional level and the businesses in achieving those benefits 
and, in particular, the extent to which inter-business or business-division 
cooperation is important. 
2. What specific structures, processes, mechanisms etc. are planned or in place to 
encourage, facilitate or drive intra-divisional cooperation. 
In practice the perspectives and practices of some divisions (cooperative divisions) 
support the theoretical view of trans-businessfinter-business capabilities as the prime 
source of divisional value. In these divisions cooperative orientations were expressed 
by divisional managers and they were managing structures and systems to facilitate 
interactions either between divisional-level resource, between the businesses or both. 
An identifying characteristic of such divisions is that a number of strategically 
focused staff are put in place at divisional level and business managers are given 
9-3 
incentives linked to divisional performance. The perspective of divisional level staff 
tends to reflect the management of a single business (the division) which is made up 
of several inter-linked components (businesses) wherein cooperative processes need 
aggressive meta-management. These divisions can be argued to be structural 
manifestation of the exploitation of horizontal, leaming-based economies of scope 
and exhibit a theoretical potential (not measured) for synergistic tean7 value although 
active guidance from divisional specialists as general management inputs from the 
Divisional Managing Director are other sources of divisional value. 
However there are another set of divisions that did not support such a view (non- 
cooperative divisions). These divisions manifest the perspective and structural 
imperatives of the traditional M-form. These organisations are characterised by a 
paucity of divisional staff, with those that are in place being in predominantly control 
oriented positions, and by the fact that business managers are offered no 
remuneration-based incentive to focus on divisional performance. While often 
espousing the "value" of cooperation the dominant logic of the divisional managers 
is based the division as a set of autonomous businesses. Value is seen as arising from 
the specific product-market characteristics and activities of the individual business 
unit with limited additional value from inter-business cooperation. Group benefits 
can arise from market and quasi monopoly effects of size. The DMD is operationally 
involved as a source of general management guidance and this involvement can be 
argued to be an exploitation of management based economies of scope (Penrose, 
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1959). However, as with the cooperative divisions, much of this input is in the nature 
of administrative or loss ameliorating activity (crisis management and performance 
maintenance) and, as such, is difficult to support as a systematic basis for added- 
value over that created by nonnally skilled and rpotivated Business Managers. 
Perhaps inevitably then divisional strategy in practice is contingent on the interaction 
of a number of corporate, divisional and business dynamics. The performance 
transparency of the M-form structure and its facilitation of specific accountabilities 
seem to make this the current default modus operandi for divisions. The potential 
gains from pan-divisional, inter-business (i. e. non-M-form) processes are non- 
measurable in the standard financial statements whereas the costs of staff, 
coordination and boundary blurring are observable and measured. If a corporate 
emphasis on cost savings, delayering, etc. and a focus on individual business is allied 
with career oriented, risk averse divisional management then this interaction militates 
against the necessary staffing and structural moves necessary to force a cooperative 
division. "Forcing" cooperation seems to be required on business managers who tend 
to aggressively strive to maintain business autonomy and to develop it further where 
they can. This anti-divisional stance is perhaps due to the prevailing culture of 
individual-manager-as-hero but might also reflect a rational striving for perceived 
stand-alone excellence as a major pre-condition for internal recognition and 
advancement. Such internal incentives for the business manager in the division take 
the place of the market incentives for the stand-alone business. 
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9.3 Question 3: How are different divisionaI strategies reflected at the 
business level? 
This question was also expanded (Chapter 3) to: 
9 How are the views, roles etc. espoused by the DMD reflected at business level 
and in particular to what extent is the divisional commitment to cooperation 
supported and manifest? 
As might be expected from the comments about the autonomy-seeking orientation of 
business managers mentioned above, the business level managers in the non- 
cooperative case support the stand-alone orientation of divisional management. i. e. 
business autonomy is viewed as the sensible, if not the only, divisional approach. 
Business differences at the product-market level are weighted. more highly in terms 
of value potential than business congruencies at the level of process or capability I. 
The benefits of divisional membership tend to be viewed at group level i. e. in terms 
of size and reputation and general management guidance and advice is accepted as 
valuable with problem-solving but high performing businesses expect to be left alone 
(and in the main arc left alone). 
In the businesses of the cooperative division tensions are more manifest between the 
units and a divisional level operating to reduce stand-alone operating. Despite the 
1 One business manager from a non-sales background was a notable exception to this view. 
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acknowledgement of the value of leani based benefits (shared learning) the necessary 
horizontal processes are not manffest below BM unless enforced by accountable 
divisional staff in the way that the DMD enforces cooperative behaviour between 
business managers. Like their counterparts in the non-cooperative division the BM in 
the cooperative structure value their stand-alone status. Although espousing and 
enacting the value of shared learning through ongoing contact or standardised 
systems, the BMs have difficulty practising this at lower levels in their own 
organisation. Their functional managers experience a resistance to inter-business 
liaison and, unless this is divisionally managed, they stay within their own businesses 
despite seeing opportunities in cross-sharing. Where strategic process and functional 
divisional staff do have an active role at business level there are manifest tensions 
between them and the BMs. 
The dilemma faced by a BMs is that, although he might recognise the divisional 
value of cooperation and inter-business teamwork, promotion to more senior general 
positions is contingent on his performance standing out from his peers. 
'Performance' here means the performance of the BM's unit. In a game theoretic 
sense then his Most rationale action is to defect and not cooperate. 
9.4 Questions 4: What practice implications emanate from a deeper 
understanding of divisional strategy? 
The major practice implications derived from this study lie in the importance of 
divisional managers understanding the divisional benefits they are trying to optimise, 
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having some sense of measurement of this value, developing and maintaining the 
appropriate organisation to release this value and dealing proactively with the 
divisional -business tensions created by those organisational processes. 
In the non-cooperative divisions in particular, divisional managers give the 
appearance of managing the businesses as a group rather than having an orientation 
to managing the division as a value creating whole. Although concerned with their 
value-adding worth they do not give the impression of having a clear, A priori sense 
of what value the division is adding. The guideline categories of guidance, team, 
facilities and group at least give a structured approach to this issue and can help 
divisional managers develop a subjective sense of the nature of the benefits the 
division is adding and might plan to add. 
A more difficult issue, and one which awaits further academic input, is the question 
of measurement or an objective view of membership benefits. In none of the 
divisions, including the cooperative ones where concerted (and expensive) effort was 
being undertaken to manifest team based horizontal processes, is there any 
measurement, even at the most rudimentary "guesstimate" level, of divisional value. 
How the division adds value is one question, how much value it adds is the objective 
extension of this. Intuitively this is a difficult problem but when tackled for particular 
divisions it has the potential to focus energy in the right areas. Initially at least it may 
be that such 'measurement' will be in the class of 'highly approximate' but it will at 
least give a starting point for further refinements. The measurement issue goes 
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beyond divisions to the value-added by all multi-business organisations but is no less 
important for divisional managers because of this. 
Establishing an orientation towards the value of divisional membership enables a 
more specific organisational framework to be developed to create and manage those 
benefits. i. e. structure follows strategy. It is not axiomatic that all divisions will 
imply a cooperative orientation. If group benefits of market power (monopoly) for 
example, are highly valuable then business autonomy with divisional control staff 
maintaining price discipline might be the most appropriate structure. Where there is 
a perspective on value based on the inter-linkage of business capabilities, however, a 
more cooperative organisation needs to be evolved. 
In developing a cooperative organisation divisional management needs to align 
systems and structures with the benefits being exploited. Horizontal processes need 
horizontal structures, incentives and management and team processes need team 
structures and management. It is likely that the power of the integrating mechanisms 
fall off as a function of the distance from direct divisional involvement. The fact that 
BMs are interacting and sharing with each other does not mean that this is happening 
at lower levels of their business units even in those divisions with the highest 
espoused level of organisational sharing. It is not essential that divisional level staff 
are appointed for each process as individual BMs can be given pan-divisional roles 
2 
2 This seems to be a powerful mechanism to gain divisional commitment. 
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but it does seem that if the process is not actively managed hierarchically then it will 
fall into disuse. 
The ongoing tensions between hierarchical levels in organisations are as old as 
organisations. The dynamics of the M-form, however, with its purposive creation of 
autonomy and separation gives rise to the dilemma of sharing verses stand-alone 
operation. In a major sense all divisional structures recognise the authority and 
responsibility of the BM for his own business unit and rewards or sanctions flow on 
the basis of this orientation. In non-cooperative divisions this M-form philosophy 
predominates and is consistent with the preferences of the BMs. In turning to a more 
cooperative, non-M-form orientation, stand-alone responsibility is incorporated with 
accountability for shared processes and performance. This tends to be against the 
preferences of the BMs who remain autonomy seeking 
3. 
9.5 Question 5: In what ways can a deeper understanding of the divisional 
strategic role develop existing views of the multi-divisional firm? 
There are two broad areas wherein divisional strategy has implications for the firm. 
The first is in the management of divisions as components of the firm and the second 
is the extrapolation from divisions to issues of relatedness within the firm. 
In managing divisions the corporate level faces similar questions as divisional 
management. In particular the questions around the nature of the value the divisions 
3 In a sociological sense this may be a transient, cultural phenomena grounded in the individualistic 
UK society of today but for the foreseeable business future this dynamic needs purposive 
management. It is notable in this context that one of the cooperative divisions in this study is made up 
of Japanese Business Managers and the divisional level still fights their desire for autonomy. 
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is adding (if any) and the measurement of this value. If the division is regarded 
purely a response to administrative overload, and divisional management is acting 
"in loco parentis" to monitor and control a set of related businesses then the value of 
the division is likely to be in terms of the reduction in complexity at corporate level. 
This orientation still begs the question of why the businesses are under one 
corporate/divisional control rather than stand-alone. On the other hand if there is a 
sense of adding value through divisional membership, then it is sensible for the 
corporate level to seek to facilitate and not impede the creation and maintenance of 
membership benefits. 
One specific attitude than could be adopted is the perception, monitoring and 
measurement of the division as a whole rather than as a set of individual units. This 
is not a foreign concept as individual businesses are monitored in this fashion. The 
business is primarily seen as a totality at the level of sales, cost etc. but is 
(secondarily) understood in depth through more detailed variance analysis of its 
components. e. g. sales by region/custorner/product. In the divisions in this study the 
"variance" analysis, the understanding of the individual businesses, is primary and 
the totality is the simple sum of the parts. Not only does such a corporate approach 
militate against viewing the division as a whole it is also a manifestation of wasteful 
double management of the same information in that the divisional monitoring role is 
carried out twice. 
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The question of the measurement of the value added by divisional membership is as 
vexed for the corporate level as it is for divisional management and, as such, the 
same comments apply as in 9.1.4. above. Without a sense of the value of its divisions 
over that of the stand-alone businesses the corporate level has no meaningful 
measure of one of its most important management layers. It can be argued that it is 
for reasons of non-measurement (non-measurability) that the corporate level looks so 
closely at the individual businesses as these are seen to be the only true source of 
value. 
In a broader sense corporations can take lessons from divisional management. 
Divisions are created on the basis of relatedness and so enable empirical 
investigation of relatedness in a relatively "pure" form. The dilemmas and tensions 
between economic and organisational rationales noted in divisions would seem as 
likely to apply to firms made up of related businesses and, if so, this adds some small 
insights to the relatedness-performance debate. It is logically unlikely that 
relatedness between autonomous businesses in the same corporation has any more 
value-adding relevance than the same related businesses as stand-alone entities. It is 
logically likely that relatedness in corporations only has value-adding relevance if it 
is appropriately envisaged and managed. Neither is relatedness per se likely to be any 
antidote to corporate (or divisional) value destruction i. e. a negative Mdiv or Mcorp 
4 
(corporate membership "benefits") . By taking a view of membership benefits in 
" if groups of related businesses do have negative membership benefits (stemming from inappropriate 
management orientation for example) then the tenuous empirical link between relatedness and 
performance is understandable. 
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various categories, a set suggested here are made up of guidance, facilities, team and 
group, corporations can attempt to manage existing related businesses in a value- 
adding manner and caý view acquisitions and divestments against specific hurdles of 
the membership benefits they will enjoy or enhance. 
9.6 Research Limitations 
This is qualitative research which derives its finding from a cross-section of 
divisional cases. It suffers from all the well aired problems of qualitative, case and 
non-longitudinal studies that have been vigorously debated by well qualified 
researchers for decades and which will not be re-aired heres. There are, however, 
particular aspects of this study , which although not new, need highlighting as 
specific weaknesses. 
9.6.1 The Cases 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of access described in Chapter 4 the set of cases are 
self-selected, UK based volunteers. The fact that all of them were also "reached" 
through consultant contacts is a further narrowing to a bunch of willing participants 
from a population which, in general, were not interested in being studied. Although 
the research is aimed at generalising to theory rather than populations this is, to some 
extent, a philosophical nicety, as what is a theory for if it is not to (deductively) 
generalise to populations? Whilst a small number of cases is a feature of this type of 
5 Bryman, 1988 captures most of the debate between protagonists of different research philosophies. 
while Pettigrew (e. g. 1985 ) is a staunch critic of non-longitudinal studies in process oriented 
research. 
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research it nevertheless remains a burden rather than a boost to the level of surety 
that can be placed on any generalities theoretical or not. 
9.6.2 Respondents 
Of the twelve cases in this research ten are drawn predominantly from the semi- 
structured interviewing of one senior divisional executive. It has been argued that top 
managers, and particularly the Chief Executive, are valid indicators of the "collective 
mind" (Weick and Roberts, 1993) of the organisation (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; 
Hambrick, 1981) particularly if the businesses is either small, specialised or not 
diversified. (Nayyar, 1992; Powell, 1992). Given that a significant amount of 
strategic management research, and particularly survey research, is based on the 
responses of a single company informant it is important that this is so. 
The two cases in this study which incorporate the views of the divisional team and 
business managers (after the initial interview with the DMD) offer a small, internal 
validity check. The several sets of responses indicate that senior manager are 
consistent with each other in their perceptions of the organisation and hence the 
views of any individual senior manager can be taken as a good indicator of the 
overall organisational orientation (enhanced perhaps because of he non-diversified 
nature of the divisions). 
Nevertheless a lot has been accepted and inferred about a complex organisation 
primarily from the responses of one participant. Despite this, confidence in the 
overall findings is based on several factors: 
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1) The themes being pursued by the researcher were not familiar to the 
respondents which, allied to a non-directive approach, reduced the pressure for 
purposive self-serving responses to the researcher's interactions. 
2) The overall findings are based on aggregating the cases into broader 
categories. The consistency within the categories suggested that responses were 
general (indicative of a standard operating climate) and not idiosyncratic in nature. 
i. e. the thematic consistency between the single respondents from different divisions 
increased confidence in the validity of the responses as a divisional indicator. 
3) The internal consistency of the responses of the individual lend support to 
the view that he/she was describing the division as other senior managers would also 
describe it. It would be difficult to operate with others if such a complex, integrated 
divisional perspective was not a shared one. 
None of these -"justifications" deny that each individual has some unique perceptions 
and beliefs. They are aimed to suggest such nuances are more akin to minor 
differences in colour rather than major reorientations in structure and perspective. 
9.6.3 Analysis 
Data collection through semi-structured interviewing has an inherently subjective, 
intuitive element. To this researcher this was highly evident in this study. The 
structure of the interviewing sessions ended up as a comprise between the agenda of 
the researcher, the agenda of the respondent and the interference of that day's reality. 
These were people in high pressure jobs for whom interruption by a management 
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researcher was marginally more attractive than face-to-face discussions with a life 
insurance salesmen. "Analysis" in qualitative research begins as soon as the 
interview commences and is reflected in the direction of the questions, prompts and 
probes. The application of an analytic framework (benefits and systems) serves to 
reduce the already reduced (i. e. pre-analysed) data 6 to a coherent set of variables 
which can be compared across divisions. The researcher, a subjective, intuitive, 
boundedly rational human being is both the instrument of data collection and the 
instrument of analysis, and data collection and analysis are inextricably linked. 
While there can be no cogent dismantling of this limitation it can be ameliorated by 
examining it in broad context of the research and its findings. In terms of general 
64rules of evidence,, 7 it is proposed that the whole hangs together, within the confines 
of what was researched , in a such a way that the overall 
findings are "fairly"8 
grounded in data that others could collect and verify., 
9.7 Further Research 
Three research themes are planned as a continuation of this work; verifying and 
refining the overall findings, testing the related/cooperative perforniance link and 
developing the benefits matrix/ measurement systems for divisional value. 
6 By this I mean that the cases as written up in the thesis are an already reduced (in terms of content 
and structure) version of the case data available. In this sense the cases in the thesis are "pre- 
analysed". The same principle applies to questionnaire research where the questions themselves are a 
form of pre-analysis. 
7 My thanks to my supervisor Professor John McGee for this term. 
8 i. e. not systematically biased towards a pre-judged outcome. 
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9.7.1 Verification and Confirmation 
It needs to be confirmed that categorising divisions as cooperative or non-cooperative 
is empirically valid across a wider set of divisions. As with all such classification it is 
more likely that a continuum exists although the pressure on divisional managers is 
such that "transitional" states might be less likely to exist than more committed 
structures. Getting inside more divisions to more fully explore the business-division 
and business-business relationships is potentially illuminating. 
If a cooperative/non-cooperative dichotomy is confirmed then it should be possible 
to develop a simple diagnostic/classification tool (questionnaire) for divisions and 
other multi-business groupings. This might be a mix of "signs" (i. e. what outsiders 
can see) and "symptoms" (what the organisation describes). 
9.7.2 Testing the Coop erative/Relatedness Performance Link 
This research did not examine perfon-nance but an underlying. propositional thread 
has been that cooperative strategic management is the key to out-performance by 
related businesses. i. e. While the strategic rationale of divisions is economic 
(relatedness, economies of scope) the realisation of synergistic value is organisational 
(cooperative structures and systems). Building on the identification of cooperative 
and non-cooperative divisions performance comparisons are feasible. 
9.7.3 Measurement/ the Benefits Matrix 
Discussions v4th managers both during and after the research attested to the intuitive 
appeal of the creation of membership benefits as the role of divisions and the use of a 
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form of benefits matrix to classify these. But a key element that is missing lies in the 
measurement of the absolute value of a benefit and divisional membership generally. 
Further work is needed to refine the benefits matrix in term of its axes, the nature of 
specific activities consigned to each category and the relative ranking of benefits (and 
hence how they are most appropriately managed). At the same time absolute 
measures of benefit and divisional membership need to be developed. This promises 
to be a difficult but interesting problem. 
9.8 Divisions: Dilemmas and Paradoxes 
Divisions are large commercial enterprises of related businesses and yet the 
divisional level is posted at an organisational cross roads. Divisional managers are 
business-accountable to their corporate superiors but kept out of the business front 
line by their business level subordinates While the corporate level focuses on 
corporate strategy, shareholder, value,, governance, "parenting" advantage, investor 
relations, portfolio planning etc. and the business level concerns itself with business 
strategy, competitive advantage, market positioning, capability development etc. no 
unique strategic role for the division has been generally promulgated or studied. It 
seems however that, more than other levels of the organisation, divisional strategic 
management is concerned with the resolution of various linked paradoxes: 
* Individualism and collectivism must be optimised within one organisational 
framework. The organisational and cultural design imperatives of the M-form, of 
which the typical division is a manifestation, facilitate splitting, autonomy and 
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business optimisation while scope economies, suggested to underpin the potential 
added value of the division, are realised through organisational dynamics of 
conjunction, integration and collectivism. 
* The divisions must exploit the value of relatedness if is to add value over the sum 
of the component businesses and yet this value is not measured. Measurement 
focuses on the individual business. 
* The potential value from relatedness ("synergy") is contingent on appropriate 
management processes and systems but the installation and maintenance of such 
(costly) systems is contingent on the level of potential value from relatedness. 
* At the business level synergy arises from collective, team based dynamics' but 
perceived outstanding individual achievement is a major condition for internal 
advancement. 
In practice the resolution of such paradoxes is fraught with real-world costs and risks 
and, while some divisions are confronting the necessary cultural, organisational and 
psychological complexities, others are staying with a simpler, more clear-cut 
philosophy. 
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Appendix A 
Introductory Letter and Outline 
Dear Mr. 
As the details on the enclosed outline show I am a former executive turned academic 
who is researching divisional strategies. Surprisingly this is an area in which few 
authors have shown interest but which is of major importance in multi-divisional 
companies. 
I have interviewed Divisional CEOs from other major companies but need more 
participants to ensure adequate breadth and depth of the research. GB and I are 
research colleagues and he suggested that your company would be a valuable one to 
include and that you might be persuaded to facilitate one hour interviews with the 
appropriate people. 
I recognize what an imposition this is on you and and interviewees but I do think the 
research is potentially useful for companies such as yours and have found that all the 
executives who have made themselves available have found the questions and issues 
covered both relevant and interesting. If there is any good news it is that I am not 
selling time share, insurance or even management education at Warwick! 
The university is currently out of term so I have enclosed my personal communication 
information as I am easier to contact via my home. I will follow up this letter in a few 
days by calling your PA to find out your response and, -in 
the event that you can help, 
to get details, arrange contacts etc. 
Sincerely, 
Chris Smith 
A-1 
The Research Proposal 
Strategic Management and Strategic Influence at the Divisional Level 
Management training and education teach that there are three levels of strategy: 
"corporate", "business" and "functional". Consequently books about the multi- 
divisional firm present the divisional general manager as a "middleman" co- 
ordinating business units and integrating business strategies with that from corporate. 
This view may have been true for multi-divisionals in the 1950s and '60s. Experience 
suggests, however, that in the turbulent world of the '90s, divisional management 
must offer something more distinctive to the strategic capability of the company than 
co-ordination and integration. "Divisional" strategy may need to taken into account as 
a uniquely valuable fourth level. 
The research project aims to develop more sophisticated theory about the distinctive 
strategic contribution of the division and to develop practical managerial implications 
from this deeper understanding. It Arill address such questions as: 
" What are the key features of the divisional role in developing the strategic 
capability and orientation of the company? 
" How do divisional managers describe this role? 
" How do they implement it? 
" What factors and circumstances affect this role over time? 
How do these roles vary between divisions? 
How do these roles vary between companies? 
The research offers several potential benefits. 
Description of the distinctive role of divisional management should help companies 
understand the role better and thus support and develop the unique perspective it 
offers. 
Highlighting the role as being more than a "middleman7 will help focus the 
education and training of potential divisional managers on the more distinctive, 
value-adding aspects of the position. 
Clarification of the role and various influencing factors will help practising 
divisional managers understand the impact of corporate and divisional change 
within their firm and enable them to foresee the adjustments necessary to optimise 
their contribution. 
A-2 
Research Process: 
The research is based on confidential* interviews with divisional general managers. It 
is envisaged that interviews will take ftom one to one and a half hours. 
* In the publication of the research it is planned to use verbatim comments of 
interviewees to illustrate themes and issues. The identities of interviewees and their 
companies, however, will be disguised. All company-specific content and any other 
matter that will tend to identify the interviewee and the company will be changed. 
Warwick Business School. 
Warwick Business School at the University of Warwick is one of the UK's foremost 
business research and teaching institutions. Within the School the Centre for 
Corporate Strategy and Change (CCSC) has focused on ongoing strategic 
developments within large companies. Strategy development and management within 
multi-business/multi-divisional firms and the role of the corporate centre are areas of 
particular interest within CCSC under its current Director, Professor John McGee. 
The Researcher: 
Chris Smith is a married, 48 year old who lives near Stfatford-upon-Avon with his 
wife Marlene. He started his industrial career in personnel roles with Simpsons Ltd, a 
major Australian whitegoods company, and progressed with them to general 
management in Adelaide and then in Sydney. He moved to Melbourne to work as 
General Manager (Films) within the Plastics Division of ICI (Australia). Later he 
returned to consumer goods as Managing Director- Britax Child-Care Products a 
subsidiary of BSG International p1c. With BSG he came to the UK in the role of 
Divisional Managing Director - Consumer Products Division. In 1994 he left 
corporate life for an academic one. 
He is currently studying, researching and teaching at Warwick Business School. 
A-3 
Appendix B 
Consultant's Introductory Letter 
Managing Director 
Dear A 
I trust all progresses well at the company -I have followed recent UK moves in the 
press with some interest. I believe you will be interested in talking with Chris Smith, 
one of my research colleagues based at Warwick. He is after an hour with you as 
someone working at the divisional level - and I have no doubt his findings will be of 
interest to you. He is particularly interested in the influences between the local people 
and corporate. 
Details are attached but I have given Chris your telephone number and he will contact 
you. 
Best wishes 
B-1 
Appendix C 
Interview Guide - Divisional Level 
A. Divisional Value-Added: 
"at is the nature and source of valuefor a husiness unitfrom heingpart of the 
division? 
"at value does the divisional level add? 
Probe/pro=ts. 
business value/competitive advantage/business strategy; source of group value greater 
than the sum of the parts; membership benefits; divisional value to the individual 
business; loss of value if business left; value to new acquisitions; value added by 
divisional level; the relatedness of the businesses and how this creates value;; changes 
ove time; specific examples; 
B. Divisional Management Orientation and Practice: 
"at are the principles andpractices in place to achieve divisional value? 
e Managerial Philosophy. 
"at are the overallprinciples of managing the division? 
Probe/prompts. 
0 divisional vision; divisional strategy; value achieved; business separate/linked; stand- 
alone/integrated; divisional strategy; scope of businesses; 
centralisation/decentralisation; overall divisional level role; teams/individuals; role of 
corporate; changes; 
e Divisional Functions, Services and Resources. 
"at specific value-adding help does the divisional levelprovide? 
Probe/pro=-ts. 
role of DMD; other roles/functions of divisional staff; services to businesses; 
augmenting/replacing business functions; shared activities; distribution; brand; push, 
plea or persuasion; matrix; behavioural (operational)/outcome intervention; vertical 
linkages; plans; budgets; changes; 
C-1 
o Pan-Divisional Structures, Systems and Processes. 
How are the businesses linked to each other and to divisional goals? 
Probe/prompts. 
integrating inechanisms, horizontal linkages meetings; business level 'divisional' 
roles; staff translocation; pan-divisional processes/systems; vertical/horizontal; sharing 
skills; pan-divisional training; IT systems; task forces; matrix; changes; 
measurement systems finance/non-finance; group/individual; corporate requirements; 
changes; 
incentive systent: link with divisional results; group/individual based; finance/non- 
finance targets; outcome/behavioural control; changes; 
C-2 
Appendix D 
Interview Guide - Business Level 
A. Source of Business Value 
How does the business aim to create value? 
Probes/prompts. - 
competitive strategy; competitive advantage; differentiation/cost; market position; 
capabilities/competencies/resources; role of MD; 
B. Source of Divisional Value 
"at are the henefits to the husiness in heingpart of the division? 
Probes/pro=ts. - 
source of group value greater than the sum of the parts; membership benefits; 
divisional value to the individual business; loss of value if business left; value to new 
acquisitions; value added by divisional level; the likenesses of the businesses that 
create value; disadvantages of membership; tensions/difficulties; size; 
reputation/brand; knowledge/learning; guidance/advice; specific examples; change; 
C. Mechanisms of Divisional Value 
How is divisional value-added maintained? 
Probes/promp-ts: 
mechanisms; structure; divisional functions/resources/services; centralised activities; 
training/development; inter-business linkages; common systems/processes; meetings; 
staff exchange; IT links; change; 
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Appendix E 
Interview Guide - Functional Level 
A. Contibution to Business Value 
nat is your role? 
How does the role add to husiness value? 
Probe/prompts: 
role description; business strategy; business value-added; links with other functions in 
the business; 
B. Divisional Membership Benefits 
-P Value 
What value is added in your role by being part of the division? 
Probe/promp-ts-- 
membership benefits-business/role; guidance, sharing; added resources; 
knowledgeAearning; 
o Mechanisms 
How is this value added? 
Probe/prompLs: 
Divisional functions/services; links with other businesses; professional 
development/training; visits; staff sharing; translocation; pan-divisional task forces; 
best practice dissemination; 
structured/unstructured; networking; 
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Appendix F 
Divisional Strategic Analysis Report 
Division F2 
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... as long as the person running the 
business is a good all-roundperformer 
I don't see that you can add value to that. Ifeel ourjob at the centre is erely 
to put in place the correct person to run that business and don't get involved 
anymore. Andjust make sure we monitor thefinancial activity. " 
"Ijust don't think we can capitalise on the our brand name the way Ford 
can. " 
"7he essence of thisjob is to run it like it's my own business. It's important 
that we have that delegation down because you need relationships with the 
local community, you need to understand how the local community operates, 
you need continuity in the line management in the dealership because 
reputation is everything. " 
"John and Paul come round and say ývou've been a good boy, you got 
budget', 
but how do we know I couldn't have done better? 
CS. - "How does beingpart of the division help with your competitive 
advantage? " 
MD: .......... it doesn't really. 
Overview 
The divisional value-added of the division revolves around the market position it is 
attaining through the movements of the major car manufacturers towards fewer 
franchise holders. This value is being enhanced by the portfolio development activities 
of the divisional team. This market position is a group benefit based on economies of 
scale as are the gains from centralised, bulk buying of consumables and the cheaper 
finance available to larger users. Some shared activity benefits will accrue when a 
common computer system is in place. Team benefits are ad hoc and not purposively 
managed and guidance benefits based on supervisory management of dealership MDs 
and the cross-pollination of best practice. 
The stategic management orientation of the division is strongly towards unit 
optimisation with the value adding management role of the senior level lying mainly in 
the governance of dealership performance and crisis intervention with under- 
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performers. The entrepreneurial value of the senior role lies in the development of the 
division as a business and the establishment of performance hurdles for dealerships 
which are above industry average Other than a competent local Managing Director for 
each dealership there has been little attempt to manage business capability in a pan- 
divisional way. The relatively recent 'kaizen' role is unlikely affect this in the long 
term unless the cultural orientation of the divisional level changes to match the 
interventionist stance required to make pan-divisional processes successful. This 
would entail a major culture change throughout the organisation where the value of 
stand-alone functioning has become a fundamental belief for most MDs. 
The apparent relatedness of business units is exceptionally high at product/market and 
resource/capability levels. The perceived strategic primacy of local markets, however, 
over-fides the value of business linkages and pan-divisional competences. A pan- 
divisional orientation is also seen as secondary to the primacy and power of the 
manufacturers in terms of product supply, brand development and business process 
improvement. 
A divisional sense of stewardship on behalf of more potent 'owners' (i. e. the car 
manufacturers) militates against a strong divisional identity. A sense of local 
ownership at business level has the same effect. 
Divisional Value Factors: 
Business Relatedness 
" The dealerships have the same strategic focus in selling the same products and 
services to the same market segments under the sarde market, industry and 
economic forces. 
" The same functions, processes and technologies are in use. 
" The dealerships report on the same issues and outputs in standardised fashion. 
" The critical success factor in the dealerships is seen to be localised customer 
service and relationships and business opportunism. 
The prime competence is seen to be the dealership managing director. 
Linkages 
" The prime intra-divisional linkages comprise meetings between the dealership head 
and his manager. 
" On a regular but infrequent basis functional managers from the dealerships meet as 
a group to exchange views. 
" On a regular basis the MDs of the main marque dealerships meet as a group. 
" Throughout the division there are cliques of MDs. who network and share 
information and practice. 'Information' is probably more in line with 'intelligence'. 
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Membership Benefits: 
Group 
" Cheaper finance 
" Possible buying power 
Activities 
* Shared computer system planned 
Team 
" Infrequent meetings of departmental heads. 
" Informal networks of alliances predominantly at MD level. 
" Pan-divisional sales incentive programme run by one of the business MDs. 
Guidance 
" CEOs acting as guide, counsellor, director, cross pollinator etc. with a 
predominantly administrative value orientation, i. e. governance and crisis 
intervention. 
" New divisional 'kaizen' staff are yet to have a pan-divisional impact. The mismatch 
between divisional intervention and the strong stand-alone culture is a major 
barrier to long term effectiveness. 
Chris Smith 
30 October 1997 
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